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David Hume's theory of justice: a defence of the establishment without recourse to 
the argument for the Divine Right of Kings, or a workable guiding principle of 
legitimate and lasting government? 
David Hume' political philosophy has a strongly paternalistic feel, leading to a 
misconception of Hume as a conservative thinker with little to contribute in the 
field of political philosophy beyond a defence of the status quo. This Thesis assesses 
the extent to which Hume's work can help us understand his world and our own. 
Chapter One dwells on the personality of David Hume, as a prerequisite to a fuller 
understanding of the intentions and significance of his work. Includes: Hume's 
ambition; his concern for accuracy (and restraint from empty rhetoric); his caution; 
his objectivity (demonstrated by his greed for independence; his emotional side 
(including an introduction to the idea of Hume as agnostic rather than strictly an 
atheist as he is - still - often characterised); his attitude towards the truth. 
Chapter Two moves onto an examination of relevant parts of Hume's general 
philosophy, forming the beginning of Hume's theory of justice. 
Chapter Three concerns the impact of Hume's general philosophy on his politics. 
Hume's theory of just government is rooted in his general thoughts on morality, which 
are characterised by a scepticism sometimes mistaken for cynicism. Hume dismisses 
the idea of an original and binding Contract of Government. In Hume's political 
philosophy man has the capacity for improvement and progress without being 
restrained by the past. Justice underscores civil society, which is about mutual 
protection - peace is justice. Justice is not necessarily about democracy, although 
Hume is not challenging the possibility of legitimate government authority. 
Key questions: What does Hume mean by stability in government? Is Hume right 
about Justice? What precisely does Hume mean by self-interest? Was Hume a 
democrat? 
Chapter Four Conclusion: concluding comments on Hume's philosophy of the state. 
Hume shares Hobbes' objective of non-ideological government. Hume w£is wary of 
change, especially if it was in accordance with some grand plan for society and / or 
mankind (which tended to mean revolution). Includes: the crucial role of property in 
Hume's jurisprudence, empirical evidence from history to support this and other 
claims; more on the political culture in Hume's fimctional civil society, including a 
look at how Hume uses the Aristotelean distinction between man and citizen; the 
practical aspects of his theory of justice in government; conclusion that Hume's 
theory of justice is a theory of property, and that this is because self-interest drives all 
men. 
Key questions: What is Hume's "common sense"? Has Hume identified the elusive, 
verifiable moral absolute? Can we derive a workable principle of civil society from 
Hume's analysis? Did David Hume fulfil his lofty intellectual ambitions? 
David Hume's theory of justice: a defence of the establishment 
without recourse to the argtunent for the Divine Right of Kings, or a 
workable guiding principle of legitimate and lasting government? 
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INTRODUCTION 
A study of Hume's philosophy of the state in the context of 
his general understanding of human nature. 
"I content myself with knowing perfectly the manner in 
which objects affect my senses, and their connection with 
each other as far as experience teaches me. This suffices 
for the conduct of life; and this also suffices for my 
philosophy, which pretends only to explain the nature and 
causes of our perceptions, or impressions and ideas." 
A Treatise of Human Nature (Book I Part n Section V) 
David Hume's works are driven by his innate curiosity, compassion -
and fear. He feared certain "philosophical" (ie completist) theories of 
politics. By attempting to be total and authoritative in one's 
prescriptions for society's ills one proposes a solution that is, 
invariably in some way or other, authoritarian. Good government 
must be rooted in the circumstances in which it finds itself. In this 
way Hume can be read as a rejection of a certain Platonism of 
Aristotle that suggests that there is one ideal way to govern a state 
that supersedes all others, and that is derived from a divine morality 
that pre-empts and exists "outside" humanity. Hume's organic 
approach to reform stems from the terrible consequences of 
instability caused by radicalism in practice. Given the circumstances 
of Hume's dayi this means that both religious fundamentalism and 
assertive nationalism (in effect the same phenomenon of human 
behaviour masked by different symbols), are fundamentally bad ways 
to live and/or govern. The same evidence exists today as then, 
sometimes less close to home but acutely visible to anyone following 
the daily news. 
Inequalities of resources, both personal and material, are 
consequences of genetic diversity and social environment. In Hume's 
day science could only wildly dream of what is so nearly possible 
today in terms of the manipulation of the former of these factors. As 
regards the second. Equality is a nebulous subject, all things to all 
men, and as amassed in contradictions as the battle cries of Liberty 
and Democracy. 
Hume addressed these grand subjects by attempting to lay down a 
workable principle of government, and this became his theory of 
Justice. This was based around his belief in man's interest in peace. 
Not all men recognise this interest for themselves. Hume's political 
philosophy has a strongly paternalistic feel. This functional peace 
and harmony was attainable and sustainable through 
a respect for property 
a respect for law and the authority of those most able to administer 
and 
an approach to reforming citizenship and government that was 
considered and organic rather than dramatic and radical. In the case 
of dealing with revolt, the balance must be fairly utilitarian: is more 
' Of which I will say more later. 
^ Platonic paternalism again. 
death and unhappiness to be caused by repressing insurrection or by 
allowing the goals of the insurgency to come about? 
This Thesis examines some of the characteristics of the man that 
have bearing on his philosophy, the philosophical motivations behind 
Hume's political theory, and a consideration of the implications of his 
property-based theory of non-absolutist justice. 
Amongst the more common traits of Enlightenment philosophy are an 
interest in (1) an epistemology dominated by "psychology" (i.e. 
theories of human nature), and (2) a practical perspective for this 
theorising. These features form the basis for discussion in this 
thesis, though the subject matter of Hume's political thought 
occupies ostensibly the last category alone. This introduction will 
attempt to explain the significance of these wider criteria. 
Hume claimed to revel in the pleasures of ideas, of thinking for 
thinking's sake: 
"I cannot forbear having a curiosity to be acquainted with the principles of moral 
good and evil, the nature and foundation of government, and the cause of those 
several passions and inclinations, which actuate and govern me. I am uneasy to 
think 1 approve of one object and disapprove of another; call one thing beautiful, and 
another deform'd; decide concerning truth and falshood, reason and folly, without 
knowing upon what principles I proceed ... These sentiments spring up naturally in 
my present disposition; and shou'd I endeavour to banish them, by attaching myself 
to any other business or diversion, I feel 1 shou'd be a loser in point of pleasure; and 
this is the origin of my philosophy."3 
Indeed he devoted considerably more words to theoretical analysis 
than to didactic pronouncements. Yet i t is clear from his letters that 
he was highly motivated by the idea of upsetting "the zealots": 
"I wantonly exposed myself to the rage of both civil and religious factions"'' 
He was a man of affairs and a self-proclaimed "citizen of the world".^ 
Amongst other things he served at the British embassy in Paris, 
tutored the insane Marquis of Annandale, and participated in various 
military expeditions. 
The broad characteristics described above are prevalent in the work 
of, amongst others. Bacon, Hobbes, Locke and Berkeley. This 
methodology was also certainly typical of Hume's approach. Bacon 
believed that knowledge, properly attained, was power. Proper 
attainment meant that there were three stages to true knowledge; a 
'Hume, 1978,p. 271. 
'in Braham, 1987, p. 14. 
'Burton, 1967,p. 237. 
recognition of the vulnerability of human perception as the tool of 
observation, the use of experience in inductive reasoning, and the 
need for logical progression of statements and conclusions, without 
recourse to leaps of faith (beyond that of the first instance). The 
sentiment that the practical value to man of such power is in material 
advancement, is echoed throughout Hume's work. In particular at 
first appearance his theory of justice is tantamount to a theory of 
property. A discussion of this and similar issues will form the 
structure of the later sections of this Thesis. 
All of Hume's work is preoccupied with a healthy scepticism, an 
empirical approach, and logical progressions of thought. It was his 
unusual rejection of history as a means for fighting the battles of the 
present. He brought a challenge to those who had hitherto, and those 
who have subsequently, upheld the maxim that history is written by 
the victors and held little truck with thinkers who started from their 
prejudices and worked back. It was this attitude that led him to write 
at the outset of The Natural Historii of ReliQion proposing the idea of 
the design argument as self-evident in the manner of Locke^ ... and 
then to conclude that book by acknowledging that one could assume 
no such thing.7 
This thesis is an assessment of Hume's political theory rather than 
his general philosophy. Hume's thoughts on social and political 
matters are principally located in Book III of the Treatise of Human 
Nature, the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, the Essays 
Moral and Political, and in the History of England.^ The 
circumstances of his time are also essential since they allow us, 
centuries later, to put a context on the words that can often be 
misinterpreted. However it is a tribute to his remarkable consistency 
of thought that a proper assessment of his thinking can be made in 
the context of his moral and natural philosophies, which are 
referenced accordingly throughout. Following from this it is logical 
to conclude that his personality too is key to an appreciation of his 
work. Part of the implication of this Thesis - though too complex an 
issue to do more than suggest here - is that it is at best incomplete to 
attempt to grasp the significance of the thought of a great thinker by 
viewing him or her exclusively through a study of his or her best 
known works. Even reading an entire oeuvre would deny the fact that 
* "As every enquiry, which regards religion, is of the utmost importance, there are two questions in particular, 
which challenge our attention, to wit, that concerning its foundation in reason, and that concerning its origin in 
human nature. Happily, the first question, which is the most important, admits of the most obvious, at least, 
the clearest, solution. The whole frame of nature bespeaks an intelligent author; and no rational enquirer can, 
after serious reflection, suspend his disbelief a moment with regard to the primary principles of genuine 
Theism and Religion" (Hume, 1967, p. 31). 
' "The whole is a riddle, an aenigma, an inexplicable mystery. Doubt, uncertainty, suspense of judgement 
appear the only result of our most accurate scrutiny, concerning this subject" (Hume, 1967, p. 98). 
* See Bibliography for Editions used. 
when the author writes a treatise, he writes of himself; an 
appreciation of the history of the author himself throws perspective 
on his writings. As Braham writes: 
"What the author writes must be viewed through a study of his personality'^ 
This is not intended to develop into an amateur essay in 
psychoanalysis. The origins of Hume's personality are not at issue 
here. Instead it is the impact of his personality and circumstances on 
his work that are under examination at the start of this exploration of 
the bases of his political theories. Ultimately it is the legacy of the 
man not the man himself that we seek. And in this case one suspects 
that that is what the man himself would have wanted. 
''Braham, 1987,p. 24. 
Chapter 1 
The Personality of Da'vid Hume 
"Every one, who is acquainted with the Philosophers or 
Critics, knows that ... they contain little more than endless 
Disputes, even in the most fundamental Articles. Upon 
examination of these. I foimd a certain Boldness of Temper 
... which was not enclin'd to submit to any Authority in 
these Subjects, but led me to seek out some new medium, 
by which Truth might be establisht." 
A Kind ofHistom of My Life, 1734 
"It is difficult for a man to speak long of himself without 
vanity; therefore. I shall be short. It may be thought an 
instance of vanity that I pretend at all to write my life; but 
... the first success of most of my writings was not such as 
to be an object of vanity" 
Mil Own Life, 1777 
Hume's ambition 
From his teenage years Hume claims that he believed he had 
something to contribute to what appeared to be a nascent science: 
"I found that everyone consulted his fancy in erecting schemes of virtue and 
happiness without regarding human nature, upon which every moral conclusion 
must depend. This, therefore, I resolved to make my principal study, and the source 
from which I would derive every truth in criticism, as well as morality."'° 
He was not a populist but he did want his work to be popular, i.e. 
accessible, widely read - and influential: 
"And though I am much more ambitious of being esteemed a friend of virtue than a 
writer of taste, yet I must always carry the latter in my eye, otherwise I must ever 
despair of being serviceable to virtue."" 
What makes good philosophy? In Hume's eyes it is clear that it 
requires a scientific methodology, testing hypotheses rather than 
pursuing pre-judged polemics. Hume wanted to stimulate, inspire, as 
much by asking questions and challenging the orthodoxy of the 
fanatic as by providing curriculum answers: 
"We must, therefore, proceed like those, who being in search of any thing that lies 
conceal'd from them, and not finding it in the place they expected, beat about all 
the neighbouring fields, without any certain view or design, in hopes their good 
fortune will at last guide them to what they search for."'2 
Hume was an evangelist of a fashion, fighting the tyranny of 
indolence - but a refreshingly humble one: 
"I assure you that, without running any of the heights of scepticism, I am apt in cool 
hour to suspect in general that most of my reasonings will be more useful by 
furnishing hints and exciting people's curiosity than as containing any principles 
that will augment the stock of knowledge that must pass to future ages."'3 
Hume's aim was not to let ignorance and intolerance suffocate the 
potential of people to make their own decisions. It is playing the 
game that matters most. The means do not justify the end. In this 
sense the end does not matter at all, since it never comes, can never 
come, for the true philosopher-agnostic. The means affirm life in 
themselves. Cogito ergo sum? Precisely; to think, even in the 
pursuit of a dubious goal, is better than blind acceptance, which to 
him represented little more than an abdication of humanity: 
"There cannot be two passions more nearly resembling each other than those of 
hunting and philosophy, whatever disproportion may at first sight appear between 
'"In Burton, 1967, p. 35. 
" In Burton, 1967, p. 113. 
'^Hume, 1978, p. 77-8. 
'^Hume, 1964, p. 226. 
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them. To make the parallel more complete, we may observe that though in both 
cases the end of our action may in itself be despised, yet in the heat of the action we 
acquire such an attention to this end that we are very uneasy under any 
disappointments, and are sorry we either miss our game or fall into any error in our 
reasoning. 
To blindly accept is to dwell in the realm of the zealot. One might 
not exaggerate Hume by suggesting that i t is vital that we should 
travel, and equally vital that we should never let ourselves think 
finally and definitively that we have arrived. Arrival represents the 
"discovery" of the one true way, to which all others must yield "for 
their own good". The issue of forcing men to be free probably should 
have been a key source in the dramatic falling out between Hume and 
Rousseau, though in fact i t was more a personal affair (see pp. 18-19). 
Still though we must have government, and a constituent part of a 
government's authority is its position as the dominant physical force 
in the land.^^ How this is achieved is another issue (see Chapters III 
& IV for more on this subject). 
Perhaps the most important and obvious moments of self-analysis 
within Hume's works comes at the end of the last chapter of Book I of 
the Treatise. It is the key to his endeavours, and to mine in this 
Thesis. In it he concludes after much soul-searching that: 
(1) The path of reason, as a source of knowledge, has in fact many 
branches, since its origin is in the imagination, based upon 
empirical induction: 
"Experience is a principle, which instructs me in the several conjunctions of objects 
for the past. Habit is another principle, which determines me to expect the same for 
the future; and both of them conspiring to operate upon the imagination, make me 
form certain ideas in a more intense and lively manner, than others, which are not 
attended by the same advantages" 
Our own exercises in lateral thinking reveal this much to us.^'' There 
are simply more reasons than excuses. Reason is an obedient dog 
that does its master's bidding. It provides for us answers that are 
products of our desires and fears - our imaginations. 
(2) We can't trust our imagination either, for the same reason! 
'"Hume, 1964, p. 226. 
Hume tended not to distinguish between government and state in his writings, preferring instead to 
distinguish factional representation under the banner of "parties"; I have followed this nomenclature in this 
Thesis. 
'*Hume, 1978, p. 265. 
For example, when we seek to persuade someone who we pity that their cloud has a silver lining, or 
someone who we envy that their silver lining has a cloud. 
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(3) Hume does not accept the conclusion that one might logically 
take, that "no refin'd or elaborate reasoning is ever to be received", 
and slip into solipsism. We cannot avoid the dilemma of uncertainty: 
"We have, therefore, no choice left but betwixt a false reason and none at all."*^ 
If we are to make practical judgements then we should talk as 
ordinary people, since it is of them whom we speak, with all of their 
propensity to belief and credulousness over the proper scepticism-
agnosticism of the philosopher. 
Progress was vital to Hume, for he was an optimist: 
"These are the sentiments of my spleen and indolence; and indeed I must confess 
that philosophy has nothing to oppose to them, and expects a victory more from the 
returns of a serious good-humour'd disposition, than from the force of reason and 
conviction."20 
We must carry through our arguments to their conclusion, before 
retracing our steps to see how far we have come, and how much was 
illusion, in terms of the desired effects and measurable outcomes that 
they create. Hume's methodology of belief is a restatement of the 
idea that "the end justifies the means", where the consequences 
qualify the validity of the original belief: 
"Where reason is lively, and mixes itself with some propensity, it ought to be 
assented to. Where it does not, it can never have any title to operate upon us"2i 
'^Hume, 1978, p. 268. 
" That is to say, non-philosophers. 
Hume, 1978, p. 270. 
^'Hume, 1978, p. 270. 
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Hume's accuracy 
Examples abound of Hume's preoccupation with not being vulnerable 
to criticism, especially of pandering to this or that faction. He was 
clearly proud of his independence. The claim that history is 
invariably written by the winners would have been like a red rag to a 
bull for Hume. This was particularly true of his Historic of England, 
on revisions of which he noted: 
"But though I had been taught by experience that the Whig party were in possession 
of bestowing all places, both in the State and in literature, I was so little inclined to 
yield to their senseless clamour that in above a hundred alterations, which further 
study, reading or reflection engaged me to make in the reigns of the first two 
Stuarts, I have made all of them invariably to the Tory side. It is ridiculous to 
consider the English constitution before that period as a regular plan of liberty."22 
The same pride in meticulousness and objectivity applied to his other 
work. Immediately after completing the Essaus he consulted Adam 
Smith for suggested improvements,23 and was correcting manuscripts 
right up unti l his death. He was similarly indignant i f accused, as by 
one Dr. Brown, his work was purely for financial gain: 
"I fancy Brown will find it a difficult matter to persuade the public that I do not 
speak my sentiments on every subject I handle, and that 1 have any view to any 
interest whatever. "^4 
When accused of inaccuracies he responded to his publisher robustly: 
"It is said by a Mr. Chas. Townsend that my history of the Stuarts is full of gross 
blunders in the facts, and that a Mr. Dyson, Clerk to the House of Commons, said so. 
You may tell Mr. Dyson that there is nothing in the world 1 desire so much as to be 
informed of my errors, and I should be extremely obliged if they were pointed out to 
me."25 
What were the consequences of his desire to be a good philosopher-
historian? Throughout his work Hume resists rhetoric. There are no 
anthems here of the type that Rousseau and Marx used so effectively. 
Is this an indication of sincerity? It certainly shows a desire not to 
mislead factually compared to the bending of the truth one associates 
with the factional politician. This is an important point. Hume 
considered himself a historian and a philosopher. 
He reveals as much in his letter to William More where he discusses 
the importance for him in his work to be "true and impartial".26 is 
"My Own Life", in Norton et al, 1993, p. 354. 
"You must not be so engrossed in your own book as never to mention mine": "Letter to Adam Smith", in 
Burton, 1967. 
In Burton, 1967. 
^Mn Burton, 1967, p. 133. 
*^ In Birkbeck Hill, Life and Letters of David Hume, p. 186. 
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there such a thing as the orphan idea? If not then we are all 
collectors of ideas, each in our own way. If we are to progress - it is 
so important to Hume that we should - then we must be surefooted as 
possible over them even as we try to step beyond them, as our eyes 
become accustomed to the dimly l i t paths all around us. For the 
empiricist, the relationship is clearer still: 
"This anxiety for correctness was a mark of his strict regard for truth."^^ 
Time and time again Hume is concerned in his political essays with 
the provision of actual examples to support his theories. His opinion 
of useful political theory was as a branch of history characterised by 
its perceptive analysis of affairs of state rather than by the 
detachment of an abstract art: 
"Nothing is more dangerous to reason than the flights of the imagination, and 
nothing has been the occasion of more mistakes among philosophers. Men of bright 
fancies may in this respect be compar'd to those angels, whom the scripture 
represents as covering their eyes with their wings. This has already appear'd in so 
many instances, that we may spare ourselves the trouble of enlarging upon it any 
farther. "28 
It was on this basis that Hume's arguments, particularly in his essays 
are regularly supported by actual historical examples, a density of 
which far exceeds that of Rousseau in his Social Contract or for that 
matter, Plato in his Republic. 
In Braham 1987, p. 32. 
Hume, 1978, p. 267. 
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Hume's caution 
Again for the sake of "scientific" progress Hume's work is a study in 
objectivity. Burton notes how free from hypothesis the Treatise is in 
its reference to the physical sciences. Few of his claims in this area 
are refutable two hundred and sixty years later. Similar caution is 
exhibited in his historical enquiries and religious debates: 
"I beg the reader to allow me the liberty of supposing it such."29 
"1 want time to read and think, to correct, to look backwards and forwards, and 
adopt the most moderate and reasonable sentiments on all subjects."3° 
Again and again he resists dogma in his Treatise: 
"I must not conclude this subject of behef without noting that 'tis very difficult to 
talk of the operations of the mind with perfect propriety and exactness."3' 
Such reluctance to condemn featured in his personal life. When he 
heard of his publisher sending a manuscript using an untrustworthy 
courier he wrote of his concern but signed off saying: 
"Yet I do not naturally suspect you of imprudence ... I must hear a little further 
before I pronounce"32 
29 Hume, 1978, p. 76. 
'° In Burton, 1967, p. 94. 
'^ Hume, 1978, p. 105. 
"Letter to Millar from Paris", 23'" April 1764, in Burton, 1967, p. 202. 
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Hume's objectivity 
" T i s easier to forebear al l examination and inquiry, than to check ourselves in so 
natura l a propensity, and guard against that assurance , which always arises from an 
exact and full survey of a n object. On s u c h a n occasion we are apt not only to forget 
our scepticism, but even our modesty too; and make use of s u c h terms as these, 'fis 
evident, 'tis certain, 'tis undeniable; which a due deference to the public ought, 
perhaps, to prevent. I may have fallen into this fault after the example of others [he 
had]; but I ... declare that s u c h expressions were extorted from me by the present 
view of the object, and imply no dogmatical spirit, nor conceited idea of my own 
judgement, wh ich are sentiments that I am sensible can become no body, and a 
sceptic still less than any other."33 
Burton notes Hume's studied detachment in his Histories, such that 
they do not suggest "either the district or the country of origin" of 
their author.34 They were written in self-imposed exile, away from 
the personalising impact of friends and family. There is very little 
recorded evidence to suggest that Hume took counsel in developing 
his philosophy. Until after publication, that is, at which point he was 
voracious in seeking comment and reaction. 
Most of Hume's intellectual borrowing seem to have come from the 
dead rather than the living, and as aJready noted he was proud of his 
self-reliance. This appears to have been at the core of his identity 
and of his expressions of i t in his writings. When writing of his 
travels across a Europe "seething with war''35 he maintains a proper 
historical perspective rather than becoming excited about the impact 
that these events might have on his person, his friends, colleagues 
and countrymen.36 The objectivity in his work with the military 
expeditions can also be regarded as no more than the balance one 
would expect from someone employed as an administrative observer. 
Whilst in truth this proves little more than that he was good at his 
job, it is indicative of the temperament of the man that this should be 
the sort of job to which he was suited. 
Hume, 1978, p. 273-4. 
'^^ Braham, 1987, p. 9. 
Braham, 1987, p. 36. 
Though he was not particularly patriotic, beyond the occasional stout defence of Scottish literary tradition. 
After the poor public reception of his early work he wrote that "had not the war at that time been breaking out 
between France and England, I had certainly retired to some provincial town of the former kingdom, have 
changed my name, and never more have returned to my native country." (Hume's "My Own Life", in Braham 
1987, p. 11). 
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What of his other jobs, in particular his infamous tenure of the post of 
tutor to the insane Marquis of Annandale? Why did Hume take on 
this employment that had so little synergy with his driving ambition 
for intellectual significance? On examination there seems little room 
for doubt that the motive was money.^^ Does this mean that Hume 
was a greedy man? Hume was possessed of a healthy level of greed, 
but not in a materialistic sense. His life was typically led in thrifty 
comfort rather than opulence, or even pretence at such. Whilst at the 
embassy in Paris he wrote to a friend saying: 
"I am misplaced ... I w i sh twice or thrice a day for my easy chair and my retreat at 
St. J a m e s ' Square. Never think, dear Ferguson, that as long as you are master of 
your own fireside and your own time you can indeed be unhappy, or that any other 
c i rcumstances can make a n addition to your enjoyment.'^s 
Hume's greed was for independence. He was of "good family''39 but, 
at a personal level, of "slender fortune" owing to the fact that he was 
not a first son and had little means to support him when he started 
his life as a scholar. Only late in life did his fortune catch up with his 
fame. 
Hume clearly felt that to engage in the pamphleteering and petty 
squabbling of many of his peers would demean him and more 
importantly his work: 
"1 found, by Dr . Warburton's railing, that the books were beginning to be esteemed in 
good company. However, I had fixed a resolution, which I inflexibly maintained, 
never to reply to anybody; and, not being very irascible in my temper, I have easily 
kept myself clear of al l literary squabbles."'"^ 
During his life, especially after his (mild) breakdown (detailed in his 
"A Kind of History of My Life"4i) his was a very level balance. One 
notable exception to this level-headed clarity appears to have been 
his experiences in Paris, accompanying Lord Hertford as acting 
ambassador. At one point he announces blissfully that in that city " I 
feed on ambrosia and walk on flowers". Yet he also observes that in 
that city: 
" See especially Burton, 1967, p. 194 - 199. 
In Burton, 1967, p. 173. 
'^ "My father's family is a branch of the Earl of Home's, or Hume's; and my ancestors had been proprietors of 
the estate which my brother possessed for several generations. My mother was daughter of Sir David 
Falconer, President of the College of Justice; the title of Lord Halkerton came by succession to her brother." 
(in Braham 1987, p. 7). 
In Braham 1987, p. 10. In 1761 he did respond, on request, to an aggressive response to his essay "Of 
Miracles" by the Reverend Hugh Blair, but ends the letter on a profoundly conciliatory note: "1 would 
therefore wish for the future, whenever my good fortune throws me in your way, that these topics should be 
forborne between us." I would suggest that this however does rather seem to be a case of the exception 
proving the rule... (in Hume, 1932, Vol. I, p.351). 
In Norton et al., 1993, pp. 345-50. 
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"All things appear so m u c h alike that I am afraid of falling into total stoicism and 
indifference about everything."'•a 
This is a good example of Hume's general ambivalence towards the 
world of employment in general. Paid employment was never more 
than a means to an end, to the intellectualism he considered his true 
calling. 
All of these examples demonstrate the independence towards which 
Hume the man seems to have been naturally inclined and Hume the 
academic considered so professionally important. 
Hume's emotional side 
It would be wrong to conclude from the above that Hume was a coldly 
analytical man. His theories were presented in a climate of academic 
rigour. Yet they were determined at heart by his strongest feelings. 
He himself observed the inevitability of this. All rational arguments 
start with assumptions based on the emotions that drive the 
imagination. 
In particular Hume held the Roman Catholic Church in some 
contempt as the arch-orthodoxy historically built on a bedrock of 
zealotry and amounting to little more than superstition and 
propaganda. He was similarly scathing towards other denominations 
such as the Independents and Presbyterians.*3 what did he find so 
objectionable about religious orders? Hume was not strictly an 
atheist. His position was rather that he was agnostic by inevitability, 
since man could not, despite Descartes best efforts, prove or disprove 
the divine without a thoroughly subjective leap of faith. He 
understood the impulse of people to search for certainty. It was his 
search too. He was distraught at the death of his mother whom he 
had loved and respected dearly. A friend observed this untypical grief 
and suggested that this was a consequence of his lack of belief. Hume 
responded: 
"Though 1 throw out my speculations to entertain the learned world, yet in other 
things 1 do not th ink so differently from the rest of the world. 
For Hume the only honest position was to advocate tolerance for and 
by religions, without accepting the legitimacy of one over another. 
The criteria by which Hume assessed religions were purely 
humanistic. Did the religion enjoinder persecution? Did it promote 
intolerance? Did those seeking to control and motivate their subjects 
"Letter to Baron Mure from Paris", 22"" June 1764, in Burton, 1967, Vol. II, p. 204. 
"•^ See Hume, 1967. 
"^Burton, 1967, Vol. I,p. 294. 
often use i t as a smokescreen for power plays? This is why the 
Catholic Church, with a history encompassing the Inquisitions, the 
Crusades and many other instances of cruel attempts to maintain 
status and influence could be held up as a particularly poor example 
of religious tolerance. 
Hume cared about his friends and went to extraordinary lengths at 
times to support them. He wrote to a number of friends and 
acquaintances trying to persuade them to buy copies the work of his 
friend the blind poet Mr. Blacklock, who on account of his blindness 
required greater financial security than he then had. He encouraged 
his own publisher, Andrew Millar, to publish his friend and rival 
historian Robertson's work. He provided counsel in the form of 
numerous often lengthy letters commiserating with friends who had 
lost loved ones such as the Comtesse de Boufflers, and was clearly 
devoted to the welfare of his infirm sister. His concern for the 
welfare of others was far from purely general, compared to someone 
like Rousseau, who loved "the people" but had difficulty forming 
lasting relationships with actual people. 
Hume was, I suggest, a gentle man and a good friend, a lover of people 
both in the abstract and the flesh. Yet there were other passions that 
marked his character. The high degree of self-regulation that 
disciplined his conduct should not be mistaken for a dullness of 
spirit. Hume loved and hated like anyone else, and had on occasion a 
notorious temper. 
What were his great likes and dislikes? For one thing he shared the 
trait of his countrymen's prejudice against the English. He was at 
pains to assure Gilbert Eliot in 1764 from Paris that he was "a citizen 
of the world" in response to claims that he was anti-British. Through 
his correspondence it is possible to put together quite a collage of 
abuse that Hume hurled at the English. The English were "the most 
stupid and factious barbarians in the world"'^^ stricken by "foolish 
prejudices which all nations and all ages d i s a v o w " . i n particular the 
Wilkes riots provoked an assessment of the "London mob" as "wicked, 
abandoned madmen"^^, "barbarians on the banks of the Thames".'^ ^ 
Commenting on Gibbon's Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire he 
noted that: 
"1 should never have expected s u c h an excellent work to have come from the pen of 
a n E n g l i s h m a n . It is lamentable to consider how m u c h that nation has declined in 
l iterature during our time."'*^ 
Birkbeck Hill, Op. Cit., p. 112-3. 
"^Ibid.,?. 143. 
"Letter to Adam Smith", 6* February 1770, in Burton, 1967, Vol. II, p. 433. 
"Letter to Dr. Blair", 26"' April 1764, Ibid. 
"'Burton, 1967, Vol. H,p. 487. 
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Was Hume simply racist? A clear counterpoint to his contempt for 
the English was his immense respect for the French. Paris in 
particular was a haven for Hume's intellectual restlessness, and he 
enjoyed the mannerisms and effusiveness of the French p e o p l e . H e 
appears to have indulged his stoic libido somewhat more in the 
French capital too, although such snippets as are available suggest 
that whilst not entirely platonic his relationships were primarily 
characterised by intellectual engagement.si 
As noted, Hume prided himself on the evenness of his temper. Time 
and again we find reference to i t . However there is evidence in his 
correspondence of another side to his character which in the midst of 
the general placidity i t is refreshing to encounter. He made an 
opinionated and vitriolic attack on Dr. Johnson's comparison of Pitt 
(Lord Chatham) with Cardinal Richelieu, for which he subsequently 
apologised.52 He had a famous but temporary falling out with a 
number of friends, notably Lord Elibank.53 But perhaps the event 
with the most significance for the student of the connections between 
the man and the philosopher is the dramatic breakdown of his 
relationship with another great thinker of the time, Jean Jacques 
Rousseau. 
Instances such as when he wrote to Professor Ferguson in 1763, of his hankering after "the plain roughness 
of the Poker" (The Poker Club, London), being notable by their scarcity (Ibid.). 
'^ Of a recent acquaintance: "She seems agreeable, well behaved, judicious, a great reader, speaks as if she 
had sentiment and was superior to the vulgar train of amusements" in his "Letter to the Comtesse de 
Bouffleurs", 6'" July 1764, Birkbeck Hill, Op. Cit., p. 206. 
"Pitt is totally destitute of literature, sense, or the knowledge of any one branch of public business. What 
other talent, indeed, has he but that of reciting, with tolerable action and great impudence, a long discourse in 
which there is neither argument, order, instruction, propriety, nor even grammar." (in Braham, 1987, p. 44). 
"Burton, 1967, Vo l II, p. 256. 
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Hume had admired the work of Rousseau before meeting him. After 
they had met in France their relationship blossomed. Little is known 
of Rousseau's thoughts on Hume. His correspondence was 
notoriously self-obsessed and selfish. However when he came to 
England for a period of residence in 1766 it was with Hume that he 
travelled. After their arrival Hume took great pains to find his 
companion a place to stay and an income. With remarkable patience 
Hume persisted even as his efforts were repeatedly knocked back by 
the habitually suspicious Frenchman. When eventually a suitable 
place was found in the Peak District, there is an extraordinary tale of 
Rousseau's reaction and the depth of feeling between the two men. 
Rousseau accused Hume's friend, Davenport, with whom Rousseau 
would be staying, of trickery. Hume at length assured him that this 
was not so. Rousseau allegedly sat in silence for an hour, before 
leaping up and sitting on Hume's knee, showering him with kisses 
and tears, which Hume reciprocated. This can be seen in retrospect 
as the high point in their relationship, before the disintegration that 
seems to have been endemic to all of Rousseau's personal 
relationships. Rousseau's paranoia led him to accuse Hume of forging 
a letter alleged to have been by Walpole. Hume, who at that moment 
in time was in the process of securing a pension for Rousseau from 
General Conway, took offence and politely demanded an explanation. 
Rousseau responded with venom, and returned to France, where he 
was no more welcome. Even after this, when the heat from the 
quarrel had died, Hume's correspondence reveals his attempts to 
engage his French friends to protect Rousseau from the French 
government. 54 
The argument was not literary or philosophical, but i t is a good 
example of a number of characteristics of Hume that have already 
been mentioned. Firstly his warmth and generosity to his friends, 
even in trying circumstances. Secondly the fact that his scepticism 
did not come from an inherently suspicious and cynical attitude 
(unlike Rousseau's, which surely did). Thirdly, that professional 
credibility mattered immensely to this man, because it reflected on 
his life's works - and nothing was more important to him than that. 
Braham and Burton both note one final aspect to Hume's emotional 
side. This is the curious absence of aesthetic observation in his 
writings. He expounded a philosophy on t a s t e , ye t instances of his 
contemplation and appreciation of actual works of art are not merely 
scarce but absent from his correspondence. This man had 
opportunities in Paris, Edinburgh, London, and from trips the length 
of the Danube through Europe to observe great works of art. Yet the 
Birkbeck Hill, Letters of David Hume to William Strachan, 1888. 
" "Of refinement in the arts", in Hume, 1994, pp. 105-114. 
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only intellectual stimulation of which we are made aware is literary. 
What should we make of this in relation to his academic output? 
Hume believed in civilisation as a positive force for human progress. 
His positive nature, manifested in many ways and detailed above, 
makes him a strange companion for Rousseau. Hume believed that 
the city was the appropriate environment for a man of letters to 
develop. His intellect was tempered with a modesty that he afforded 
others who lacked their own. Yet his passions were strong in life, and 
beneath the surface of his writings is a profound and relentless desire 
to refine and develop old assumptions into enlightened truths that 
might benefit both individuals and society. As Braham puts it: 
"He had a creative intellect joined with a throbbing heart.'^e 
Hume was also known for having a playful sense of humour.57 
However this stops when it comes to his academic endeavours, about 
which he was never anything other than passionately serious. The 
other side to his personal character that sheds light on Hume's 
perspective as a thinker is his love of people. As Mackenzie, a 
lifelong acquaintance, observed: 
"He had two minds: one which indulged in the metaphysical scepticism his genius 
could invent, but which it could not always disentangle; another, simple, natural and 
playful, which made his conversation delightful to his friends, and even frequently 
conciliated men whose principles of belief his philosophical doubts, if they had not 
power to shake, had grieved and offended."^s 
Braham, 1987, p. 46. 
" I offer this example of his particular, gentle yet not flaccid, sense of humour: [writing of his brother's 
engagement] "He went off on Monday morning; and this is the first action of his life wherein he has engaged 
himself without being able to compute exactly the consequences. But what arithmetic will serve to fix the 
proportion between good and bad wives, and rate the different classes of each? Sir Isaac Newton himself, who 
could measure the course of the planets and weigh the earth as in a pair of scales: even he had not algebra 
enough to reduce that amiable part of our species to a just equation: and they are the only heavenly bodies 
whose orbits are uncertain." ("Letter to Mrs. Dysart", in Burton, 1967, Vol. I, p. 338). 
Burton, 1967, Vol. II, pp. 438-439. 
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Even on his deathbed "his cheerfulness was still so great, his 
complaisance and social disposition were so entire, that when any 
friend was with him he could not help talking more, and with greater 
exertion, than suited the weakness of his body".59 We can contrast 
this with the characters of many great thinkers whose preoccupation 
with "the people" was not matched by their concern for the people 
around them. It does not seem far-fetched to speculate that this love, 
and the sights of chaos and disorder ripping through the lives of real 
people in war-torn Europe witnessed by Hume, influenced him 
greatly. It was this first hand knowledge of the consequences of 
ignorance and prejudice masquerading as knowledge that gave him 
such zeal in his work as an anti-zealot. 
Hume's attitude towards the truth 
It can be judged from the above that i f there was one thing that one 
could be certain to rile Hume it would have been to accuse him of 
being a liar. Yet his personal writings reveal his sensitivity to the 
impact of the truth in certain circumstances, in contrast to the 
pomposity of Dr. Johnson's pronouncement: 
"1 deny the lawfulness of telling a lie to a s ick man for fear of alarming him - you 
have no bus iness with consequences; you are to tell the truth. Besides, you are not 
sure what effects your telling him that he is in danger may have. It may bring his 
distemper to a cr i s i s that may cure him-'^o 
Hume wrote: 
"It is certainly wrong to deceive anybody, m u c h more a friend, but yet the difference 
mus t sti l l be allowed infinite between deceiving a m a n for his good and for his 
injury- ' s i 
This ambivalence to the truth suggests a pragmatism that allows for 
the bliss of ignorance. In governmental terms, this opens the door for 
a highly patrician perspective. The duty of the governor is to rule the 
governed in their best interests. This, of course, need not be the 
same thing as their tacit or even - perhaps especially - their explicit 
consent. The argument depends on the validity of Hume's precursor 
to Popper's theory of "higher" and "lower" order desires: we can know 
what we want even as we know it is not what we need.62 
"Letter from Adam Smith to William Strahan", in Braham 1987, p. 19. 
* In Boswell's Johnson. IV, p. 306. 
In Birkbeck Hill, Op. Cit., p. 202. 
" Popper, 1966. 
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Chapter 2 
Hume's general philosophy 
"When we trace up the human understanding to its first 
principles, we find it to lead us into such sentiments, as 
seem to turn into ridicule all our past pains and industry, 
and to discourage us from future enquiries. Nothing is 
more enquir'd after by the mind of man, than the causes. ... 
the original and ultimate principle ... And how must we be 
disappointed, when we learn, that this connexion, tie, or 
energy lies merely in ourselves, and is nothing but that 
determination of the mind, which is acquir'd by custom, 
and causes us to make a transition from an object to its 
usual attendant, and from the impression of one lively idea 
of the other?" 
The Treatise of Human Nature (Book I Part IV Section VII) 
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Hume considered himself a philosophical historian. Hence his 
arguments needed both historical examples and a coherent theory of 
human nature. 
Yet the characteristics of the man as detailed in Chapter 1 naturally 
contribute to our understanding of Hume's investigations. Given his 
innate caution - expressed as scepticism in his work - for declarations 
of absolute knowledge, how can Hume assert anything? In the 
Treatise he offers an explanation based on a comparison between the 
law of association in the mental world and the law of gravity in the 
physical world. Some ideas are attracted to each other. The 
coherence that they seem to offer creates psychological phenomena, 
that in turn create perceptions, "bundles" of which constitute our 
experience. Thus whilst we are some distance removed from the true 
sources of our experience we can at least make some sort of inductive 
sense out of them. The way we distinguish between memories and 
imagination is in the relative strengths of sensation. The claim being 
made here is that the impact on our perceptions of a mental / 
physical disturbance is greater than purely internal mental imagery. 
Strength of custom defines our "knowledge" of the way the world 
around us works: 
"There is , then, nothing new either discover'd or produc'd in any objects by their 
constant conjunction, and by the uninterrupted resemblance of their relations of 
success ion and contiguity. B u t 'tis from this resemblance, that the ideas necessity, 
of power, and of efficacy, are deriv'd. These ideas, therefore, represent not any 
thing, that does or c a n belong to the objects, which are constantly conjoiu'd'^s 
Is this satisfactory? Caution should be exercised before we accept 
that imagination can never compete for validity with "truth once 
removed". Is there really any difference between perceptions and 
mental images? Vivid imagination, such as that experienced in 
dreams and nightmares, is a powerful sensation, and capable of 
creating all the same key physiological consequences as "reality". 
This vividness was central to Descartes' deconstruction of our 
perceptions in his First Meditotion.64 i t is fair to assert as Hume does 
that all mental facts as we know them are derived from impressions 
upon our senses. But so too do many mental fictions. Sum res 
cogitans - all I know is that at this moment I am thinking something, 
real or not. 
"Hume, 1978, p. 164. 
Descartes, 1955, Vol. L 
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Nonetheless this thinking forms the bedrock of Hume's general 
attitude to belief systems, and their imposition on others. It seems 
only right to add a proviso that our misguided perceptions do not 
cease to be perceptions because we later change our minds about 
them. Although he never explicitly acknowledges this, it can be 
concluded from the fact that he never asserts a precise origin for 
perceptions themselves that this proviso would make sense of the 
general course of his argument, which is that the truth is out there, 
identifiable yet without precision. So we should tread carefully. 
The relationship of ideas and impressions: Causality and Belief 
All this obviously has an immense bearing upon the way Hume 
constructs his arguments. His analysis of inductive reasoning as the 
basis for theories of causality is crucial. Whilst Hume fully 
appreciates the way in which man achieves harmony with his 
environment by making connections, such as between fire and heat, 
he is wary of creating a pretence of unbreakable bonds. We are 
accustomed to what appears to be fire creating a sensation that we 
label generically as heat. What Hume observes is that heat sensations 
are not necessarily identical, and hence neither are fires: 
"There is , then, nothing new either discover'd or produc'd in any objects by their 
constant conjunction, and by the uninterrupted resemblance of their relations of 
success ion and contiguity. But 'tis from this resemblance, that the ideas of 
necessity, of power, and of efficacy, are deriv'd. These ideas, therefore, represent 
not any thing, that does or can belong to the objects, which are constantly 
conjoin'd."65 
Custom binds us, makes sense of our world. Some relationships make 
more of this kind of sense (what Hume would describe as the quality 
of "liveliness") than others. However, constant association remains a 
subjective connection: 
"Again, when I consider the influence of this constant conjunction, I perceive, that 
s u c h a relation can never operate upon the mind, but by means of custom, which 
determines the imagination to make a transit ion from the idea of one object to that 
of its u s u a l attendant, and from the impression of one to a more lively idea of the 
other.''66 
'^Hume, 1978, p. 164. 
^Hume, 1978, p. 170. 
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Braham suggests that Hume ties himself in knots with this analysis. 
The ultimate origin or origins of ideas and impressions is never 
directly addressed. They are simply attributed to "unknown causes", 
a contradiction of his general argument, which is that causes do not 
exist.67 This, surely, is not what Hume meant. As we have seen 
Hume was no nihilist as a person, and it is wrong to regard any of his 
work in this light. What a study of his life confirms is that his writing 
is that of what might be described as a positive agnostic. He wants to 
believe, but he wants to establish the belief in empirical observation, 
and to do this credibly requires an honest assessment of the 
epistemology of our observations. It does indeed seem excessive to 
deny that causes exist. Objects have properties, and objects have 
different properties. Subjects, as the next idea in the chain of events, 
interact with objects. The real point here is that faith not reason 
begets belief. We cannot know rationally anything with certainty, and 
so we should be humble in our assertions over our environment 
including over other people. We are part of the chain of events, and 
our own "properties" influence our impressions, as do those of the 
object that stimulates them. 
Hume's theory of causality leads on to his theory of belief. As 
previously discussed the vividness of the association between ideas 
through mechanisms such as resemblance and spatial and temporal 
continuity is what creates belief and distinguishes i t from 
imagination. I have already expressed my doubts about this, but the 
point remains that belief is sensitive not cognitive - at least not 
comprehensively and universally cognitive.68 69 
"The phrase is unmeaning on Hume's view of cause." (Braham, 1987, p. 54). 
As Braham notes (1987, p. 54-55) this is quite in contrast to the claim of Spinoza that belief is "conviction 
from reason", and makes one wonder at the ordering of events that allows him to claim that true belief "is the 
way to true cognition" (in his Short Treatise, quoted in Lloyd Morgan, Emergent Evolution, p. 293). By 
Hume's analysis this would seem at best tautologous. Hume would doubtless have argued that true belief and 
true cognition were one and the same, and furthermore, certainty that one had achieved that enlightenment is 
in any case unattainable. 
Note: These arguments lead on to Hume's discussion of the self and personal identity. Whilst his thoughts 
on these subjects are important parts of his philosophical contribution, and their origins are at the core of his 
political philosophy, the debate becomes more esoteric than is relevant for the subject matter of this Thesis. 
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Truth and matters of fact 
Hume was one of the pioneers of psychology. The subsequent 
centuries have however broadened our analysis of human nature. In 
particular Hume deals little with the phenomena of psychological 
continuity, the subconscious and the unconscious. To be fair his 
objective in this as in all his work is to stimulate our own thought as 
to our mental lives and their interpretation. 
Typically he avoids dogmatism over the issue of truth. .Braham 
criticises Hume's unwillingness to accept matters of fact that are not 
derived from experience: 
"... j u s t as we know, for instance, that 2 + 2 = 4 without the need for any proof, it is 
possible that we may know directly and immediately, without the need of any basis 
in experience, some facts w h i c h we have never observed."™ 
I disagree with Braham's claim, which is really a refutation of the 
most basic instinct - intellectual humility - which pervades Hume's 
work. We can know supposed facts, be familiar with ideas, and know 
those ideas well. But we cannot "know" a country's population. Such 
facts are speculation right up to the point of mathematical tautology, 
which we can only know by working out. As Einstein observed, every 
clock tells a different time, and they may all be wrongJ^ 
It is better to think of truth in degrees. The description of the self as 
"a bundle of perceptions" has deservedly attracted reservations from 
many commentators. Psychological atomism seems a rather 
reductionist assessment of the vast complexities surrounding the 
subject of human consciousness. The mind is surely more accurately 
seen as an identity experiencing continual ebbs and flows, patterns 
and inconsistencies. S. Alexander observes that there is a notable 
inconsistency in Hume's account when he acknowledges that 
sometimes our imagination can create ideas without prior experience. 
His example is that we can imagine an intermediate shade of grey 
between darker and lighter shades. Yet surely we must at least go 
through a mental process of picturing the colour in our minds - on 
the basis of our previous experience of the polar shades of grey -
before we can say that we have imagined it! In other words 
everything in the imagination is the product of a creative process; 
and that process demands an empirical product. It seems strange 
that Hume includes this argument which is so clearly at odds with his 
general position that all ideas are the consequence of impressions, 
and as such I am inclined to dismiss this argument as anomalous. 
The important thing is that we understand that the variety of our 
™ Braham, 1987, p. 68. 
'^ "As far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are not certain, and as far as they are certain, they do 
not refer to reality" (in Capra's The Tao of Physics, Ch. 2). 
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perceptions over time and other contexts deny the likelihood of static 
identity, or at least our awareness of it . It is the interrelations 
between them and our basic human instinct to understand that cause 
us to overlook this and allow us to take our perceptions to take root 
in us as though they were part of our essential human nature.^2 In 
general the idea that we can do more than feel right and wrong, but 
actually prove i t , would present us with the oxymoron of rational 
faith. It is the argument of the sophist, the zealot, and the plainly 
wrong. 
Of his own time he considered that most people's characters in 
relation to society were a varying combination of what he described 
as "superstition" and "enthusiasm". 
The first of these two was the divine rightist, steeped in mysticism 
and superstition ("weakness, fear, [and] melancholy" leading to "blind 
and terrified credulity"). This part of humanity allowed certain 
institutions the privilege of access to God, and hence obedience to 
them was no more in question than obedience to God. ^3 
The second aspect of character, the enthusiast, is a more positive 
believer in the essential freedom of man. The tendency of this 
"man"'''^ to "hope, pride, presumption, [and] a warm imagination" 
nominally made him an opponent of religion, but such is the degree of 
affection of this man for the principles of autonomy and civil rights 
that in effect his belief was every bit as fervent as that of the more 
negative superstitious man.'^ s 
These were the characteristics of the "zealots" in opposition to whom 
Hume defined his work. The many wars of religion that occurred in 
post-Reformation Europe were results of these theologies, where 
denominational and secular (i.e. nationalist) forces combined against 
others or conflicted amongst themselves. 
Our "degrees" of truth are open to question, according to Hume. 
Logic allows us to assess the validity of relationships between ideas. 
Empiricism gives us food for thought. Induction affords us some sort 
of consistency in mental and physical events, suggesting - but not 
proving - sense and order in our world. This is how Hume approaches 
the challenges of the external world. Reason and action are 
unconnected. Moral judgements are the result of perception, and 
hence impressions and ideas, with regularity of sensation that passes 
for habit: 
Hume, 1978, Book I, Part IV, Section H. 
" Hume, 1994, p. 46. 
*^ In fact, of course, most people exhibited a combination of both instincts. 
" Hume, 1994, p. 46-7. 
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"'Tis this principle [habit], which makes u s reason from causes and effects; and 'tis 
the same principle, wh ich convinces u s of the continu'd existence of external 
objects, when absent from the senses. B u t tho' these two operations be equally 
natura l and necessary in the h u m a n mind yet in some circumstances^^ they are 
directly contrary, nor is it possible for u s to reason just ly and regularly from causes 
and effects, and at the same time believe the continu'd existence of matter. How 
then sha l l we adjust those principles together? Which of them shal l we prefer?''^^ 
Do we only affiliate by instinct? We do not prove matters of fact with 
reason though it can offer explanations of relationships of ideas 
without as such being an idea itself. Certainly morality is practical, 
but logic can and does f i l l the gap between the passions excited in the 
first instance by a vivid idea and leads, further down the order of 
"intermediate" ideas to action itself. The power of Marxist-Leninism 
is twofold, in its appeal to the basic passion of unity ("Workers of the 
world unite! You have nothing to lose but your chains!" etc) and to 
the rather more theoretical and contentious issue of the logical 
progression between didactic materialism and the inevitable 
historical forces that it unleashes. Hume suggests that emotion, will 
and action are unaffected by reason: 
"Morals excite pass ions and produce or prevent actions. Reason of itself is utterly 
impotent in this particular. The rules of morality, then, are not conclusions of our 
reason."78 
Must we agree that there is no relationship? They are not the same 
things, which is the point at the heart of Hume's argument here on 
the basis of what we know of the nature of the man and his 
circumstances. Hume's problem, I suggest, is in his passionate 
involvement in the great debates of his time. As a man intellectually 
opposed to the tyrannies both of religion, particularly denominate 
religion (see his Historu of England) and of the "new" science of 
reason, he was loathe to endorse either way as a means to righteous 
living. Both assume the sort of superior, "revealed" knowledge that 
started with tyranny of the mind and tended to end with tyranny of a 
more physical sort, e.g. the worst excesses of the Inquisitions. This 
discomfort translates into a position that is very strange and difficult 
to reconcile. It seems to take a one-level view of human desire and 
action. In this philosophy there is no connection that bridges the gap 
between, for example, the desire to smoke motivated by the passion 
of basic pleasure, and the desire in the same person at the same time 
not to smoke for reasons of health. There is clearly a connection 
between the polarised passions of the person (1) for his pleasure and 
(2) for his health. This argument is the basis for Popper's 
"solidity necessarily supposes two bodies, along with contiguity and impulse; which being a compound 
object, can never be represented by a simple impression ... tho' solidity continues always invariably the same, 
the impressions of touch change every moment upon us; which is a clear proof that the latter are not 
representation of the former" (Hume, 1978, p. 231). 
" Hume, 1978, p. 266. 
Hume, 1978, p. 457. 
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categorisation of higher and lower order desires, and seems to be one 
that Hume chooses not to address. Not everything man does is 
derived wholly from his basic instinct, and we do not have to endorse 
a theory of religious or logical epiphany to conclude this. Reason and 
emotion interact to determine action. 
So when Hume writes that "vice escapes you if you only consider the 
object" Braham claims that he is suggesting that there is no matter of 
moral fact in a murder except certain passions, motives, volitions and 
thoughts.79 This is the tangle in which Hume finds himself, but I 
suggest that i t is not indicative of his true position on the matter. 
The real point is made in his Treatise when he observes that "'Tis one 
thing to know virtue: another thing to conform the will to it".^^ Pure 
reason is no guide to anything by itself. It is a shame that Hume does 
not equally recognise that pure emotion is not the only alternative. I f 
the notion of free will^i - one that from his life and works we know 
was absolutely vital to Hume's philosophy - is to mean anything, pure 
(i.e. base) feeling must be recognised as being just as guilty of 
enslavement as pure reason. 
In the course of these arguments we uncover ambiguities in Hume's 
philosophy. Popular sympathies are pleasure related, as mentioned 
above. These like any other sympathy may vary over time and 
circumstance, yet our morality remains constant, for "we fix on some 
steady and general points of view, and always in our thoughts place 
ourselves in them, whatever may be our present situation".^2 There 
are two problems here. Firstly, these "steady and general points of 
view" seem hard to swallow in the context ojf the sceptical relativism 
of Hume's general theory. Secondly, the altruism that we use to 
make our judgements (sic.) also offers us detachment from others, to 
stand in observation of signs of their "durable principle of the mind" 
informing their benevolence or otherwise. This durability seems to 
hang less easily than Hume might have liked with the notion of 
mental states as transient "bundles of perceptions". 
Nonetheless a just act "pleases after a particular manner", and is 
categorised by being intrinsic to a person, performed altruistically 
and giving pride to its performer.^3 This forms the beginning of 
Hume's theory of justice. The interest of the community is not 
always the same as that of the individual. Yet right-thinking 
individuals exhibit sympathy for those acts that promote harmony 
over the general uneasiness of insecurity. In a communal sense right 
''Braham, 1987, p. 72. 
'° Hume, 1978, p. 465. 
In the sense not so much of man's capacity to take autonomous decisions as his ability to overcome his 
propensity to abdicate from responsibility. 
Hume, 1978, p. 603. 
Hume, 1978, p. 547. 
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and wrong are discussed with regard to a public interest. This 
interest, however, remains an instinct. In its absence there is no 
public, and hence no pubHc interest. Pohtical artifices can 
strengthen (or weaken) this bond, but they cannot produce it . The 
desire for community preceded the existence of state, and any 
government that lacks this backing is doomed to failure in the normal 
course of the ebbs and flows of power over time. Some instincts run 
much deeper and stronger than custom. This is Hume the populist 
speaking. Popular sympathies are the symptom of natural justice, 
and the cause of institutional justice (or for that matter, injustice). 
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Chapter 3 
The impact of Hume's general philosophy on his politics 
"the science of politics affords few rules, which will not 
admit of some exception, and which may not sometimes be 
controlled by fortune and accident" 
"Of the original contract" 
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The political philosophy of David Hume is often overshadowed by his 
far greater output of theoretical work. However there was a strong, if 
not vital, aspect to his work that was practical. Haakonssen has 
observed that Hume "meant his political writings to be also political 
acts, shaping the opinions or beliefs that in turn shaped politics and 
society".84 This is clearly the case, as one can observe from his 
correspondence the disappointment at the lack of impact of the first 
publication of most of his works. But as can be seen in Chapter 1 
Hume does not necessarily want to answer all the questions but 
rather to raise the right questions. As such his work is suggestive 
rather than didactic. As also suggested in Chapter 1, morality and 
aesthetics might not in Hume have much to distinguish themselves at 
a purely theoretical level. All theories that are not purely 
mathematical demand assumptions at their core that are, to put it 
another way, leaps of faith. Hence there is no such thing as 
completely rational belief, so both lack certainty of knowledge (Hume 
could be ascerbic on the subject of the appropriateness of 
partisanship of political philosophers). 
However, at the socio-political level Hume clearly has something to 
say, and is unwilling to let his scepticism drift through relativism into 
solipsism. The question for Hume becomes - which emotions should 
we "believe" (i.e. treat as true) and why? In general man lives and 
dies in societies into which he is born, and which are ruled by some 
system of government. The state is sustained by the belief in 
peoples' interests being served by that government's continued 
existence. Since popular opinion on the right of a government to 
exercise authority is fundamental to any durable system of 
government, it was Hume's opinion that the science of politics should 
be a study in the ebbs and flows of this opinion.^6 
Whereof can we speak, then, in Hume's terms? There is clearly some 
underlying belief here, as always related to the issues of the time and 
following from Hume's general theories on human nature (see Chapter 
2). Hume's theory of just government is rooted in his general thoughts 
on morality. There are two types of moral duties. 
The first are the "humane instincts", or "those to which men are 
impelled by a natural instinct ... independent of all ideas of obligation, 
and of all views either to private or public utility" .^7 Actions such as 
love for one's child, gratitude to our benefactors, sympathy for those 
less fortunate than ourselves, are, in Hume's view, pursued selflessly, 
and are not concerned with the greater picture of social convention or 
Haakonssen, K., 1993, p. 183. 




'Hume, 1994, pp. 16-18. 
In Barker, 1970, pp. 159-60. 
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self-aggrandisement.88 This is the motive of the good, or "noble" in 
Hobbes' terms, man. 
The second type are more pragmatic. The common moral framework 
or "social fabric" that sustains a civil society must be supported by at 
least its most powerful members. It is essential for justice in Hume's 
philosophy that their "original inclination ... or instinct, is here 
checked and restrained by a subsequent judgement or observation". 
Hence the behaviour brought about by these morals is "performed 
entirely from a sense of obligation, when we consider the necessities of 
human society, and the impossibility of supporting i t , i f these duties 
were neglected".^9 in short, these are the actions of the good citizen. 
Superstitious men endorsing the divine right to rule of those who by 
and large already were, are one side of the coin. Enthusiasts rejecting 
all authority but that of fully autonomous individuals are the other. 
Both display ignorance of the real reasons for society and 
government. As a consequence of this Hume was particularly 
concerned with the true "nature" of justice and its relationship with 
political obligation. This attitude was enough to have him branded an 
atheist in some quarters, but this does not properly describe Hume's 
core philosophy, which was: 
" ... to look upon all the vast apparatus of our government, as having ultimately no 
other purpose or object but the distribution of justice's^ 
Hume's politics concern justice. A proper examination of Hume's 
political work must start with his perception of the relationship 
between morality and justice, particularly in matters of religion, and 
move on to what he considers to be an appropriate means and method 
for the practical "distribution" of this notion of justice. This latter 
task requires an extraction of his underlying morality in relation to 
the "public interest". 
Such sentiments have been explored through detailed empirical examination of what has become known as 
the "selfish gene" (see Ridley, 1996). 
In Barker, 1970, p. 159. 
'"Hume, 1994,p. 20. 
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Morality 
Hume claims the humanist position - man makes his own rules and 
lives by the consequences. 
In Hume's intellectual present there was a strong Platonic-
Aristotelian tradition of viewing social and political phenomena, such 
as contracts and magistrates, as versions of perfect "Forms" which 
were in nature before their "discovery" by human society. So specific 
instances of actions or arrangements that man calls "contract", 
"property" or "government" are approximations, measured by their 
closeness to an external and absolute measure. This measure, or 
Form, is identifiable only through philosophical reflection. Hence 
good kings have to have good philosophy to pursue a just course. 
Since kings are not necessarily by nature philosophers, this 
necessitates the presence of "advisers" to "guide" them on the "just" 
course of action. Such arguments create the need for 
institutionalised spiritual advisers. By doing so they create the 
philosophical basis to the controversies of Hume's life. This was the 
philosophy underpinning absolutist privilege inherent in eighteenth 
century Toryism, High Church Anglicanism, absolutism in general, 
and most specifically for Hume Catholicism and divine rightism. 
The post-Reformation Enlightenment period brought a crucial 
challenge to this set of beliefs. The Protestant naturalist theorists, 
including Grotius, Hobbes and Locke, challenged the notion that 
there was an external set of definitions which should be regarded 
generically as The Truth. Meanings are uses, imposed upon a 
basically amoral world in which mankind finds itself. For these 
thinkers, God created man with the capacity to be something unique. 
In this sense "humanity" is an achievement of socialisation not an 
inevitable consequence of birth. 
Hume, too, fights for the cause of human exceptionalism. Goodness 
is a factor of people: 
"Inanimate objects may bear to each other all the same relations which we observe 
in moral agents - a young tree which overtops and destroys its parents stands in all 
the same relations with Nero when he murdered Agrippina; and if morality consisted 
merely of relations would no doubt be equally criminal."^2 
" This was a theme later taken up by Wittgenstein, who supplemented his famous "Whereof we do not know, 
thereof we must be silent" by observing that in semantics we should look for the use of the word in question to 
derive its meaning, and not the other way around (see Pitkin, 1972, Ch. 1). 
Hume, 1751, p. 293. 
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Braham observes that: 
"The inference that Hume draws from this is that moral quality does not belong to 
the action at all, but to the state of mind which the circumstances produce in the 
observer."93 
Those thinkers who espoused natural law were in effect still operating 
within the absolutist paradigm. "Nature" or "man" had simply 
replaced "God". Prescriptions for social institutions ranging from 
marriage to civil government were espoused as the correct form for 
social interaction. There was a further development, particularly 
noted in the works of Grotius and Hobbes, towards the idea that 
empirical assessment of contractual relationships between men in 
society is more important than some fundamental prescription over 
the nature of those contracts. The creation of rights and duties was a 
mechanism for peace and prosperity, and natural rights theorists 
considered this to have the principal bearing upon the actions of law-
makers and their subjects. As we shall see, this was to have 
considerable influence on the political philosophy of David Hume. 
Unfortunately these revolutionary ideas tended to create revolution 
on the ground also. The "legitimisation" of the continual 
construction and reconstruction of moral and political rights and 
duties had created a climate of extreme factionalism in Europe, and 
exemplified by the strife of seventeenth century Britain. So 
fundamental were these instincts of enthusiasm and superstition to 
human nature that as far as Hume was concerned this battle was not 
over by the eighteenth century e i t h e r . T h i s exemplifies of the way 
Hume, as any writer, writes with a perspective that is influenced by 
contemporary con t rove r s i e s . In this context we may find at times 
the real value in his writings is slightly obscured by its contemporary 
focus, a problem further compounded by his use of irony. Again this 
is why a proper understanding of more than the texts is so important 
in understanding a man who, ironically, wanted posterity only to 
judge him on those texts.9^ 
Can we say that the action of the aforementioned "murderous" tree, 
"conscious" or otherwise, was a "good thing"? Hobbes and Spinoza 
both argued that what was meant by "good" was really a subjective 
label for certain objects of desire. A pleasure-pain analysis of just 
Braham, 1987, p. 76. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, Hume frequently condemned those rioters in favour of the return to the House 
of Commons of John Wilkes. His remarks on the English and "the London mob" in particular are best 
interpreted as an expression not of racism but of his concern that unfettered liberty enabled the possibility of a 
degeneration into factional "barbarism" (and hence some sort of fettering and culture of restraint would be a 
good thing) (see Hume, 1983, pp. 209-11,212-13,216, and 1954, pp. 196,199). 
In particular his key rivals here were Clarke, Shaftesbury, Butler, and Hutcheson, and are perhaps more 
significant than Locke in appreciating the underlying passion of Hume's work. 
In his "My Own Life" he adjudges literary fame to his "ruling passion" (in Braham, 1987, p. 14). 
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behaviour has certain obvious flaws. "If it feels good, do it" does not 
seem like a sophisticated approach to the world around us. 
Of course, all human behaviour can be explained in terms of the 
perceived cost-benefits of possible actions. The diversity of responses 
to these calculations reflects the diversity of mankind, and is what 
makes general theories of human morality at a private or public level 
so contentious, as it does any theory of human behaviour such as 
psychology, sociology or economics. Consciousness - a notoriously 
sticky subject in itself - cannot provide the key. If Nero and Caligula 
were as mad as is commonly supposed had they any more control 
over their actions than the sapling? What of the lion that kills its 
rival's cubs? Consciousness of instinct is nowhere near the same 
thing as freedom of wil l . Is sane human consciousness different from 
all other consciousness (i.e. do we have a soul?)? We would like to 
think so, but the onus is on us to prove it, or else assume a greater 
level of humility regarding our supposed superiority over other 
creatures. Morality, like freedom, is ultimately a state of mind rather 
than of action. Which is not to say that the thought counts for 
everything i f i t is not carried through to its practical conclusion. 
Hume furiously attacks the idea that man should do things that feel 
wrong but are in accordance with the dicta of a higher authority, be i t 
secular or religious. What Hume argues is not for full-on moral 
relativism, which would in fact make a mockery of the notion of a 
cohesive idea of morality in the same way as Thrasymachus would 
have of that of justice. He is arguing for the souls of the people as 
individuals, their right and duty to seek their own peace within 
themselves as to their own actions. He is arguing for right-thinking 
to come from within. Whilst he is arguing for free will he is doing so 
with a clear belief that there is such a thing as common sense. When 
enough people are possessed and aware of i t to let i t guide their 
judgement, their opinions and actions - steeped in pragmatism - are 
what will form the bedrock of what Hume would consider to be a 
functional society. 
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If justice is a cost-benefit analysis of pleasure and pain, we must 
recognise that the spirit in which Hume writes is one in which he is 
thinking of particular kinds of pleasures and pains. 
And so we chase our tail; for this qualification effectively leads us 
back to where we started except in terms of what Hume himself does 
and does not stand for. What then does Hume mean by just pleasures 
and just pains? What is common sense? 
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Common Sense 
Is common sense really some sort of Progressive Scepticism? 
"Why should I assent to my own reasonings? I can give no other reason why I 
should assent to it, and feel nothing but a strong propensity to consider objects 
strongly on that view-'^ ^ 
Hume's scepticism is fundamental to every intellectual utterance he 
made. His concept of common sense as a guide to moral behaviour 
and public policy are no exceptions. The attitude is not one of denial 
per se. All men want to believe. Without belief we have nothing to 
bind us to our world, no sense or sanity beyond sensations the 
significance of which we do not know. Truth is not rational, it is 
emotional. And emotion is not prescriptive, it is personal. So it is up 
to each person to determine his or her own morality. This for Hume 
was according to a bilateral analysis of virtue and vice. Morality that 
was entirely natural, such as the protective instinct of the mother 
leading to benefactory behaviour to her child, is an example of where 
instinct, here genetic preservation, is the natural and "right" course 
of action. These instincts and the actions that they provoke "have no 
dependance on the artifice and contrivance of men".^^ These natural 
or social virtues (that is to say, beneficial to society rather than 
created by it) provide the basis to close relationship-forming (and 
otherwise) between human beings. There is another kind of morality 
that is easily and often confused with the former kind but vitally 
distinct, and at least as important to peace and security. This is the 
morality of convention, known by Hume as the artificial virtues. 
These values, often applied to the same actions, have a different 
application. Rather than a simple relationship between subject and 
object, actions of this type have a broader significance. In this sense, 
the payment of a debt is not an instinctive consequence of gratitude 
for a good or service rendered, but the recognition of the 
consequences of a culture of non-payment, e.g. debt enforcement by 
"other means". As such reciprocity may not be an instinct for all 
men but i t is the key to peaceful coexistence in a civil society. Hume 
offers an example to make clear the distinction. Whilst we might see 
little sense in isolation in a poorer person giving money to a richer 
person, we realise that all is well and good if this is in exchange for 
the performance of some sort of contract, such as the repayment of a 
loan. 
Hume, 1964, Vol. L p. 559. 
Hume, 1978, p. 574. 
''Hume, 1978, p. 578. 
The sort of culture that we see as a result of weak and corrupt government in contemporary Russia. 
Hume, 1978, pp. 480-1. 
40 
As already mentioned there is no necessary contradiction between 
this separation of the natural and the artificial and the hope that 
morality can be shared. "Thou shalt not steal", for example, has 
aspects of its practise that are rooted in both the natural and 
artificial camps. In fact this is an ideal scenario, since it matches 
virtuous instinct with pragmatic expediency. Hume's position is that 
it cannot be considered certain, and therefore any claim to just action 
must carry with it a degree of humility and consent. 
Cynicism is broadly absent from Hume's life and works. What Hume 
is about is agnosticism, accompanied by fundamentally constructive 
inclinations. As such he has been described as the first of the "post-
Sceptics". ^02 As already mentioned man, according to Hume, cannot 
genuinely appeal to inherent values or divine inspiration. Hitherto, 
as Haakonssen observes, "Only Hobbes had isolated humanity 
metaphysically and religiously as completely as Hume".i°3 
Hume and Hobbes fall some way apart on a number of other matters, 
particularly their teleology. Hume was more optimistic about man's 
character and ability to interact socially than Hobbes was, but there 
was more that set them apart. Hume distrusted the arrogance of the 
rationalist movement. This was a cause of his arguments that reason 
was never a true motivating factor in the actions of men. This has 
already been discussed. Reason cannot defend reason. However: 
most of his more didactic work only makes sense i f one accepts that 
in truth he had some regard for reason in its place; the reason for 
belief is experience, and reason, without applying value in itself, is 
the thread by which experiences hang together in our 
consciousness. In itself we cannot be certain of the exact 
significance of experience but we can only proceed to make pragmatic 
judgements on the basis of preceding events. Despite his caution 
regarding the validity of inductive reasoning Hume would 
undoubtedly have agreed with the axiom that history repeats itself. 
His historical and political writings - not to mention the numerous 
accounts of his ready wit - suggest that he might well have added that 
this was because not enough people listened the first time. 
Hume was a progressive, and his scepticism was a force for scientific, 
metaphysical and political truth. Doubt in this sense is mental 
virili ty, since intellectual activity seeks debate not dogma, True 
scepticism must logically doubt even itself, and Hume does not rule 
out the idea of "perfection to the sciences". He merely observes 
rather galactically that two thousand years is not very long to have 
'"^  Norton £•/a/., 1993, p. 1. 
Haakonssen, 1993, p. 186. 
'"^  As discussed in Chapter 1. 
What Kant later described as "Critique" (see Kant 1974,1965). 
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conducted one's experiments, los This can only sit well 
retrospectively in comparison to the theorists of everything who were 
so prevalent at the time of the Enlightenment. Yet he was not in 
favour of abandoning the project. His scepticism is far from 
nihilistic, and takes a distinct approach to that of Cartesian 
deconstruction. He does not seek to build from nothing to arrive at 
conclusions beyond dispute. Hume, i t is clear from his attitude to 
life, loved dispute - though usually in the gentlest of ways. He values 
greatly in his political works the stabilising power of convention, but 
his thoughts are based around probabilities rather than certainties. 
Hume's brand of scepticism places considerable emphasis on the 
weaknesses and strengths of sensationalism. In Hume's political 
philosophy man has the capacity for improvement and progress. The 
conditions for this progress, rather than the nature of the progress 
itself, are what concern him most. It affronts his principles to dictate 
lifestyles; his concern, in the light of recent historical circumstances, 
was that there should in general be as little such dictation as 
possible. Reason proves little, though it provokes much.io^ Common 
imagination and shared emotions are what bind us and yet, 
paradoxically and qualified by the right set of circumstances, support 
us on the road to justice. 
Hume, 1978, pp. 187 and 273. We can make what we will about this dismissal of any useful scientific 
advances by the Ancient Greeks, Romans or anyone else until a couple of centuries BC. The point, I think, 
still stands. 
Hume was keener to stress the former than the latter, as noted: "As all reasoning concerning matters of fact 
arises only from custom - and custom can only be the effect of repeated perceptions - the extending of custom 
and reasoning beyond the perceptions can never be the direct and natural effect of the constant repetitions and 
connections, and must arise through the co-operation of some other principles." (Hume, 1978, p. 198). 
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Authority 
Why do men obey the law? Why do they disobey it? 
Hume dismisses the claim that an original and binding Contract of 
Government exists. Based on empirical facts there was little to 
support the idea that such things could exist, let alone whether they 
should. 108 However Hume does consider, in a vague form, that certain 
basic criteria might allow a citizen to judge for himself the degree of 
legitimacy in the state's actions. For Hume, these criteria are 
"justice and protection". io9 Qn the subject of protection from what or 
whom, for what or whom, by what particular means, Hume is less 
forthcoming. As i t transpires, however, protection in Hume's terms is 
really just a part of just government. Since protection, as part of just 
government, plays an integral role to the Social Contract of Thomas 
Hobbes' "Mortall God" and its subjects i t is interesting to hear what 
Hobbes has to say on the matter. In De Cive Hobbes makes it clear 
that in regard to the potentially fatal weakness in claiming the 
sovereign jurisdiction of the state over an individual who makes his 
own mind up over the exact parameters of that jurisdiction: 
" ... if any man pretend somewhat to tend necessarily to his preservation, which yet 
he himself doth not confidently believe so, he may offend against the laws of 
nature" " 0 
It is clear that Hume took a similar line of argument. If one wishes to 
properly discuss the rights and wrongs of a course of action one 
cannot do so from a position of moral dupl ic i ty .^ 
Hume dealt with what justice is not - the cynical advancement of the 
strong and/or devious - but some of what he has to say about what it 
is creates problems. Unlike Aristotle, as already stated, Hume 
rejected the idea that conventions of the civil society had pre-
conditional meanings. The virtue and vice of justice and injustice 
and their associated "actions" of property and contract are equally 
artificial. By doing so Hume has also rejected the "traditional" 
contractarian reliance on explaining the existence of these 
This was on the basis of a history which at that time did not include the US Constitution, although it is a 
moot point to suggest that a document at once so noble and yet so vague really fulfills the characteristics of a 
full-blooded Social Contract as perceived by Hobbes or Rousseau, 
'"'in Barker, 1970, p. 150. 
"° In Tuck, 1984, p. 104. 
''' Hobbes appealed to the "noble" and "base" sides to a citizen's personality. It is the former which feel 
bonds of love with his fellow men; the latter makes do with calculating the cost-benefit (authority-freedom) 
trade-off and, hopefully, concludes that it is in his interest to structure society in a way which promotes 
general welfare. 
"^Hume, p. 1978, pp. 483-4. 
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institutions as the expression of "the will of the p e o p l e " . W h e r e 
then do such notions as property and contract come from? 
In Book III Part I I Section I I of the Treatise, Hume offers his 
explanation. 114 We live in families by instinct. However the 
functional family unit creates a mini-society. Again, property is at 
the heart of these relationships. This toy is mine, this car is yours, 
and the notions of trust and reciprocity ("doing one's share" etc). 
Historically man has sought the benefits of exchange with other men, 
and in such a spirit were the first communities c r e a t e d . T h e 
imitation of such family relationships with those around us who are 
outside the family, and the desire to make a functional community 
with the resultant benefits to needs-satisfaction, creates the notion of 
friendship (and of course, where unsuccessful, that of enmity). 
Harking back to the idea that imagination creates belief through 
empirical association, the artificial institutions of trust and 
reciprocity are established, 
As the society grows and confronts competing claims for finite 
resources, the greater the challenge on these artifices becomes. 
Empirically, not all societies can withstand this challenge, and either 
break down completely or stop growing. Those that meet the 
challenge, says Hume, do so if two conditions are fulfilled. Firstly, its 
practitioners must consider the practice in question in general terms 
rather than as an isolated act of goodness in its own right. The 
practice must be understood to be artificial. Secondly, the 
practitioner should consider this an act that is as binding upon him 
as it is upon his fellows. No man wishes to be "the cully of his 
integrity". 117 The combined effect of these criteria is that social 
practices come to be seen not as an observation of what people do, 
but a qualitative term: they are rules on what is right and wrong 
[natural], and what should be done [artificial). 
Hume brought a fresh approach to an old problem for moral 
philosophers - the relationship between goodness and obligation. The 
Lutheran divine rightist would claim that man had been essentially 
lost since the Fall and moral knowledge was beyond him. The only 
course of action for man in the absence of his free will was obedience 
to God's representatives on earth, a feudal hierarchy ending in God 
Himself. Calvinists operated at the other extreme, claiming that each 
individual man directly reflected the will of God. In either instance, 
Such as Rousseau's "General Will" (Rousseau, 1968). 
'""Hume, 1978, pp. 484-501. 
Confirmed by contemporary historians of such societies (see Wood 1992). 
"*Hume, 1994, pp. 484-501. 
Hume, 1978, p. 535. Cf. also Rousseau, 1968, Bk. I, Ch. Vm: "The passage from the state of nature to the 
civil state produces a very remarkable change in man, by substituting justice for instinct in his conduct and 
giving his actions the morality they previously lacked". 
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there was little free, human will involved, and as such both were 
rejected by Hume as so much rationalisation of existing power 
structures and / or hocus pocus. 
There were thinkers who offered a more humanistic approach to the 
problem before Hume.n^ Most still wished to find a role for God in 
morality, however, This generally led to the idea that God had 
given man the partial ability to know good from bad, and 
teleologically to know that when natural inclination faltered God's 
will as written in the scriptures would determine the correct course of 
action, to which the good man was obliged even i f in a particular 
instance he was not mcimed.i20 
Hume applied a fairly similar analysis. The point of such things as 
honouring contracts and respecting the property of others is in the 
resultant society that they create, that is to say, their utility. 
Collaboration requires trust, and many things cannot be done without 
collaboration. Thus the general principles of reciprocity in these 
matters create specific instances of achievement, which in turn can 
give the impression that there is some grand design above the world 
of man at work. 121 in this way, actions perceived to be in the public 
good are popular, and property and contract "come to be accepted as 
moral rules", or rights. 122 This acceptance leads people to mistakenly 
consider them as natural, and this becomes a powerful motivator for 
people's obedience to the law (i.e. as natural duties). 
Moving once again from the general to the specific, there can be 
applications of the rules of property that we call justice that do not 
provide satisfactory outcomes for all or even any of the parties 
concerned. As already stated the argument of Hutcheson et al. is that 
at this point it is awareness of God's will within us that guides us. 
Hume accepts that an internalised will is important here, but being 
the staunch humanist that he is he argues instead for the presence of 
Notably Clarke, Hutcheson and Shaftesbury in Hume's time. 
'" Subsequently, too. Kant, whose First Critique had developed from Kant's own studies of Hume's work, 
paid homage to his Protestantism by claiming that faith can rest within the boundaries of knowledge. 
Nonetheless, in reality Kant had presented a case for the impossibility of knowing God that was in no 
substantial way different from that around which Hume's agnosticism had developed. 
'^ ^ This "Christian Utilitarianism" was highly popular during the eighteenth century, particularly that of 
Hutcheson, who argued that when moral institutions are part of God's design for humanity, and that when they 
work properly the welfare of the greatest number in society is guaranteed (see Haakonssen, 1990, and 1993b, 
pp. 61-85). 
The issue over whether Hume accepted the Design Argument is still hotly debated, and in truth Hume 
contradicted himself on the subject on more than one occasion. Notably this includes the contents of the first 
and last paragraphs of The Natural History of Religion, respectively in part: 'The whole frame of nature 
bespeaks an intelligent author; and no rational enquirer can, after serious reflection, suspend his belief a 
moment with regard to the primary principles of genuine Theism and Religion." and "The whole is a riddle, an 
aenigma, an inexplicable mystery. Doubt, uncertainty, suspense of judgement appear the only result of our 
most accurate scrutiny, concerning this subject." (Hume, 1967, pp. 31 and 98). 
'^ ^ Haakonssen, 1993, p. 191. 
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a mechanism that allows us to understand social morals without 
depending on an epiphany. This mechanism is the treatment of 
justice as though it were an instinctive act of goodness, such that 
those who do not follow i t are subject to disapproval of themselves by 
themselves (unless they enjoy wrong) and by their peers. Thus it is 
through a sense of guilt that people derive obligation to pursue the 
perceived just course of action. We disapprove of deficiencies in our 
morality in ourselves and in others. Our moral obligation therefore is 
either natural (like benevolence, perhaps) or social (respect for 
property, for example), and the emotions that affect man's motivation 




How does the sovereign harness the natural recalcitrance of some 
men to the inclination towards allegiance and gallantry of others? 
Justice underscores the civil society. It is the perception of 
influential members of society that underscores the effectiveness of 
the rules that exemplify justice. The fact that most people favour the 
general opinion that some rules that bind society is held to be 
evidenced by man's tendency to create such societies. Equally 
supported by empirical evidence is the fact that these rules are, when 
it comes to the specific application of the principle of justice i.e. law-
making, subject to the inconsistencies and selfishness that is also an 
essential part of human nature. From this need to make and enforce 
these rules, then, comes the institution of government, i^s In Hume's 
terms, we must ask on what basis the government, being essentially a 
servant of the people in a functional civil society, can claim (and 
where necessary, enforce) the allegiance of the members of the 
society? 
Hume answers this question with the same methodology used to 
analyse the rules of justice. He examines the main contemporary 
theories, identifies their weaknesses, and proposes an explanation 
that is rooted in his humanistic dependence on empirical evidence. 
Hume lamented the way in monarchical societies the frequent 
absence of undisputed successors to "the line of princes" produces 
"the violence, and wars, and bloodshed, occasioned by every new 
settlement". He did not (although he could have done) use this as an 
argument in favour of governmental structures with a greater 
democratic input. However what he does say becomes crucial to our 
understanding of his concept of justice: 
"In reality, there is not a more terrible event than a total dissolution of government, 
which gives liberty to the multitude ... Every wise man then wishes to see, at the 
head of a powerful and obedient army, a general who may speedily seize the prize, 
and give to the people a master which they are so unfit to choose for themselves"'24 
Hume, 1978, p. 543. 
In Barker, 1970, p. 159. 
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Hume was no democrat. He shared the Platonic fear of the rule of the 
mob. The time of strife dur ing the various conflicts collectively 
termed the "English Civil War" was not distant for an avid historian 
such as Hume, having riven the Kingdom 61 years before his b i r th i n 
1711.125 Tensions i n the American colony were high, and in the year 
of his death (1776) the War of Independence broke out. Similarly, 
although the French Revolution did not occur u n t i l 13 years after his 
death, the pressures and instabil i ty i n that society were tangible even 
dur ing his l i fet ime. These experiences (see also Chapter 1) left h im 
w i t h a profoundly humanist belief: that social Justice and social 
stabil i ty are the same thing. 
'^^Davies, 1996, pp. 549-53. 
Schama, 1989, Part 1. 
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StabtZity 
What does Hume mean by stability in government? 
I n Hume's thought there are really two aspects to this concept. The 
f i r s t is measured in terms of what the state does and the second in 
terms of who and what actually constitutes the state. 
The practice of government is stable i f there is rule of law. Where 
rules exist, they must exist for all and where necessary must be 
enforced as such. As already mentioned this is vital for the citizens' 
t rus t i n the state, which ult imately sustains i t . As a consequence a 
government must carefully consider what is and is not an appropriate 
area for legislation. Laws that are not to be treated as laws should be 
unmade since they affect the credibil i ty of the whole system. Again, 
the two basic inst i tut ions of justice-social stability are the integrity 
of contract and property, and the abil i ty of the government to 
guarantee these conditions determine the security of the allegiance of 
those upon whom i t relies. 127 
These arguments would probably have led Hume to question the 
wisdom of the Marxist mantra that each should produce according to 
his abi l i ty and receive according to his needs. ^28 The principle may 
indeed be a fine one, but as a plank of government policy i t would 
become highly specific to the individuals concerned, and would create 
a chaotic allocation of resources throughout society that would, to 
say the least, be unlikely to create conditions of peace and harmony. 
Similarly, the argument of the Levellers i n favour of an equalisation 
of property might seem fair, i n principle, but given that i t would 
create a culture of revolutionary give and take that was a recipe for 
rebellion and disintegration of the civil society. 129 
From this we can Interpret Hume's just ice and not simply a matter of 
procedure, but of consequence. As Haakonssen rightly observes: 
"The object of j u s t laws is thus individual liberty and, since the most obvious and 
most endangered expression of s u c h liberty is the acquisition and use of property, 
jus t i ce is centrally concerned with property, and. it follows, with contracts."'3° 
Why are property rights so important? Does Hume think that there is 
anything more to Justice than property? 
Hume, 1994, pp. 16-19. 
'^ ^ Marx & Lenin, 1960. 
Viz. the French Revolution. It is possible to read such sentiments and consider Hume to be little more than 
a defender of the status quo, but this again misses the point that Hume was first and foremost an advocate of 
incremental change rather than social upheaval. Actually his statements were something of a challenge to 
many religious authorities' claims to rightful ownership of the land as God's representatives on earth (see 
Hume, 1751, 3.2, pp. 193-4). 
''"Haakonssen, 1993a, p. 198. 
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The answer lies i n Hume's actual definit ion of property, which is 
divided into "three species of goods". These are the "internal 
satisfaction of the mind , the external advantages of the body, and the 
enjoyment of such possessions as we have acquir'd by our industry 
and good fortune". I t is questionable to imply as Hume seems to that 
there is no such th ing as a tyranny of the mind - let alone the 
body. However i t is quite clear that for the purposes of detailed 
law-making that w i l l govern and hopefully stabilise society into 
something approaching civi l i ty, i t is only this last category of 
property that is subject to the ordinary social pressures of supply and 
demand. The Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals makes 
clear that justice is an artifice for the protection of al l three species 
of goods. In practical terms the easiest one to affect directly is the 
last, and this is why Hume's wr i t ing sometimes seems to suggest that 
that this is the only type that matters. 
Reciprocity and humi l i t y define "common sense", and like Aristotle, 
create the possibility of relationships beyond the immediate and 
int imate (e.g. the family) . Civil society, of which the state is for 
Hume the driving force, i33 jg a means to achieving social harmony, 
which is stability, which equates to justice. Beyond this he inclined 
towards Montaigne's famous rhetorical question, "what t r u t h is that, 
which these mountains bound, and is a lie in the world beyond 
them?". 134 
Is Hume right about Justice? 
The "average" man does seek certainty, the abil i ty to plan. We fight 
speculation and uncertainty; we want to know the likely 
consequences of the range of actions wi th in our reach. It is no 
surprise that the single greatest benefit of a single European currency 
is not a reduction in transactions costs through an end to currency 
conversions but a reduction i n speculation costs through the 
increased certainty of currency stabil i ty in the fu tu re . Contemporary 
events i n post-Soviet Russia have caused nostalgia amongst the 
population even for the "bad old days" of Communism. Greater 
certainty allows people to concentrate time and resources away from 
the essentially negative pursui ts of exploitation and defence. As 
Parris puts i t : 
"Too m u c h political philosophy concerns democracy, too little concerns certainty. 
Certainty under law, certainty of return, certainty of contract has been m u c h 
"The last only are both expos'd to the violence of others, and may be transferr'd without suffering or loss 
or alteration" (Hume, 1978, pp. 487-8). 
'^ ^ Hume, 1751, 3.2, pp. 193-4. 
'^ ^ And certainly was in his time, alongside the Church. 
In Tuck, 1984, p. 97. 
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underrated in the study of development economic and politics ... Allow people to 
plan their own betterment and they will . Official caprice is the greatest oppression. 
W h i c h is to be preferred: certainty or jus t i c e? It must be certainty, for uncertainty 
is the greatest injust ice of air^ ^^ 
D. Gauthier believes that such conditions can avoid the classic 
Prisoners' Dilemma problems in favour of the mutual ly beneficial 
arrangement of collective action. He introduces the concept of the 
rat ionally "constrained maximiser" who accepts certain l imits on the 
maximisat ion of his perceived interests on the assumption that 
others w i l l do the same. Hence the conclusion is that constitutional 
government is the most efficient way, potentially, to organise society 
according to Hobbes' bottom line, "base" terms. 
These terms of mutua l reasonability, good fa i th and interest are not 
an alternative to a Contract of Government i n a civil society but the 
very s tuf f of i t and hence Hume is a Contractarian, of a sort. 
'^'Parris, 1995. 
Gauthier, 1986, Chapter 6. 
51 
Fidelity 
Trust is crucial. Fidelity is an important part of justice, i n social 
terms. Bond-keeping, and where necessary enforcing, is a vi ta l role of 
the state i n c iv i l society. Hume is unambivalent on this matter: 
"society could not otherwise exist". ^ 37 
Government is not necessary to this equation. In the Treatise Hume 
quotes the example of Native American tribes operating domestically 
without recourse to government except i n dealings wi th outsiders. In 
support of the naturalistic interpretation of Hume's work one might 
suggest that i n the animal kingdom, "government" is rare yet society 
is common. I n the jungle, the strong survive for as long as they are the 
strong. Their fate after that point may be brutal. I t is the civi l 
authori ty 's duty that i t should prevent "the encroachments of the 
strong upon the weak, of the violent upon the just and equitable". i38 
Otherwise no interests are served by i ts maintenance, and i t wi l l lose 
the allegiance of those whose allegiance i t needs to survive. 
I n the Treatise Hume claims that man's knowledge of his need for 
government is derived f rom his awareness of actual and potential 
confl ict over property. This awareness is brought about through 
internal strife and external threat: 
"Throw any considerable goods among men, they instantly fall a quarrelling"'^' 
An enlightened, j u s t man "would totally abstain f rom the properties 
of others". But i n the absence of such widespread nobility, 
government is a necessary evil, an exercise in damage l imita t ion. 
Internal factors may or may not produce problems. Such factors 
include the size of the community, relative extremes of wealth and 
the level of "noble" incl inat ion of i ts Inhabitants. 
' " I n Barker, 1970, p. 161. 
'^' Hume, 1978, p. 540. 
139 Hume, 1978, p. 540. 
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More obvious examples arise when the community that precedes the 
government has to deal not internal ly but wi th "outsiders" who do 
not originate f rom the sphere of t rus t or at least cooperation that 
characterises a healthy civil society: 
"And so far am I from thinking with some philosophers, that men are utterly incapable 
of society without government, that I assert the first rudiments of government to arise 
from quarrels, not among men of the same society, but among those of different 
societies" 
I t can also be a force for good. I f the "right" people are involved i n 
running a just system (Hume's exact definitions for both of which are a 
key area of focus for this Thesis): 
" . . . bridges are built; harbours open'd; ramparts rais'd; canals form'd; fleets equip'd; and armies disciplin'd; 
every where, by the care of government, which, by one of the finest and most subtle inventions imaginable, a 
composition, that is, in some measure, exempted from all these infirmities."'"' 
But i n the f i rs t instance, at the level of the roison d'etre, a just 
government has no higher calling than to enforce the three basic 
principles of justice, namely stability of possession, transference by 
consent, and the performance of promises.i42 These are absolutely 
fundamental to the creation not necessarily of a Contract of 
Government but a Contract of Society: 
"But tho' it be possible for men to mainta in a smal l uncultivated society without 
government, 'tis impossible they shou'd maintain a society of any kind without 
just ice , and the observance of those three fundamental laws concerning the stability 
of possession, its translat ion by consent, and the performance of promises ... 
government, upon its first establishment, wou'd naturally be suppos'd to derive its 
obligation from those laws of nature, and, in particular, from that concerning the 
performance of promises. When men have once perceiv'd the necessity of 
government to maintain peace, and execute just ice , they wou'd naturally assemble 
together, wou'd chuse magistrates, determine their power, and promise them 
obedience. As a promise is suppos'd to be a bond or security already in use, and 
attended with a moral obligation, 'tis to be consider'd as the original sanction of 
government, and as the source of the first obligation to obedience"'''^ 
The problem wi th such a pragmatic morality, based around "long-
range self interest", is that a rationale of mutual t rust and 
advantage is insufficient . An enforcer state must be on hand to 
ensure that those who pursue the short-term gains of injustice cannot 
be perceived to be the only "winners" i n society. Crime must be seen 
not to pay, at least to the extent where all regard for the law and the 
state is lost. Hume recognises this in the Treatise: 
""Hume, 1978,p. 540. 
'" Hume 1978, p. 539. 
'"^  In Barker, 1970, p. 154. 
'"' Hume, 1978, p. 541. Of course Hume is at pains to point out both in the Treatise and in "Of the original 
contract" that this is the first instance of government, and that he does not want to imply that the matter of the 
Just government is settled then and there... 
'^Mackie, 1980, p. 106. 
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"The consequences of every breach of equity seem to lie very remote, and are not 
able to counterballance any immediate advantage, that may be reap'd from it. They 
are. however, never the less real for being remote; and as all men are, in some 
degree, subject to the same weakness , it necessari ly happens, that the violations of 
equity m u s t become very frequent in society, and the commerce of men, by that 
means, be render'd very dangerous and uncertain"!^^ 
and again in Of the original contract: 
"Our primary inst incts lead us , either to indulge ourselves in unlimited liberty, or to 
seek dominion over others: A n d it i s reflection only, which engages us to sacrifice 
s u c h strong pass ions to the interests of peace and public order. A small degree of 
experience and observation suffices to teach us , that society cannot possibly be 
maintained without the authority of magistrates, and that this authority must soon 
fall into contempt, where exact obedience is not payed to it. The observation of 
these general and obvious interests is the source of all allegiance, and of that moral 
obligation, which we attribute to it'i^e 
Common belief i n the idea of the Contract of Society is essential to 
society's stabil i ty and hence, perpetuation. However only the naive 
ignore the fact that man's mental and physical imperfectibil i ty 
demands an overarching framework which provides help in 
ident i fy ing and protection of the interests of those under its 
ju r i sd ic t ion . Again, the inst i tut ions of civilisation are inst i tut ions of 
men f i r s t - "subject to al l human infirmit ies" i47 - and of God second (if 
of God at all), there is a need for a governmental system to reflect the 
fa l l ib i l i ty of men in government as in any other walk of life. Hume is 
keen on checks and balances on the power of "the state". Rather 
than a concentration of power he would favour a state in which "the 
balance of power, and the balance of property do not coincide", i^s 
This, then, is the Contract of Government, distinct f rom the Contract 
of Society bu t vi ta l to i ts perpetuation. 
Hume is a contractarian, where the Contract is (1) twofold, between 
the members of Society, and (2) between the Society and the 
Government. The basic concern of the f i r s t is that communal living 
produces tangible benefits for its participants. The terms of the 
second are: 
"to point out the decrees of equality, to punish transgressors, to correct fraud and 
violence, and to oblige men, however reluctant, to consult their own real and 
permanent interests" 
'"'Hume, 1978, p. 535. 
"*Hume, 1994, p. 196. 
"'Hume 1978, p. 539. 
'"** Hume, 1994, p. 18. See also his comments on Athenian democracy in "Of some remarkable customs", op. 
cit. pp.181-2. We might find incongruous his suggestion that amongst his suggestions for criteria that could 
have created a more sophisticated concentration of rulers was a level of property - which in fact it often was -
but this probably does not detract from the gist of his arguments. 
"'Hume, 1994, p. 21. 
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Consent is recognised for the elusive beast that i t is. 
"No compact or agreement ... was expressly formed for general submission ... each 
exertion of authority in the chieftain mus t have been particular ... the sensible 
utility ... made these exertions become ... more frequent; and their frequency 
gradually produced an habitual, and ... voluntary, and therefore precarious, 
acquiescence in the people"'50 
So in Hume any "Contract" between fellow men and between 
government and men is based on "voluntary, and therefore 
precarious, acquiescence in the people". Er^o the civil society needs 
maintenance to survive, and no ruler or good citizen would be wise to 
forget the precariousness of the inst i tut ions, and the balance between 
them, that consti tute that society: 
"Religion ... and other principles or prejudices frequently resist all the authority of 
the civil magistrate; whose power, being founded on opinion, can never subvert 
other opinions, equally rooted with that of h i s title to dominion"'^! 
This does breed i n government, i f not conservatism, a certain innate 
caution, as was Hume's nature. As Viscount Falkland put i t centuries 
beforehand, "when i t is not necessary to change, i t is necessary not 
to change". 152 
'"*In Barker, 1970, p. 149. 
'^'Hume, 1994, p. 23. 
In "A Speech Concerning Episcopacy", delivered 1541, reproduced in A Discourse of Infallibility. 1660. 
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However the idea of "tacit" consent i n the people as part of a 
contractual relationship is dismissed for the nonsense that i t must 
be. We are by and large born into a system of government. When we 
learn the convention of obedience we learn the law as that which 
must be obeyed. Rarely does an individual have the power invested in 
h im or her self to operate i n conditions of choice i n this matter so 
significant as to be described as one of consent, in the absence of 
rebellion. 153 As Haakonssen observes: 
"People of a particularly enthusiast ic cast may, of course, say that they always have 
the choice of dying rather than living with what they consider a tyrannical 
government. These are exactly the people Hume fears most of all because in their 
fanat ic i sm they could destroy existing government, and their wildness of temper 
could never sus ta in a lasting government" 
Hume recognises the fact that governmental authori ty and the liberty 
of the citizenry are i n confl ict i f they are not in balance: 
"In al l governments, there is a perpetual intestine struggle, open or secret, between 
A U T H O R I T Y and L I B E R T Y ; and neither of them can ever absolutely prevail in the 
contest." 
For a civi l society, as Hume acknowledges, "liberty is the perfection". 
Yet he argues that l iberty wi thout authority is anarchy, and the kind 
of freedom one associates wi th the jungle rather than civilised 
society. In order to protect man f rom man, f rom himself and f rom 
the elements, "a great sacrifice of l iberty must necessarily be 
made".155 
Hume suggests that "free" government features a division of 
executive powers united under a common but largely symbolic 
sovereign. Laws are to be made according to accepted process, and 
the rule of law is universally applicable and enforced. In other words, 
civi l society is not arbitrary, i^e 
As already stated, allegiance (Hume's word for his version of consent) 
to society creates the need for government. Government can only 
therefore demand the allegiance of the people i f i t delivers justice, 
which is f i rs t and foremost peace (internally and externally). 
Allegiance to government is, l ike just ice and government themselves, 
a r t i f i c ia l . Also like just ice , once the interest served i n the existence 
of and obedience to the government is apparent, allegiance becomes a 
pseudo-natural sentiment of the good citizen. Under these conditions 
the absence of such loyalty to the state is considered a personal 
'" Hume, 1978, pp. 534-50. 
'''Haakonssen, 1993a, p. 192-3. 
Hume, 1994, p. 22. 
"'Hume, 1994,p. 23. 
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deficiency and the state has a funct ional foundation of support 
amongst i ts citizens. 
I f this description seems more or less familiar to the late 20^^ Century 
inhabi tant of a "Western Liberal Democracy" then i t should impress 
upon us how thoroughly prescient Hume was 250 years ago. He 
remains not simply an interesting stage i n the history of some linear 
philosophical "development" bu t a highly pertinent thinker for today. 
'" Hume, 1978, p. 545. 
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Justice in practice 
Does Hume offer a credible concept of a public interest? How does it 
fit into his vision civil society? 
I t is quite clear f rom his work that Hume considered the public 
interest to be all policies, behaviour and activities that sustained the 
civi l society. The civi l society of the eighteenth century United 
Kingdom was the largely commercial social order surrounding the 
material benefits of secure government, rule of law in commercial 
transactions, and the spread and deepening of civic freedoms.i^s 
Later Tom Paine used the concept to distinguish an area of the social 
whole that encompassed all except the state itself (i.e. the "non-
polit ical": markets, churches, families, clubs, universities, the stock 
exchange). 
Marx offered a new perspective on the concept when he observed that 
in practice these bourgeois freedoms did not really extend to all areas 
of the non-poli t ical , and were i n fact a perk for those who could afford 
them. Freedom to eat what one chooses means l i t t le i f one does not 
have the wherewithal to buy i t . Rights for those who were starving or 
homeless were s t i l l t h in on the ground in Hume's time. There is l i t t le 
in his wri t ings to suggest that he had a particular policy in mind for 
those who did not share his fair ly fortunate background. To a large 
extent he had the robustness of a man self-educated through his 
wri t ings and tutorials . He shared the general Enlightenment attitude 
towards the idea of the civil society as an order which includes all the 
inf luent ia l poli t ical and non-political uni ts of the society, and which 
is geared through these mechanisms for the benefit of those who 
come under the jur isdic t ion of its state. This was progress enough, in 
the context of historical events i n England, France and the colony of 
America. 
So in Hume's civi l society the state is a component, albeit a uniquely 
special one. But i n fact the state is only one of society's two hearts. 
The other is the economy, and certainty of contract and laws that 
affect property reach such prominence i n his th ink ing that his theory 
of just ice becomes to a large extent a defence of property rights. This 
can be jus t i f i ed i f one takes this to include one's property to include 
one's person. 
Throughout Hume's political works i t is clear that he has l i t t le 
interest i n revolution as a medium for constructive change: 
'^ ^ In general, of course; this statement certainly does not mean to imply that all transactions of that time took 
place within the law or that the richer members of society were not able to receive preferential treatment at 
times, but simply that a greater certainty of contract was available under conditions of a strong mediator state 
than in its absence. 
Which were to become enshrined in the Reform Acts of 1832,1867, and 1885. 
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"The crime of rebellion among the ancients was commonly expressed by the terms 
neoterizein, novas res moUri." 
Yet he is not a conservative. The single most important aspect of the 
status quo is its defining characteristic, that is to say, peace. That 
peace is just ice, i n Hume's terms. Yet since all things are subject to 
change and development, and whi ls t technological change in Hume's 
time may seem almost stationary by today's breakneck standards, i t 
is the scientist who brings about the most significant developments 
in man's capacity and environment. Hume was well aware of this. 
Change is endemic to all things. How a species deals wi th change 
determines that species' long-term prospects for survival. Similarly 
for the civi l society, a capacity to develop to meet new challenges and 
opportunities is vi ta l . Hume's paradigm is that progress is linked to 
underlying stability and security. The embrace of the new can only 
be supported by the consolidation of the old. In the euphoria of the 
former i t is easy for the naive revolutionary idealist - and those he 
carries w i t h h im - to overlook the importance of the latter un t i l i t is 
too late. 
"To strive for novelty". 
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As Anthony Daniels has observed: 
"This tendency to anger - or self-righteousness - is promoted by a historiography 
which sees progress through the ages as the result of pure and irreducible political 
opposition to what already exists. What exists didn't have to be created by (among 
other things) h u m a n ingenuity: and insofar as it is better than what existed before, 
it too is the result of the struggle against what pre-existed it. Bakunin ' s claim that 
the urge to destroy is also a constructive urge has been subtly transmuted into the 
dictum that the urge to destroy is the only constructive urge."'^' 
Is the promotion of the rule of law and general endorsement of the 
status quo indicative of lax morali ty and vested interest? Potentially, 
yes. Marx would have us consider this to be the case i n regard to 
bourgeois just ice. Thrasymachus would have us believe that that is 
indeed the essence of any just ice in practice. But as Socrates 
answered Thrasymachus, so too would Hume answer Marx that with 
certain qualif ications and w i t h a motive of belief i n the possibility of 
individual and corporate advancement, i t need not be 50.1^2 Again, i t 
may help to view the poli t ical spectrum in scientific terms. In the 
sciences, a challenge against tradit ion is not valued per se. Such a 
revolt is only valued when qualified by the one criterion that really 
matters - whether i t brings us closer to the t r u th . In the meantime 
things that we might consider "essential" to the ident i ty of civil 
society, like perhaps the monarchy, ought by defini t ion to be able to 
mainta in that position. Other more progressive features of that civil 
society, such as a universal, comprehensive health provision for its 
citizens, must be given the highest pr ior i ty i n government: 
" ... a c ircumstance , w h i c h is essential to the existence of civil society, must always 
support itself, and needs to be guarded with less jealousy, than one that contributes 
only to its perfection, w h i c h the indolence of men is so apt to neglect, or their 
ignorance to overlook."i^s 
In government, Hume is i n line wi th Deng Xiaoping's pragmatic 
dic tum: "It doesn't matter whether a cat is black or white so long as 
i t catches mice". Yet Hume is not a moral cynic. Many who knew 
h im personally, including Carlyle and Smith, would and did testify to 
his "warm heart and clear brain".'^s His ethic is altruistic, and he is 
quite clear that as far as he is concerned morality has humanity 
rather than divini ty as its foundation. In general, good morahty (i.e. 
justice) is to someone's benefit. To whose benefit precisely is another 
matter, discussed in Plato's Republic by Socrates and Thrasymachus 
and by many commentators since. But whether private or public, i t 
cannot be selfish. I t must be an act that excites the sympathies of 
the observer. Thus i t becomes clear how justice and property rights 
'*' Daniels, 1997. 
'*^  In other words, depending on who and how... 
'"Hume, 1994,p. 23. 
'*^  In Burton, 1997, p. 26. 
'*^  Braham, Op. Cit., p. 75. 
60 
w i l l converge. Furthermore there is an extremely significant 
d is t inc t ion between the in i t i a l motivat ion of the development of an 
ins t i tu t ion and the subsequent motivation f rom which we can assess 
its wor th . 
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^enominationaZj Religion and the State 
What are these common imaginings that have such power? 
Above al l , i n Hume's time - and arguably for all human history - the 
pre-eminent answer to this question is religion. I have noted already 
that man seeks certainty to make sense of the chaos of life.i^e That 
i t is not as strong and universal a "propensity" as towards those of 
sensation and experience does not change the fact that i t is a 
powerful binding force. In his Dialogues concerning Natural Religion 
Hume assumes the existence of the divine. His focus is on the nature 
of that d iv in i ty . 167 Taking into account the scepticism inherent i n 
his work, i t s t i l l seems fair to say that Hume is aware that there are 
many things on earth and beyond that conform to some sort of 
coherent pattern. Obviously the universe is not to be explained i n 
purely human terms, and i t is not completely random. So in the 
sense of certain consistencies i n action and reaction, and i n the 
metaphysics that may operate between them, "controlling forces" of 
the universe appear to exist. As far as Hume is concerned the nature 
of these forces, conceived as Nature herself, a Father Christmas 
character si t t ing on a throne i n cloud-borne Heaven, or any other 
imagining, is i n fact incomprehensible, and yet another reason for 
intel lectual humi l i ty . 
'** It would be a distraction to be drawn here into a discussion of scientific "chaos" and "antichaos"; suffice to 
say that the more one analyses the basic building blocks upon which we place our certainties the more we 
wonder what shifting sands they are, viz. the bizarre behaviour of electrons, quarks etc suggested by Quantum 
Physics (see Gilmore, 1995, Gleick, 1987, Lecomber, 1992). 
'*' "Surely where reasonable men treat of these subjects the question can never be concerning the Being, but 
only the Nature of the Deity." (Philo, in Hume, 1989, Part 1). 
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There is much evidence through the words of Cleanthes in the 
Dialogues that Hume's belief in human exceptionalism comes from 
his promotion of the Design argument (that was also later used by 
Kant): 
"The chief and sole argument for a divine existence is derived from the order of 
nature" 
As a political observer Hume is well aware of the impact of religion. 
In Of the origin of government he states that religion is historically 
one of the most important motivating and binding factors in the 
coming together of individuals to form collectives. i69 Its significance 
also presents a potential challenge to the pre-eminence of the state in 
civil society. Here lies the key contrast between the thoughts of 
Hume and Hobbes on the matter of the sovereignty of the state. In 
both cases the "contract" is made with men not God. Religious 
appeals are in fact a practical tool to ensure obedience, i^o The role of 
the state is not to dictate morality but to arbitrate between the 
different practices and courses of actions that may occur through 
different moralities.i^i 
For Hobbes, in the tradition of Grotius, Locke et al, certain rights are 
absolute, immutable - and identifiable. Beyond this, moral authority 
is in the hands of the Sovereign. Subjects may seek to influence but 
not challenge the Sovereign's judgement while he continues to 
honour the covenant, that is to say, offers "sufficient" security. 
For Hume on the other hand, we have to remember that everything is 
viewed through a profoundly anti-absolutist lens. Justice, freedom, 
even rationality itself are external moral artifices intended to enable 
stable society. Hume the outsider puts much of himself into the 
strong undercurrent of individualism in his writings. The concepts of 
freedom and morality, though external pressures may define them, 
come from within. 
Hence the notion of some form of individual consent is an essential 
ingredient of state legitimacy rather for Hume, whereas Hobbes is 
rather more satisfied with the idea of an original, static contract. 
'*^ Enquiry, "of a Particular Providence and of a Future State". It is an argument that has echoes of Hobbes' / 
Descartes' Prime Mover argument. All things are observed to feature movement, and all movement is energy 
derived from another source. What then was the original source of movement / energy? By our understanding 
this argument demands the existence of something beyond the universal cycle, to have started the ball rolling, 
as it were. The Dialogues do reveal some hesitancy here however. We know from elsewhere that Hume is 
reluctant to accept as a Matter of Fact the existence of innate ideas / properties, since we have only access to 
our own perceptions (Hume, 1978, p. 160). 
'^'Hume, 1994, p. 23. 
'™ Both men were noted for their at best ambivalence to the existence of the Judaeo-Christian God; in De Cive 
Hobbes argues that atheism is not a sin (Hobbes, 1972, Vol. II). 
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Equally Hobbes believes that the natural rights of man to (1) self-
preservation and (2) freedom from wanton attack by another are at 
the basis of any such compact. Hume does not argue even this - he 
does not want to be drawn into the dilemmas of the natural rights 
debate, and it does not to him seem to matter. The natural interest 
of all but the most perverse is security, and thus we have our 
criterion for legitimacy. 
Hume hopes that by accepting the Design argument of a finite (i.e. 
bound by the world of impressions and ideas) "God", societies can 
bond in an atmosphere of rational piety. In these societies mutual 
tolerance is the goal, as a consequence of this humility, rather than 
the imposition of one particular set of moral beliefs. We are all 
ignorant believers. Man exists in conditions that are conducive to 
good and evil, which in themselves are man-made concepts from 
wherever they may have been derived. Pontificating about the 
infinite is a waste of time, though Hume never denies their possibility 
any more than he asserts i t . Once again we come to Hume the 
defender of a fearful freedom: 
"Look around this universe. What an immense profusion of beings, animate and 
organised, sensible and active. You admire this prodigious variety and fecundity. 
But inspect a little more narrowly these living existences, the only beings worth 
regarding. How hostile and destructive of each other! How insufficient all of them 
for their own happiness! How contemptible or odious to the spectator. The whole 
presents nothing but the idea of a blind nature impregnated by a great vivifying 
principle and pouring forth from her lap, without discernment or parental care, her 
maimed and abhortive children. Epicurus' questions are yet unanswered. Is God 
willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then He is impotent. Is He able, but not 
willing? Then He is malevolent. Is He both able and willing? Whence, then, is 
e v i l ? - i 7 2 
In other words it is up to us. Do we ever really consent to 





As already mentioned Hume has serious qualifications for appeals to 
tacit consent, since these usually involve the Socratic^^s notion that 
i f one chooses to remain within the boundaries of the state one is 
bound by the jurisdiction of that state: 
"Can we seriously say, that a poor peasant or artizan has a free choice to leave his 
country, when he knows no foreign language or manners, and lives from day to day 
by the small wages which he acquires? We may as well assert, that a man, by 
remaining in a vessel, freely consents to the dominion of the master; though he was 
carried on board while asleep, and must leap into the ocean, and perish, the moment 
he leaves her."1^4 
Certainly in today's terms this makes consent a very middle class 
prerogative, at best. Yet "the perception of political power is close to 
being the essence of that power" i^^^ as Hume acknowledges: 
"The force, which now prevails, and which is founded on fleets and armies, is plainly 
political, and derived from authority, the effect of established government. A man's 
natural force consists only in the vigour of his limbs, and the firmness of his 
courage; which could never subject multitudes to the command of one. Nothing but 
their own consent, and their sense of the advantages resulting from peace and order, 
could have had that influence."^^^ 
What Hume categorically rejects is that have sporadically given 
consent over time, that the current generation have bound 
themselves and their descendants more or less irrevocably into a 
particular status in the chain of command: 
"It is in vain to say, that all governments are, or should be, at first founded on 
popular consent, as much as the necessity of human affairs will admit ... in the few 
cases where consent may seem to have taken place, it was commonly so irregular, so 
confined, or so much intermixed either with fraud or ignorance, that it cannot have 
any great authority" 
From this we begin to see how, rather than being opposing or even 
distinct viewpoints, divine rightists and original contractarians are 
putting forward much the same argument - those not in power have, 
on the whole, no right to do anything about i t . Or alternatively, they 
represent a common call for revolution through obligation. The 
status quo is immoral! We must rebel! Either way, scant attention is 
paid here to the status of the citizen as an independent entity 
entitled to his own opinion. 
See Plato's Crito, referred to by Hume, quoted in Barker, 1970, pp. 155-6. 
"'Hume, 1994, p. 193. 
Maidment & Tappin, 1989, p. 100. 
'^'Hume, 1994, p. 188. 
'"Hume, 1994, p. 192. 
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Hume is fighting the notion of a "philosophical origin to 
government"; such a thing, he believes, has not been, cannot be, and 
does not need to be the basis of political obligation. Governments 
that come to power through struggles based on metaphysics are 
frauds right from the start. Politics is about power, and it is what is 
done with that power in practical terms which counts (see A principle 
of government and citizenship, pp. 81-84). Sui generis the state has a 
coercive intrusion upon the life of the average citizen. What should 
matter to the citizen are what tangible benefits he gets in return for 
his "great sacrifice of liberty". 
From here we start to see that though Hume pursues an 
individualistic line he is wary of following the easier path to 
concluding, in the words of the anarchist Federica Montseny, "The 
words government and authority signified the negation of every 
possibility of freedom for man".i78 AS is clear from preceding quotes 
there are echoes in Hume's analysis of the origins of society and 
government of the Hobbesian state of nature. The state of nature of 
course represents the literal anarchist ideal - brutal freedom. Hume's 
state of nature is one where man is able to conceive of ways in which 
his lot could be improved, i.e. an environment from which to escape 
not seek. 
Hume is not challenging the possibility of legitimate government 
authority. However, having exposed the flaws of the two main 
philosophies of his time regarding such authority, he does put upon 
himself the task of proving the existence of "some other foundation 
of government". He does this by asserting that since "FORCE is 
always on the side of the governed" those who govern must court 
public opinion, or most specifically enough public opinion to carrv 
the support of the enforcers (the "praetorian bands" 1^°). Popular 
unanimity is no more essential to good government than it is likely. 
InBlinkhom, 1988, p. 11. 
In Barker, 1970, p. 154. 
'^°Hume, 1994, p. 16. 
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In Hume's view there are two kinds of "opinion". The first is interest-
based, being the sense of advantage gained from a particular 
government, and right-based. Right-hased opinion concerns either 
power, via antiquity, inheritance, a general sense of the 
appropriateness of continuity, or property, specifically the 
entitlement of a citizen to certain possessions and/or standards of 
living. 
As far as Hume is concerned these factors in popular opinion, from 
which the "grounds" for popular consent may or may not be derived, 
are at the heart of de jure and de facto government authority. It is 
the way that these factors are regarded, in terms of "self-interest, fear 
and affection", that determine the level of consent in the civil 
society. 
Is Hume entertaining some uncertainty on this matter? He seems 
not to wish to take a stance on whether self-interest is paramount in 
justifying a government, as he seems to propose in Of the original 
contract, or whether i t is the public interest, in a more utilitarian 
sense suggested in Of the first principles of government, that is more 
important. The answer appears to be that the second part of opinion, 
right-based, is in fact one of self-interest. Thus we come to a more 
satisfying clarification: public opinion is fundamentally determined 
by the coincidence of public and private interest. C. H. Rolph 
exemplifies this in his observation of the impact of Churchill's 
"Finest Hour" speech in 1940: 
"Men who, to my knowledge, had always detested each other were united in a surge 
of righteousness that they barely understood, even if they later came to see it as 
self-preservation disguised as brotherhood"'^2 
What precisely does Hume mean by "self-interest"? Self-interest is 
the concern for specific rewards rather than general advantages of a 
particular government. This source of de jure authority is likely to 
come as a result of a de facto authority already established. A similar 
argument underlines the secondary nature of "fear and affection": 
"No man would have any reason to fear the fury of a tyrant, if he had no authority 
over any but from fear"i83 
"A man's natural force consists only the vigour of his limbs, and the firmness of his 
courage; which could never subject multitudes to the command of one"'^ "* 
A single man without authority cannot dominate the masses 
physically; he must rely on the obedience of others via respect. 
Hume, 1994, p. 17. 
In Sparkes, 1994, p. 104. 
"'Hume, 1994, p. 16. 
'^''Hume, 1994, p. 188. 
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Similarly with affection: we frequently have affection for others 
without granting them any kind of sovereignty, 
The notion of consent, fundamental to the quasi-contractarian 
philosophy of the state of Hume, demands not only that the citizen 
should choose but also that he should know that he has a choice. If 
he does not, he like an animal obeys only his basic instincts. As such 
he is, i f not sub-human, certainly sub-civilised. He tacitly denies 
himself any option other than obedience by accepting without 
question the perpetuity of his father's constitution. Aldous Huxley 
suggested that: 
"the root and primal cause of bondage is wrong belief, or ignorance - an ignorance. 
let us remember, which is never completely invincible, but always, in the last 
analysis, a matter of will. If we don't know, it is because we find it convenient not 
to know. Original ignorance is the same as original sin.''*86 
Having said this, Hume was well aware of the fact that it took 
exceptional men to be good leaders, and often exceptional 
circumstances (e.g. war) to find them: 
"It is probable, that the first ascendant of one man over multitudes began during a 
state of war; where the superiority of courage and of genius discovers itself most 
visibly, where unanimity and concert are most requisite, and where the pernicious 
effects of disorder are most sensibly felt."187 
Whether one considers Hume a democrat or not naturally depends on 
what one means by democracy; probably the parts of Lincoln's famous 
assessment of the democratic constitution as "of the people, for the 
people, by the people" that Hume would endorse would be the first 
two. The majority of the population do not deserve "or even expect 
and desire" to rule themselves. Participatory democracy of an 
Athenian nature was a recipe for disaster. A regard only for the 
immediate wil l of the majority "without any limitation of property, 
without any distinction of rank, without controul from any 
magistracy or senatei^^" was one "without regard to order, justice, or 
prudence."190 
Hence Machiavelli's observation in The Prince that "it is desirable to be both, but because it is difficult to 
join them together, it is much safer for a prince to be feared than loved, if he is to fail in one of the two" 
(Machiavelli, 1961, Chapter VIII). 
Huxley, 1945, p. 300. 
Hume, 1994, p. 22. 
In Barker, 1970, p. 158. 
Except the senate of the Bean, which Hume dismisses as "only a less numerous mob" (Hume, 1994, p. 
181). 
"°Hume, 1994, p. 181. 
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It is interesting 
a. that Hume feels that there should be criteria limiting the suffrage 
c ind 
b. which criteria he suggests might be the most reasonable. 
He does not suggest sex, or age. Yet class - and top of the list, 
property - do seem relevant factors in a citizen's right to be on the 
electoral roll in Hume's civil society. 
In a civil society "the people" in the main seek leadership. Only the 
relative few have both the talent and the inclination to do the job. So 
for Hume whilst consent is vital to civil society, unanimity is an 
unattainable and unnecessary judgement. The continual referral to 
the people for their explicit consent for each and every act of 
government is not only an intrusion but also a challenge to a basic 
facet of human nature. 
Much learned debate has concerned the supposed atheism of Hobbes, 
and Hume too was known in some quarters of Edinburgh as "The 
Atheist". Neither is wholly accurate, as I have suggested. It would 
be fairer to think of both men as academic agnostics. They are too 
practical to wish to rely on alarming leaps of faith, and too honest to 
concoct a rationalisation of a position they consider unproven. 
Accordingly Man - or certain men in positions of power - can make 
good or i l l , and his fate is not necessarily predetermined by 
benevolent or other forces entirely beyond his control, in the manner 
of Augustine's Citu of God.^^^ 
See, for instance, Fieser, J. , 1995. 
''^ In his Theism as in much of his other work he is trying to stimulate his readers by posing questions rather 
than answering them. T. H. Huxley is wrong to dismiss it as "shadowy and inconsistent". Taken empirically, 
as it is quite clear all of Hume's work should be, he is saying that the finite resources that are available to us, 
mentally and physically, cannot permit us comprehension of the infinite. 
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His scepticism does not blind him to the fact that the objects of 
allegiance are crucial foundations of the stability that made the 
Contract of Society in the first place and from which the Contract of 
Government was derived.i^^ There is a strong conservatism in man's 
attitude to his government. The divine rightists of the pre-
Enlightenment time argued that in our ignorance of God's Plan For 
The Universe, we should accept our circumstances as inevitable. This 
includes the inevitable authority of our rulers. Using this argument 
does of course reduce ad absurdia. Without choice there is no 
responsibility, without responsibility there is no right or wrong 
behaviour, and whatever we do - whether we support the sovereign or 
destroy him - is a consequence of God's Plan, and therefore any issue 
should be taken up directly with Him. 
In this way divine or hereditary rights to govern are dismissed by 
Hume. However he can see a justification i f they f i t into his plan - on 
the grounds of utility, i.e. i f i t avoids anarchy, provides a source of 
bonding in the civil society. 
Hume uses stability not simply as a consequence but also a source of 
authority: 
"Some innovations must necessarily have place in every human institution, and it is 
happy where the enlightened genius of the age give these a direction to the side of 
reason, liberty, and justice ... but violent innovations no individual is entitled to 
make : they are even dangerous to be attempted by the legislature : more ill than 
good is ever to be expected from them'''^ '* 
There is a vital transition between the Dialogues and the later 
Enquirij. Good government is possible, because moral attributes are 
identifiable. Reason and appetite define man. Reason is not 
negotiable by God or anyone else. 
Hume, 1978, pp. 539-567. 
In Barker, 1970, p. 158. 
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Hume concedes that man himself and hence his appetites are created 
things, and without making bold claims about the identity of man's 
creator, the sentiments of approval or disapproval are common to all: 
"Reason, being cool and disengaged, is no motive to action, and directs only the 
impulse ... by showing us the means of attaining happiness and avoiding misery. 
Taste, as it gives pleasure and pain, and thereby constitutes happiness or misery, 
becomes a motive to action, and is the first impulse to desire and volition. From 
circumstances or relations, known or supposed, the former leads to the discovery of 
the concealed and unknown; after all circumstances and relations are laid before us, 
the latter makes us feel from the whole a new sentiment of blame or approbation. 
The standard of the one, being founded in the essential nature of things, is eternal 
and inflexible even by the will of the Supreme Being; the standard of the other, 
arising from the eternal frame and constitution of animals, is ultimately derived 
from that Supreme Will which bestowed on each being its peculiar nature and 
arranged the several classes and orders of existence."'^^ 
Absolute knowledge of the basis of the sensation of right and that of 
wrong is not the lot of man the finite, just as knowledge of God is said 
by many believers to be beyond our comprehension. And we can be 
incorrect in our judgement. But it is out there, and we can approach 
it, in the manner of Plato's man in the cave seeking the source of the 
light that pervades the surrounding darkness, That is the clearest 






In Of the first principles of government Hume makes references to 
how the "lawful" ("law" here meaning both constitutional and 
legitimate) sovereign comes to reign. The present is what matters, 
but our view of the present is a consequence of our perception of the 
past. Stability demands the general acceptance of the "imagination-
based" principles mentioned earlier (pp. 45-6). These principles, 
being historical possession, current possession, "legitimate" conquest 
- in Hume's opinion it matters a great deal to the vanquished the way 
in which they were vanquished i ^ ^ - hereditary succession and the 
value in positive law-making assume an interesting mixture in the 
human spirit of a strongly conservative ideology of continuity and 
respect for the dynamics of progress, i ^ ^ Hume's understanding of 
human nature is reflected in the balance that these forces can attain 
for the good, but as all with any polarised balancing items, there is 
the possibility of upset i f the balance is not made. 
The fact that in practice for the state "its first authority was derived 
from usurpation and violence" suggests that original Contracts of 
Government were rarely more than power plays of the great.i^^ As 
such the authority was largely practical. As Proudhon suggested, 
possession of anything is based on exclusion, a view which echoes 
Himie's opinion that:2oo 
"there is no property in durable objects, such as lands or houses, when carefully 
examined in passing from hand to hand, but must, in some period, have been foimded 
on fraud and injustice"2oi 
Hence in the first instance leadership is an exclusion of certain aspects 
of a man's freedom. This is a complex issue but one that is firmly 
rooted in the present. The grounds for legitimacy are individual and 
subject to constant re-examination. There is a dangerous but 
theoretical case for saying that we can therefore pick and choose the 
laws that suit us. Indeed that is what we do. But we must not forget 
that the Contract of Government is a development from the Contract 
of Society. When we litter or travel above the speed limit in a car we 
do not consider ourselves a threat to society, and it may well be that 
the state does not either. However i f a person steals, or rapes, or 
Defeat by a stronger external enemy is more readily accepted than the loss of an internecine quarrel. 
Familiarity can breed contempt, and it is much harder to lose to a rival for whom one has no respect. It was 
popular notion in inter-War Germany that Germany had lost the War as a result of having been "stabbed in the 
back" by immigrants and above all Jews. Hitler's skilful exploitation of such a perspective helped to 
popularise Nazism in its early stages. Certainly, usurpation is not a principle that is likely to bind society to 
the usurper, for if it succeed, who dares call it usurpation... 
Hume 1994, p. 18. 
"'Hume, 1978, p. 556. 
'^^  "Property is theft", in Qu'est-ce que c'est la propriete? (Proudhon, 1840, Chapter 1). 
Hume, 1994, p. 197. 
72 
murders, there is a clear breach of the stability principle, of justice. 
What i f we were all to behave thus? Hence whilst as an individual the 
person may be exercising his freedom of judgement, the state exercises 
Its duty in protecting the rest of society by the means necessary to the 
general stability.202 Hume's point here is that there are other aspects 
of a man's potential that are released through the security that the 
right government can engender that makes him "freer" than he was 
before. 





Comments on Hmne's political philosophy 
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Whilst Plato and his successors in Western political thinking tended to 
create elaborate theories about the nature of the just state and the 
good life, and of right and wrong in general, they made assumptions 
about nature, both physical and metaphysical.203 These assumptions, 
however rational their subsequent arguments, were based in subjective 
viewpoints. Like it or not (and many of them would not), making 
claims about "natural" rights - to the extent that they might be 
enforced upon others - demands a leap of faith somewhere between 
intuition and epiphany. Wittgenstein's observation that "whereof one 
cannot speak, thereof one must be silent" was intended to be a 
statement of the obvious.204 i t is not simply a matter of saying what 
the rights of man are; there is an enormous hill to climb simply to 
satisfy the sceptic that there is any such thing as a right at all. And 
this challenges the very heart of political theory. Philosophy has 
become logic, and logic, like mathematics, is, however complex, 
tautologous.205 In other words, the answer is in the question - and we 
are left fearing that political "science" is no more than a series of 
rationalisations of different historical stages in power politics. 
See Tamas, 1991, Chs. 1, II, III, IV, V for a discussion of this theme. 
^"''Wittgenstein, 1961, Ch. 7. 
^°^See Stewart, 1998. 
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Hume's "common sense" 
David Hume confronted the issue of the absence of an objective, 
knowable criterion for justice in traditional political theory. He 
rejected the idea of the divine rule of authority as a logically absurd 
rationalisation of tyranny. But he had no more time for specious 
arguments claiming the existence of a social contract like Magna Carta 
that binds current and future generations of subjects to the commands 
of the sovereign. Hume was comfortable neither with absolutism nor 
relativism. His moral philosophy was based around the belief that life 
without happiness is imfulfilled, whatever else one might achieve. The 
fulfilment that brings happiness varies from person to person. Some 
people, in the Greek tradition of telos, are best suited to public service 
whilst others are more natural traders and artisans.206 
Hume observed that fundamental to the functional society was an 
absence of civil unrest. His observations were made around the time of 
the English Civil War and the French Revolution. The sheer sense of 
outrage that he felt at the way disinterested civilians were caught up in 
the worst of the atrocities that such instability created is something 
we can, should, must share. We need only look at the despicable 
actions of man against man, and even child against child, in the world 
around us, in Algeria, Liberia, Bunmdi, Rwanda, Chad, Nigeria, 
Afghanistan, Bosnia, to Iraq's treatment of the Kurds and Indonesia's 
treatment of East Timor under Suharto. Must we still refuse to commit 
ourselves, to pass judgement, because it is not our neighbours or we 
ourselves who suffer? Some say so; I cannot help but despise them for 
i t , for their callousness, their narrow-mindedness and lack of 
compassion. There are none so blind as those that refuse to see. 
'^^  See Barker, 1945; or more specifically, see Plato, 1993, pp. 60,119,165 & Aristotle, 1981, pp. 183-5. 
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Belief systems 
Hume may have doubted religion but he always remained fascinated by 
the beliefs of others because of the thought processes upon which they 
were dependent and the actions that they instigated. 
The rationale behind the idea of a state which aspires to stand aloof 
from matters of belief is appealing in empirical terms both for Hume's 
time and our own. Hobbes lived through the English Civil War and 
the Huguenots were persecuted and expelled from France only 26 
years before Hume's birth. The limpieza de sangre of Torquemada's 
Inquisition 500 years ago is echoed in the behaviour of contemporary 
"ethnic cleansers" in the Balkans, East Timor, Tibet and parts of sub-
Saharan Africa. Hume shares Hobbes' objective of non-ideological 
government. As Tuck observes of the latter: 
"Strong beliefs allied to powerful institutions were anathema to him: men had to be 
defended from the physical force of fanatics ... The power of the state to determine 
ideological matters was a precondition for using it to smash the ideologues, and it is 
not at all clear that Hobbes intended his sovereign to have any strong beliefs of his 
own ... the institutions which would oppress men intellectually were above all 
Churches, since their whole raison d'etre was to get people to believe various 
improbable things"207 
Likewise, Hume was attempting to be "reasonable" in an intellectual 
climate that tended either toward the mysticism of divinely inspired 
authority, or the rationalist belief that reason, along the lines of pure, 
unfettered mathematical logic could f i l l all the "metaphysical" gaps, if 
properly applied. These latter beliefs, based upon enormous 
intellectual arrogance of the sort that Hume so delighted in 
puncturing, tended towards drastic systematic programmes for the 
reform of society that were more akin to revolution. 
207 Tuck, 1984, pp. 106-7. 
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devolution, reform and the status quo 
Hume was not an enthusiast for changing things, in general. Man must 
sometimes challenge and innovate as part of his nature, his search for 
betterment. Making him do so, "forcing him to be free" as i t were, is 
rather less natural. Beaten paths may well be for beaten men, and 
Hume was aware of this. Change in the Contract of Government is fine 
because Hume is so careful to emphasise that good government is not 
measured by a plethora of criteria. The ways to judge just government 
are few, large, and very, very important. This is why he points out the 
absurdity of the idea that living under dominion does not create a 
"tacit" consensual relationship that justifies the ruler's action to the 
point of revolt. There is a clear distinction between dejure and de 
facto sovereignty. Similarly Hume does not see why we must be bound 
by a one-off contract into which we are bom, and are bound by thereof. 
Instead Hume's reasonability was based around pragmatism, what one 
might refer to as "common sense" (would that i t were so common!). 
Stability and certainty, being the opposites of turmoil and caprice, 
were the conditions imder which human happiness could flourish. 
There was no guarantee, no Utopian promise that in a coimtry with no 
war or famine that contentedness would be the inevitable fate of every 
citizen. But i t did begin to allow the sort of freedom to plan and 
develop that could enhance its possibility. 
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Balance 
There was clearly then in government, as in life,208 a need for balance 
between tolerance and intolerance. Given that all sorts of elements 
make up societies, just as our instincts pull us in different directions, 
the identification of that balance between the man and the citizen has 
proven an appealing challenge for many political thinkers. A 
"Community" is therefore extremely difficult to identify. Yet i t is a 
rare, anti-social, and extraordinarily perverse individual who would 
rather live in a society characterised by random violence and death, 
famine, disease, lies, deception and ruthless exploitation. This polar 
juxtaposition is what the Spanish describe as the two nations in their 
souls. The one desires and believes in the possibility for a great and 
structured society that ensures the morally correct behaviour citizens. 
The other treasures almost animalistically the propensity of man to 
seek his own path and live free from the restrictions and constraints of 
government. Even General Francisco Franco - not a noted libertine -
observed that "at heart, all Spaniards are anarchists".209 One might 
even venture further and suppose that this balance is at the core of 
what we generically term "the human condition". 
It does seem sensible to speak of collective security, strength in 
numbers, etc. Even this does depend however on a certain ontology. 
Many philosophers have valued unrestrained emotion above the 
application of philosophical reasoning, leading to the characteristics of 
balance and restraint. A little over a hundred years after Hume's death 
Nietzsche promoted the idea of the "affirmative man" who rejected 
what Nietzsche saw as the hypocrisy of the idea that a man has any 
"duty" to anyone other than himself: 
"The concept 'sin' invented together with the instrument of torture which goes with 
it, the concept of 'free will", so as to confuse the instincts, so as to make mistrust of 
the instincts into second naturel'^'o 
In the manner of natural selection, in Darwinistic terms, the weak are 
a drain upon the resources of the strong and should, naturally perish if 
a new breed of "supermen" are to characterise the progressive 
development of the human race: 
"Finally - It is the most fearful - in the concept of the good man common cause is 
made with everything weak, sick, ill-constituted, suffering from itself, all that which 
ought to perish - the law of selection crossed, an ideal made of opposition to the proud 
and well-constituted, to the affirmative man, to the man certain of the future and 
As Waterfield (1993, p. xviii) observes of Chapters XI and XII of the Republic, there is a clear and surely 
deliberate analogy between the tripartite state and the tripartite soul. Balance, in both cases, is the key - and in 
both cases, therefore, there is a need for balance specifically between the forces of discipline and consolidation 
and those of dissent and change. 
In Blinkhom,M., 1988. 
^'"Nietzsche, 1992, p. 134. 
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guaranteeing the future - the latter is henceforth called the evil man ... And all this 
was believed in as morality! - Ecrasez I'infamel"^^^ 
S h o r t l y a f t e r w r i t i n g these words, Nietzsche wen t mad . But i n the days 
o f E m p i r e , where j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r the subjugat ion o f ent i re fo re ign 
cu l tu re s was sought, such beliefs were echoed. F r o m his though t s and 
those o f the ex i s ten t ia l i s t M a r t i n Heidegger, the Nazis were to draw 
ph i losoph ica l i n s p i r a t i o n f o r t h e i r h a t e f u l propaganda. Th i s 
propaganda fue l l ed some o f the cruel les t acts o f a c iv i l i sed na t i on . So 
there i s great relevance to the t w e n t i e t h and the t w e n t y - f i r s t cen tury 
i n the words o f a m a n who w o u l d c o n f r o n t such v ic ious , unc iv i l i sed and 
seduct ive l ies about h u m a n progress. 
There are a number o f c o m m o n l y raised "problems" w i t h Hume's 
t heo ry o f j u s t i c e i n t h i s con tex t . 
1. I n keep ing w i t h h i s sceptical tendencies Hume does not real ly 
address " jus t ice" as a noun , bu t r a the r observes adjec t iva l ly , i n 
t e r m s o f j u s t and u n j u s t behaviour . I n t h i s way he ra ther predates 
W i t t g e n s t e i n i n equa t ing the mean ing o f a w o r d w i t h i t s use ra ther 
t h a n spending t i m e and energy es tabl ishing the fo rmer i n 
isolat ion.212 T h i s i s bo rn o f h i s c o n v i c t i o n t ha t j u s t i ce is a man-
made concept der ived f r o m social needs (the Contrac t of Society) 
r a the r t h a n pre- or super- h u m a n na ture . For man , 
" ... his confin'd benevolence, and his necessitous condition, give rise to that virtue, 
only by making it requisite to the publick interest, and to that of every individual. 
'Twas therefore a concern for our own, and the publick interest, which made us 
establish the laws of just ice; and nothing can be more certain, than that it is not any 
relation of ideas, which gives us this concern, but our impressions and sentiments, 
without which every thing in nature is perfectly indifferent to us, and can never in the 
least affect us. The sense of just ice , therefore, is founded not on our ideas, but on our 
impressions."2i3 
2. I t m i g h t appear t h a t Hume does no t care about pr ivate in jus t ices , 
since a l l h i s w r i t i n g s o n the subject o f j u s t i c e seem to be about 
c i t i z ensh ip and the c o m m u n i t y . T h i s is pa r t ly t rue , but there are 
q u a l i f i c a t i o n s to be made before the s ta tement can be accepted. Hume 
relates so closely the Cont rac t o f Society and the Contract of 
Government t ha t a n y t h i n g tha t does no t come under the contex t of 
the f o r m e r is no business o f the l a t t e r . Excep t ing to oneself, there 
probably i s no such t h i n g as a "pr iva te" i n ju s t i ce , such as an "issue" 
be tween f a m i l y or f r i ends . These are u n i t s of society and as such may 
or may n o t come under the j u r i s d i c t i o n o f the state i f the state is l i k e l y 
to enhance the general ha rmony o f re la t ionships between al l c i t izens i n 
the state, be they f a m i l y , f r i ends or strangers. I n t h i s context the state 
^"Nietzsche, 1992, p. 134. 
'^^  "Don't ask for the meaning, ask for the use" (quoted in Pitkin, 1972, Chapter I). 
'^^  Hume, 1978, p. 496. 
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can be as i n t ru s ive or as laissez-faire as the s i t ua t ion ra ther t h a n a 
" n a t u r a l law" demands. 
3. Some commen ta to r s have argued t h a t wha t Hume has really given 
us i s n o t a theory o f government at a l l but a j u s t i f i c a t i o n of the 
Es tab l i shment , i n the respect t ha t p roper ty ownership defines the 
idea o f an Es tabl i shment as a class e n t i t y . For example Scaff c la ims 
t h a t Hume imp l i e s t ha t : 
"all those cases in which our considered moral duties contravene formal legal 
requirements must be excluded ... as must those cases, far from uncommon nowadays, 
in which our sense of just ice can only be satisfied by our exercise of human rights" 214 
T h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n may n o t do j u s t i c e t o the independent sp i r i t o f the 
m a n , w h i c h we k n o w to be h i s charac ter i s t ic f r o m h i s own w r i t i n g s and 
f r o m h i s f r i e n d s and foes. However t h i s is a f l aw i n Himie ' s arguments 
t h a t t y p i c a l l y he acknowledges even w i t h o u t a clear so lu t ion . He 
accepts t h a t single acts o f j u s t i c e can challenge the s tab i l i ty (or public 
in teres t ) t h a t he so s tudious ly a t t e m p t s to equate: 
"A single act of just ice is frequently contrary to public interest; and were it to stand 
alone, without being followed by other acts, may, in itself, be very prejudicial to 
society. When a man of merit ... restores a great fortune to a miser, or a seditious 
bigot, he has acted just ly and laudably, but the public is a real sufferer. Nor is every 
single act of just ice , consider'd apart, more conducive to private interest, than to 
public; and 'tis easily conceived how a man may impoverish himself by a single 
instance of integrity, and have reason to wish ... the laws of just ice were for a moment 
suspended in the universe"2i5 
Ibsen's An Enemu of the People provides a clear example. The ac t ion 
o f the doc to r o f the spa t o w n , w h e n he announces tha t the waters are 
p o l l u t e d , is an ac t ion w h i c h , despite Ibsen's c rea t ion of a genial and 
generous character , is also an act of i m p e t u o s i t y , self-indulgence and 
m e n t a l bl indness . 
Scaff, 1995, p. 211. 
'"Hume, 1978, p. 497. 
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The role of property in Hume's jurisprudence 
I t i s clear tha t j u s t behaviour has an element o f the good m a n as wel l 
as the good c i t i z e n , even f o r Hume . A good government should a im to 
p rov ide oppo r tun i t i e s f o r and examples of a convergence o f the two . 
We should no t over look the fac t t ha t Hume 's s t a r t i ng p o i n t f o r po l i t i ca l 
p r e s c r i p t i o n was t h a t M a n k i n d c o n f r o n t s u n l i m i t e d wan t s w i t h f i n i t e 
resources. Uncon t ro l l ed these fac to r s create cond i t i ons o f c o n f l i c t and 
m i s e r y . A government w o r t h f i g h t i n g f o r is one t ha t l i f t s a l l o f us who 
w o u l d be l i f t e d ou t o f the quagmire o f m i s t r u s t i n g , basic, se l f i sh 
i n s t i n c t s . I f the c o n s t i t u t i o n of h i s theory of j u s t i c e is domina t ed by a 
t heo ry o f p roper ty t h e n t h i s is because proper ty is at the heart o f our 
need f o r government : 
"Property must be stable, and must be fix'd by general rules. Tho' in one instance the 
public be a sufferer, this momentary ill is amply compensated by the steady 
prosecution of the rule, and by the peace and order which it estabhshes in society. 
And even every individual person must find himself a gainer, on balancing the 
account; since, without just ice , society must immediately dissolve, and every one 
must fall into that savage and solitary condition, which is infinitely worse than the 
worst situation that can possibly be suppos'd in society."216 
T h i s is despite the fac t t ha t p roper ty is clearly no t par t o f the 
essential , na tu ra l qua l i t i e s o f an externa l object.217 
There are three types o f p rope r ty i n Hume 's phi losophy - the m i n d , the 
body, and ma te r i a l possessions. The f i r s t is unat ta inable by others, the 
second is perishable and subject to v iolence, but no t s t r i c t l y 
t ransferable to another ' s advantage. Hence the on ly "goods" relevant 
to p o l i t i c s are "such possessions as we have acqul r 'd by our indus t ry 
and good fo r t une" .218 Hume considers the idea o f na tu ra l j u s t i ce to be 
false f o r a number o f reasons. He challenges the n o t i o n tha t one can 
def ine ju s t i ce as the g i v i n g or rece iv ing of tha t w h i c h one deserves. 
T h i s d e f i n i t i o n assumes t h a t there are ideas of r i gh t and proper ty tha t 
are separate to j u s t i c e . F u r t h e r to th i s , there are m o r a l qual i t ies to the 
n o t i o n s o f p roper ty , r i g h t and d u t y . Hume accepts t ha t i n t h i s way 
r e t u r n i n g a good t h a t was lost to a person is an act o f v i r t u e . A 
c h a m p i o n o f noturoZ j u s t i c e w o u l d argue tha t t h i s is no t because i t 
makes the r e tu rne r feel l i ke a good member o f society, a good c i t i zen , 
b u t because i t is the a c t i o n o f a good m a n to r e t u r n a good to i t s 
r i g h t f u l owner, and that there is only one such owner for each piece of 
property. 
''*Hume, 1978, p. 497. 
'^^  See also Hume, 1978, p. 527, and Vol. IV of the Enquiries. 
^'^Hume, 1978, pp. 487-8. 
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Hume considers t h i s empi r i ca l ly unsound: 
"...it seems sufficiently evident, in this dry and accurate consideration of the present 
subject, that nature has annex'd no pleasure or sentiment of approbation to such a 
conduct" 219 
However, Hume is aware o f how i m p o r t a n t the r e f u t a t i o n o f any theory 
o f na tu r a l j u s t i c e is to h i s po l i t i c a l ph i losophy , so he goes on to 
examine the c o m m o n arg imients i n i t s favour . His argument is t ha t i f 
such j u s t i c e were real ly in tegra l to h u m a n nature , as our i n s t i n c t s f o r 
sustenance and procrea t ion , t h e n we w o u l d analyse i t i n tha t way. By 
c rea t ing a " d e c e i t f u l " c i rcu la r a rgument t h a t presupposes proper ty i n 
i t s t heo ry o f j u s t i c e and presupposes j u s t i c e i n i t s theory of proper ty , 
such an a rgument proves n o t h i n g . Since the way we actucdly 
de te rmine p roper ty , r i gh t s and dut ies is by con t r ivance of 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l law, and as such are created by c i v i l government o n the 
basis o f a stable o rde r ing of society 
"if men had been endow'd with such a strong regard for public good, they would never 
have restrain'd themselves by these rules"22o 
There is also the issue o f c l a r i ty . Good and bad are o f t e n s imultaneous. 
The a c t i o n o f a ship 's cap ta in i n sealing a h o l d o f 20 m e n on a s i nk ing 
ship w h i c h has 200 men , when no t do ing so w o u l d seal the fate of a l l 
hands, is b o t h good and bad. Yet the essence o f the concept of 
p roper ty , c i v i l rights and duties, is f a r more black and wh i t e . I n 
society, we endorse ownership no t as a vague or s imul taneous t h i n g , 
bu t as a clear-cut d e f i n i t i o n of the social i d e n t i t y o f t ha t t h i n g . A 
horse belongs to t h i s man , no t t ha t man , unless t ha t second m a n under 
some agreement o r imder s t and ing takes possession o f t ha t f i r s t man 's 
horse, at w h i c h p o i n t the possession remains "con t rac tua l" , and not 
"na tu ra l " . Whi l s t Hume h imse l f uses t h i s a rgument to suggest tha t 
j u s t i c e i s pure ly social , and v i r t u e pure ly personal, i t is possible to use 
h i s expos i t i on as an a r t i c u l a t i o n o f the d i f fe rence between social and 
personal j u s t i c e , and the fac t t ha t they are d i f f e r e n t expressions o f the 
same impulse , i .e. m o r a l i t y . I n the n o r m a l course o f h u m a n ac t ion and 
i n t e r a c t i o n , our m o t i v e s are impuls ive and re la ted to the specific 
circtamstances i n w h i c h we f i n d otirselves. I n more phi losophical 
m o m e n t s w h e n we t r y to f o r m general rules ou t o f the par t icu la r 
instances, we f i n d t h a t there are no t m a n y and those tha t we do ho ld 
to t e n d to be h i g h l y qua l i f i ed and "a l low o f m a n y except ions". 
Since we do no t a l low tha t of j u s t i ce , rights or dut ies , w h i c h i n each 
ins tance are supposed to be absolute, j u s t i c e cannot be an ac t ion of 
i n s t i n c t i v e v i r t u e . Jus t i ce is a social phenomenon : 
^'^Hume, 1978, p. 528. 
Hume, 1978, p. 529. 
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"Were men, therefore, to take the liberty of acting with regard to the laws of society, 
as they do in every other affair, they wou'd conduct themselves, on most occasions, by 
particular judgements, and would take into consideration the characters and 
c ircumstances of the persons, as well as the general nature of the question. But 'tis 
easy to observe, that this wou'd produce an infinite confusion in human society, and 
that the avidity and partiality of men would quickly bring disorder into the world, if 
not restrain'd by some general and inflexible principles, and have agreed to restrain 
themselves by general rules, which are unchangeable by spite and favour, and by 
particular views of private or public interest. These rules, then, are artificially 
invented for a certain purpose, and are contrary to the common principles of human 
nature, which accommodate themselves to circumstances, and have no stated 
invariable method of operation ."22i 
So p rope r ty is, l ike j u s t i ce i t se l f , a re la t ive t e r m . There is n o t h i n g 
essent ia l ly possessive i n the t h i r d category o f goods. A house does no t 
naturally be long to i t s i nhab i t an t s any more t h a n rap music belongs to 
b lack people. 
Since we are ne i the r pa r t i cu l a r ly w i l l i n g no r able to dissolve our selves 
i n t o selflessness our con t r ac tua l sys tem of graceful government mus t 
also recognise tha t obedience is best obta ined by appeals to in teres t . I t 
i s ins tead more c o m m o n to the na ture o f m a n to selfishness, or "self-
love" , and our system o f government is mos t hke ly to re f lec t t h i s i n i t s 
p ragmat ic ba lancing of these in teres ts . S tab i l i ty of possession is 
f u n d a m e n t a l to j u s t i c e and cons t i t u t i ona l i s ed r ec ip roc i ty is the t rue 
law o f nature.222 
Hume's second form of morality seems curiously detached from 
virtuous origin. Can we learn from this dual definition, or is Hume 
really talking about two isolated concepts? 
As a co ld and r a t iona l surv iva l s trategy, t h i s seems to be related to the 
Judaeo-Chr i s t i an r a t iona l i sa t ion o f obedience to and worsh ip of God f o r 
fear o f the consequences, i .e. he l l . We do have to be carefu l here. 
Htmie was a h u m a n i t a r i a n m a n , and as we k n o w (see Chapter 1) no t 
over ly m a t e r i a l i s t i c . So there should be cau t ion over wha t Hume 
seems at t i m e s to i m p l y : t ha t we mus t have rules to have f reedom, and 
t h a t i f we do have those rules and they are generally obeyed whatever 
they may be and however they were made our society is b o t h free and 
j u s t . Consent i s absolutely v i t a l to H imie ' s phi losophy of the c i v i l 
society , and somet imes he does no t emphasise i t a l l t ha t m u c h , and h is 
scep t i c i sm threa tens to become pure r e l a t i v i sm . I t is our knowledge o f 
'^'Hume, 1978, pp. 532-3. 
By "natural" he meant not that it is not natural for man to consider right and wrong, but that in social terms 
justice is a mechanism for good citizenship and good government. Justice is a natural invention of mankind as 
a consequence of man's impulse to society, but it remains a human rather than divine invention: "Tho' the 
rules of justice be artificial, they are not arbitrary. Nor is the expression improper to call them Laws of 
Nature; if by natural we understand what is common to any species, or even if we confine it to mean what is 
inseparable to the species."'^' 
84 
the m a n tha t al lows us to appreciate the f u n d a m e n t a l l y o p t i m i s t i c and 
cons t ruc t i ve nature o f h i s endeavours. 
The p o i n t is t h a t t r a d i t i o n a l concepts of v i r t u e , such as those t h a t 
t e n d to s p r i n g f r o m re l ig ious tenet , derive r i g h t and w r o n g f r o m a 
source outs ide h u m a n knowledge and experience. Hume ' s m o r a l i t y is 
s t i l l based a r o u n d v i r t u e , b u t i t is a resolutely practical v i r t u e ; r i g h t 
a n d w r o n g are the ways i n w h i c h we order our society, and t he i r 
e f fec ts . H u m e does a rguab ly b o r r o w f r o m the me taphys ica l i n 
p o s i t i n g peace and ce r t a in ty as the u l t i m a t e b e n c h m a r k . These 
states are u n d o u b t e d l y v i r t u o u s i n a Platonic / re l ig ious sense to h i m , 
b u t we m u s t q u a l i f y t h i s w i t h a cons idera t ion f o r h i s stress on the 
means fo r t he i r i m p o s i t i o n over chaos be ing a m o r a l concern fo r 
people n o t gods. People b r i n g peace, or war , to each other, and 
m o r a l - re l ig ious teachings can of fer a smokescreen to t h i s . W a r is 
essent ia l ly by Hume ' s analys is a f a i l u re , however necessary - and a 
ho ly w a r is s t i l l j u s t a war . M o r a l i t y and v i r t u e are synonymous i n 
H u m e , b u t fo r h i s t ime he was u n u s u a l i n the exp l i c i t degree to w h i c h 
they were a f u n c t i o n o f h u m a n i t y r a the r t h a n d i v i n i t y . 
A t t imes H u m e the t h i n k e r m a y seem esoteric a n d d i s tanced f r o m the 
p o l i t i c a l w o r l d . T h i s is n o t the case. As we know, Dav id H u m e was a 
m a n o f society, a n academic m a n of a f f a i r s . W h a t t h i s reasoning does 
is prepare the g r o u n d w o r k f o r h i s t hough t s on t r a d i t i o n and 
c o n v e n t i o n i n a f f a i r s o f s tate . These, i n whatever m a n i f e s t a t i o n they 
s h o u l d take , were the "objects o f allegiance" t h a t m a t t e r so m u c h to 
the we l l -be ing of the c i v i l society. Cus tom cou ld be bogus, b u t i t 
cou ld b i n d a n a t i o n and m a i n t a i n peace and secur i ty t h r o u g h a 
c o m m o n b o n d such as r e l i g ion . I t cou ld on the o ther h a n d s t i f le and 
f r u s t r a t e the n a t u r a l i n c l i n a t i o n s of m e n such t h a t i t w o u l d fomen t 
a n d explode i n t o violence a n d in secu r i t y . A classic example o f t h i s 
w o u l d also be re l ig ion . Rel igious bel ief can be good or bad . W h a t 
H u m e is l ead ing towards is the idea t h a t p rescr ip t ive re l ig ion ne i ther 
guarantees no r denies i n i t s e l f the good l i f e . W h a t H u m e rea l ly wan t s 
to do is present a defence of h u m i l i t y . I n the face o f o u r ignorance, 
we s h o u l d k n o w t h a t to le rance i s the key to "get t ing a long". 
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A principle of government and citizenship 
Con we derive a workable principle of civil society from Hume's 
analysis? 
Societies, as systems o f social i n t e r a c t i o n , d i s t i n g u i s h themselves 
f r o m each o ther by the way t he i r i n s t i t u t i o n s are ordered. The 
i n t e n t i o n o f the c i v i l society, be i t the u n i q u e l y " f u n c t i o n a l " 
c o n s t i t u t i o n t h a t A r i s t o t l e sought to def ine , or s i m p l y p a r t o f the 
broader genus t h a t H u m e believed was to achieve a c o m m o n a i m of 
c i v i l i t y , to create a sys tem of h a r m o n y amongs t c i t izens w h o 
p a r t i c i p a t e d i n i t ' s r i g h t s and du t ies . To c o n s t r u c t t h i s concept o f 
order , one m u s t have a p o i n t of reference, a g u i d i n g p r inc ip le to 
create a n i d e n t i t y a n d coherence t h a t suppor t s such a system. In 
H u m e there is obviously , as we have seen, a p rob lem caused by h i s 
general r e luc tance to p ronounce on absolu te mora l s or p r inc ip les . 
Hume ' s one m e t a p h y s i c a l concession is to the place of grace i n h i s 
concept o f j u s t i c e . H u m e concedes t h i s p o i n t because he beheves 
t h a t we do have the capac i ty to make m o r a l j udgemen t s . H u m e 
h i m s e l f was f a r f r o m a m o r a l v a c u u m , and cer ta in ly d i d no t encourage 
a m o r a l i t y i n o thers . 
So where does t h i s lead? A l t r u i s m , as selflessness, does no t real ly 
make sense i n p r a c t i c a l t e rms . We c anno t "forget" w h o we are 
w i t h o u t a d i s a b l i n g loss of i d e n t i t y t h a t w o u l d ce r t a in ly no t a l low us 
to t h i n k w i t h reason. Reasons are always b u i l t u p o n assumpt ions . 
Our assumpt ions are an essential p a r t of ou r iden t i ty , as m u c h as the 
way we b u i l d o u r r a t i o n a l i t y f r o m t h e m . F u r t h e r m o r e , i t is a moo t 
p o i n t as to w h e t h e r g i v i n g of oneself to o thers is a lways v i r t u o u s . 
Sacr i f ice a n d d u t y are on ly p a r t o f w h a t makes society w o r k . Every 
r i g h t imp l i e s a du ty , every du ty , a r i g h t . Hav ing regard to our own 
needs can be no more se l f i sh t h a n b r e a t h i n g i tself . The acts of g iv ing 
and receiving, as Jesus gives and receives foot -washings i n the New 
Tes tamen t , p rov ide t he essence o f communi ty .223 The key to t h i s 
f u n d a m e n t a l social ba lance is r ec ip roc i ty i n the Con t rac t of Society 
and i t s en fo rcemen t t h r o u g h the Con t r ac t of Government no t by 
a l t r u i s m b u t by grace. 
To have grace one m u s t have power. The grace of God - any 
o m n i p o t e n t , o m n i s c i e n t God - is t he u l t i m a t e grace because God is 
the u l t i m a t e power and He bestows u p o n us His favours . Grace 
demands respect, and the bearer of t h a t grace m u s t be i n a pos i t ion of 
s t r eng th a n d knowledge224 _ and de facto a pos i t i on o f po ten t ia l abuse 
In John, Chapters 12 and 13. In the latter Jesus actually states, "Unless I wash with you you have no share 
Tie". 




- over ano the r i n order to act g race fu l ly . The weak do no t have the 
l u x u r y of grace. 
Theo log ica l grace is the d iv ine love a n d p ro t ec t i on bestowed f ree ly on 
people. I n h u m a n i s t t e rms i t is e i ther the state of be ing protected, or 
o f possess ing en l i gh t enmen t t h a t p u t s the s t rong at the service of the 
weak , t h r o u g h the mas te ry of t he i r basic des t ruc t ive i n s t i n c t s . The 
desi re to reach h igher p lanes of en l i gh t enmen t - w i t h o u t the rel iance 
o n a n y t h i n g as f u n d a m e n t a l as a sou l - t h r o u g h the recogni t ion of 
f u n d a m e n t a l h u m a n weaknesses (but w i t h potent ial) makes one 
w o n d e r i n id le r momen t s i f H u m e was n o t someth ing o f a Buddhis t .225 
C e r t a i n l y there seems to be a shared a t t i t u d e t ha t there is no grace 
w i t h o u t power , and government of the m a n or people demands the 
a t t a i n m e n t of a p o s i t i o n o f b e n i g n c o n t r o l . 
I n the case o f governments , t h e n , grace is the pragmat ic 
m a n i p u l a t i o n o f phys ica l s t r u c t u r e s and i n s t i t u t i o n s l ike pa r l i amen t s 
a n d secu r i t y forces . The be l i e f systems o f the p o p u l a t i o n o f the state 
are also v i t a l l y t i ed u p i n a l l t h i s . A n y denomina ted bel ief system can 
have a n i m p a c t on the ba lance o f c i v i l society, be i t re l ig ious , 
m o n a r c h i c a l or cul tura l .226 There is as men t ioned i n Chapter 4 a 
s t r o n g h i n t t h a t democracy need n o t be the mos t i m p o r t a n t 
s e n t i m e n t i n a gove rnmen ta l sys tem. 
Grace i s the answer, the use o f power to help those tha t cannot help 
themselves , to f i n d the ta len t s t ha t m i g h t no t at f i r s t be apparent. We 
d i d n o t come ou t o f the state o f na ture because of the power o f heroes. 
We came out o f the state o f na ture f o r m u t u a l benef i t . There is a self-
in te res t t ha t works , t ha t does hera ld progress, and tha t Hume 
p romote s t h r o u g h a theory o f j u s t i c e as s t ab i l i ty ; i t is no t the self ish 
hedon i sm o f the Nazi or the ex i s ten t ia l i s t : 
"'Tis by society alone he is able to supply his defects, and raise himself up to an 
equality with his fellow-creatures, and even acquire a superiority above them. By 
Buddhism analyzes human existence as made up of five aggregates or "bundles" {skandhas): the material 
body, feelings, perceptions, predispositions or karmic tendencies, and consciousness. A person is only a 
temporary combination of these aggregates, which are subject to continual change. No one remains the same 
for any two consecutive moments. Buddhists deny that the aggregates individually or in combination may be 
considered a permanent, independently existing self or soul (atniaii). Indeed, they regard it as a mistake to 
conceive of any lasting unity behind the elements that constitute an individual. The Buddha held that belief in 
such a self results in egoism, craving, and hence in suffering. Thus he taught the doctrine of anatman, or the 
denial of a permanent soul. He felt that all existence is characterized by the three marks of anatman (no soul), 
anitya (impermanence), and dukkha (suffering). The ethic that leads to nirvana is detached and inner-
oriented. It involves cultivating four virtuous attitudes, known as the Palaces of Brahma: loving-kindness, 
compassion, sympathetic joy, and equanimity. A central ethic of Buddhism is centered on fulfilling one's 
duties to society. It involves acts of charity, especially support of the sangha, as well as observance of the five 
precepts that constitute the basic moral code of Buddhism. The precepts prohibit killing, stealing, harmful 
language, sexual misbehavior, and the use of intoxicants. By observing these precepts, the three roots of evil— 
lust, hatred, and delusion—may be overcome. 
At least one war in recent memory has been triggered by the result of a football match. 
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society all his infirmities are compensated; and tho' in that situation his wants 
multiply every moment upon him, yet his abilities are still more augmented, and leave 
h im in every respect more satisfied and happy, than 'tis possible for him, in his savage 
and solitary condition, ever to become."227 
Jus t i c e makes sense by p r o v i d i n g us w i t h "force, ability, and 
security" .^'^^ Has H u m e i d e n t i f i e d an elusive, ver i f iab le mora l 
absolute? He doesn't real ly t h i n k so himself . S tab i l i ty is s imply the 
sensible way to organise society and therefore the correct a i m of j u s t 
gove rnmen t . En l igh tened scept ic i sm does no t a l low h i m to make 
bolder assertions t h a n t h i s . The f i r s t par t of tolerance is scept ic ism. 
H u m e provides c r i t e r i a f o r j u d g e m e n t s o f j u s t and un jus t acts, qua l i f i ed 
by h i s wariness o f asser t ing an a rgument o f such s igni f icance so 
d e f i n i t i v e l y . So H u m e ' s " g u i d i n g p r i n c i p l e " fo r a c i v i l society is 
j u s t i c e , c o n s t i t u t e d by the p r a c t i c a l v i r t ue s of r ec ip roc i ty ( r ights , 
co r respond ing dut ies , r u l e of law) and i nc lu s ion (i.e. a sense of 
participation229) a n d the me taphys ic of grace. 
Hume, 1978, p. 485. 
Hume, 1978, p. 485. 
The relevance of democracy comes in the power of the unsettled masses. To curb a mob's urge for 
expression through rage, universal suffrage offers a participatory olive branch to those who feel 
disenfranchised. 
Who should govern? 
Having examined Hume's concept of stability in government action, 
the investigation then moves on to that of the stability of the identity 
of those who govern and the system in which they operate. 
Everything centres around the opinion of those with influence over 
the right of a particular system and / or government to power. Hume 
actually challenged James Harrington's positing of property as the 
basis of authority to govern. The tendency for those with property to 
gravitate towards political power is fairly common, but in general 
popular affection towards this or that constitutional frameworks 
tempers this inclination. Otherwise England would have become a 
republic, probably since the Magna Carta, and certainly since the 
arrival in the House of Commons of so many landed gentry. Once 
again we see the consistency of Hume's philosophy at work; 
convention creates expectations which in turn create the illusion of 
external morality: 
"Time and custom give authority to all forms of government, and all successions of 
princes; and that power, which at first was founded only on injustice and violence, 
becomes in time legal and obligatory"23o 
The "imagination-based" factors constituting a government's right to 
power are: 
long possession (historical precedent) 
present possession (with considerable pragmatic impetus), conquest 
(in reality, an immediate example of present possession) 
succession (from the human belief in / need for continuity) 
positive laws (specific regulation on the subject, e.g. the Act of 
Settlement of 1701).23i 
Not all these factors necessarily point in the same direction, and 
should it come to conflict, the rationale to which all other factors are 
subordinate is a government's ability to deliver peace and certainty 
into the lives of its citizens. If it cannot it is not worth having.232 
Much of Hume's political works that deal with social contractarian 
issues ("Of the original contract", "Of the first principles of 
government", and the last essay he wrote, "Of the origins of 
government") challenge the contractarian notions of the time. 
Writers like Hobbes in Leviathan and Locke in his Two Treatises of 
'^"Hume, 1994, p. 566. 
Hume, 1978, pp. 556-63. 
Hume, 1994, p. 562. 
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Gouernmcnt were devoted to the preservation of the status quo in a 
way no great manner dissimilar to those who proposed the theory of 
the divine right of the (usually current) king to rule. Locke went so 
far as to title the preface to his Two Treatises "to establish the 
Throne of Our Great Restorer, our present King William; and to make 
good his Title, in the Consent of the People". 
In the outset of "Of the original contract" Hume establishes his 
opinion that both such approaches are nothing more than 
"unshapely" ex post facto rationalisations of factional interests of the 
present establishment.233 
Can the same accusation be levelled at Hume himself, as it was by 
Kant?234 It seems unlikely that this entirely true, however, of the 
man who concluded his essay "Whether the British Government 
inclines more to absolute monarchy or to a republic" in such 
ambivalent style: 
"we have reason to be more jealous of monarchy, because the danger is more 
imminent from that quarter; we have also reason to be more jealous of popular 
government, because that danger is more terrible. T h i s may teach us a lesson of 
moderation in all our political controversies''235 
What Hume did argue, paralleling his argument for the continuity of 
death and rebirth in the animal world of which man is very much part 
in his general philosophy, was that "every government must come to 
a period, and that death is unavoidable to the political as well".236 in 
this Aristotelean context, where popular and autocratic government 
follow each other as night and day, the stabilising influence of the 
absolute monarch who unifies the factions amongst his people is 
preferable to letting those factions run riot. This exemplifies his 
empirical analysis, demanding how one can know that dissolution of 
the status quo, as opposed to organic change, will bring greater peace 
and harmony. 
Hume, 1994, p. 186. 
See Kant, 1965. 
"'Hume, 1994, p. 32. 
Hume, 1994, p. 31. 
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In what one supposes to be a dig at the Socratics he observes that: 
"The question is not concerning any fine imaginary republic, of which a man may 
form an opinion in his closet."237 
Hume has come to be interpreted more perceptively as time has 
passed. His writings offer in fact a striking alternative to the works of 
the Establishment philosophers of the Enlightenment. In his view a 
theory of government that provides proper justification needs to 
establish a balance between deference to the individual as a person 
with a certain right to natural individuality and the need for 
safeguards against excessive self- or corporate assertion. 
Was this "distinction" and "balance" a social contract between rulers 
and ruled, binding the two forever in a relationship of mutual 
conditions? Hume derided such "justification" of the status quo as 
the creation of "violence and hurry".238 This went for social 
contractarians and divine rightists equally. He did not actually 
equate them, though the many wars of nationalist-religion in post-
Reformation Europe might have suggested that there was not really 
more than one species involved here. The view of a Contract of 
Government (derived from a separate Contract of Society) having an 
isolated origin based on Natural Law was anathema to Hume's 
historical-empirical inclinations. 
There is a version of the original contract that Hume finds palatable. 
This is in fact one of the two Contracts which operate in civil society, 
this first being a Contract of Society, between members of that 
society, and a Contract of Government derived from and dependent 
on the Contract of Society for its dejure and de facto existence. 
From the beginnings of civilisation, thousands of years ago, men and 
families convened because the common human goals of security, 
strength and power were seen to be best achieved through orderly 
community. The very first social bonds were forged in an atmosphere 
of trust, mistrust and consent. According to Hume there were no 
subjects: 
"Nothing but their own consent, and their sense of the advantages arising from 
peace and order, could have had that influence"239 
Hume, 1994, p. 31. 
Hume, 1994, p. 186. 
In Barker, 1970, p. 149. 
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There was no "documentation" of the proceedings either: 
"In vain, are we asked in what records this charter of our liberties is registered. It 
was not writ on parchment, nor yet on leaves or barks of trees."^^o 
Hume is right to doubt the responsibility of descendants for the 
activities of their ancestors. This is a strong argument against the 
rigid contractarian stance of the Magna Carta type of social 
arrangement.241 However that less refutes the idea of a bond between 
ruler and ruled than refines it. 
Rousseau's concept of a "general will" suggests the necessary 
imposition of the judgments of a rectifying state over the consent of 
individual citizens: 
"Whoever refuses to obey the general will shal l be constrained to do so by the whole 
body, which means nothing more than that he should be forced to be free''242 
To an extent Hume actually shared this sentiment. Hume believed 
passionately in the rule of the best, the best being those who are able 
to gauge the laws and practices in government that will maintain the 
short and long-term stability of the state. Yet we must of course be 
wary of putting too much faith in our leaders. This translates into 
another, aristocratic justification of democracy as the late twentieth 
century would have it. The immediate interest of the ruler in power 
could be directed by mechanisms affecting his very interest in power 
such as universal suffrage and maximum term elections. And of 
course by introducing such qualifying factors on the powers of rulers 
as the checks and balances favoured by Hume, we can organise our 
political culture to prevent inept governments from doing too much 
damage. 
^*Hume, 1994, p. 188. 
As promoted by Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau et al. 
'^^  Rousseau, 1968, p. 64. 
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More on the political culture in Hume's functional civil society 
Certainly good government is judged by content and results rather 
than form. It remains the duty of the society's policymakers to 
maintain a relationship of grace with these cultural institutions 
known as the "objects of affection", even as they themselves remain 
as far from having too rigid a set of beliefs as possible. The ability of 
the state to intervene should be well-toned, but ideally in practice, a 
muscle rarely flexed.243 This seems to have been Thomas Hobbes' 
basic intent in Leviathan, despite a turn of phrase that suggests 
Divine Rightist teleology.244 
The difference between Hume and Hobbes in this area is derived from 
their different approaches to absolute authority. Both argue that civil 
liberty is derived from a state that protects its citizens from the 
vagaries of anarchy. Hobbes enthusiastically endorses such authority 
in the right hands. Hume more sceptically doubts the prolonged 
existence of the right hands, and the need for checks and balances on 
the dexterity of those hands to counter potential political excess. 
Consent rather than physical domination is where Hume's emphasis 
lies. Not only should just governments be obeyed but also in the long 
run onZy just governments will be obeyed. 
In his unwillingness to infuse the state with a sense of quasi-religious 
fervour we see the Hume we know from his general philosophies. 
People can approach the truth but they cannot arrive, or at least 
there is no particular reason to believe that they have. The state is 
human in creation and constitution, and hence the powers of men in 
the state must be limited even as the bonds of the citizen to that 
state are encouraged. These bonds are for reason of grace or nobility 
towards the weak on the one hand, but also grounded in the rationale 
of self-interest. Worshipping the state per se is nonsense. The words 
of J . E . McTaggart convey Hume's attitude, that: 
"It would be as reasonable to worship a sewage-pipe, which also possesses 
considerable value as a means"245 
An acceptable Contract of Government is one that is equally 
acceptable to those who it places in authority and those whom it 
takes as its citizens. This is the characteristic moment of balance in 
Hume's political philosophy: the sovereignty of the state is the point 
of balance between how much power the rulers will be satisfied with 
and how much the masses will put up with. At this point the 
Although occasionally, given the concerns of Machiavelli for the risk for the complacent state of losing the 
respect of those who might support it against those who might challenge it (1981, p. 96). 
".. .that great LEVIATHAN, or rather (to speake more reverently) ... that Mortall God, to which wee owe 
under the Immortall God, our peace and defence" (Hobbes, 1994, p. 222). 
^"'in Sparkes, 1994, p. 222. 
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reasonable man, whether as ruler or normal citizen, experiences a 
convergence of his admiration for the principle of reciprocity and his 
desire for self-aggrandizement. This is what might describe as the 
point of consent. 
The government must be strong to reach this point. . . And ultimately 
the goal is prudence with the strength to back it up. A system of 
allegiance that is perceived to provide this for its citizens is that 
which is most likely to endure. However once again we come to a part 
of Hume's political theories that has its roots in his more esoteric 
thinking. The self in Hume is not entirely coherent, and it would not 
be natural if it was. 
What Hume meant by "bundles of perceptions" in relation to identity 
and accuracy has been written about extensively.246 in keeping with 
this perception Hume considered a number of forms, if not all forms, 
of government to have potential legitimacy if they deliver a truly civil 
society. The convention of a Magna Carta offers no essentially 
superior legitimacy upon a system of government than the conquest 
of a Battle of Hastings: 
"How far these fundamental laws extend is not determin'd in any government; nor is 
it possible it ever should. There is s u c h a n insensible gradation from the most 
material laws to the most trivial , and from the most antient laws to the most 
modern, that 'twill be impossible to set bounds to the legislative power, and 
determine how far it may innovate in the principles of government. That is the 
work more of imagination and passion than of reason''247 
Societies and governments do not have fixed identities, and so it is 
natural and healthy that the Contracts that define them are dynamic. 
It is the extremities of revolution and stasis that cripple societies and 
threaten civilisation. 
Is this the direction of contemporary society, as politicians converge 
on an "End of History" enlightened pragmatism, appealing to "the 
people" to endorse not so much the radical alternativism of their 
beliefs as their relative competence and incorruptibility? Perhaps we 
are headed into a future of charismatic technocrats operating under 
the guidance of unified and unifying principle of liberty, justice and 
stability that Hume would find satisfyingly familiar... 
Hume's theory of just government relies on consent, but really to a 
slightly limited sense, certainly one that does not require the presence 
of universal suffrage in a just society. Hume's prince relies on the 
Praetorian Guard, and the key power bases within the civil society. 
The only ways for an "ordinary" citizen to count in this society would 
'^^  See Penelhum, 1976, for a particularly good refutation of the alleged contradictions and identification of 
the gaps and complexities within Hume's idea of the self. 
^"Hume, 1978, pp. 561-562. 
94 
be to ally himself with one of the existing power bases or to create 
through class action one of his own. Hume's functional, civil society 
does rather depend on a convergence of pragmatism with non-absolute 
power. If one is powerful enough to ensure through force and fear of 
force the obedience of the rest of civil society, and of a mind to do so, 
there is no reason to compromise one's ambition for the logic of 
reciprocation, wherein one might become "the cully of my 
integrity" .248 As Rousseau put it: 
"If, unhappily, there should appear one ambitious man, one hypocrite ... that man 
would readily exploit his pious compatriots."249 
So in Hume, as in Hobbes, a strong and impartial state is of paramount 
importance: 
"it is impossible for the human race to subsist, at least in any comfortable or secure 
state, without the protection of government"250 
Where opportunities for grace are seen and spumed by those members 
of a social grouping who prefer selfish behaviour, then it is to the 
greater grace of the state to which the civil society must look for its 
survival. 
Competing pressures are endemic to all societies. With all dynamism 
comes friction, and all life is dynamic. How a society deals with these 
pressures, what valves it creates to allow steam to escape, determines 
fundamentally the very essence of that society. Nationalism and its 
practical consequences - internal persecution, chauvinist imperialism 
- are on the darker side of the same moon as multicultural awareness 
and positive-sum alliance making. On this the facts of life are clear. 
All species evolve - or die. Violent protest should not of its own 
accord be allowed to force changes. A process of change is essential 
but if it is not organic then it is anarchic. Anarchy represents death, 
to the civil society and invariably to individual human beings as well. 
^'^Hume, 1978, p. 535. 




Could Hume do more than hint at why stability is not the be-all and 
end-all, but the start? 
"The general obligation, which binds us to government, is the interest and necessities 
of society; and this obligation is very strong. The determination of it to this or that 
particular prince, or form of government, i s frequently more uncertain and dubious"25i 
I t may be easy to endorse, but absolute relativism is an absolute denial 
of human moral evolution. I t is also a denial of a basic human instinct 
that has spawned religions and ideologies across cultures and 
continents. We want to believe. But generalisation is the great double-
edged sword. On the one edge, i t allows us a sense of moral 
consistency, of integrity, which allows us coherence as individual 
people and as societies. I t is said that most cliches are cliches 
precisely because they contain at least a grain of t ru th . On its other, 
more deadly edge, i t can equate to simplification, the rejection of 
diversity, xenophobia. I t is this type of lack of sophistication, of moral 
insensit ivity, that tmderlies Mein Kampf, for example.252 
Some writers argue constancy i n a world that is not at all constant is 
less than a vir tue. Aldous Huxley wrote "Consistency is contrary to 
nature, contrary to l i fe . The only completely consistent people are the 
dead".253 And the dogmatic, of course. 
People do crave consistency. This inst inct underpins mankind's 
impulse towards the certainties of religions and ideologies across time 
and continents .254 i n this regard stability without reference to how 
this stability is achieved and perpetuated is s t i l l natural (in a basic 
sense) and noble, but i t is an incomplete notion of justice by Hume's 
criteria. I t is blind love. Policy makers should have their eyes open. 
That some elements wi th in and without society are threats to the 
broadly harmonious interaction of the citizenry is quite plausible. But 
where is that line drawn, between the terrorist and the freedom 
fighter? Can that sort of question be answered without implici t 
reference to moral judgements of some kind? In Hume's theory they 
are borne of the quest for stability and the issues that surround i t . In 
this Thesis I have endeavoured to examine and propose the criteria 
that support these beliefs. These questions are of paramount relevance 
to the public and i ts servants. 
"'Hume, 1994. 
"^Hitler, 1974. 
"Mn Usher, 1997. 
Is this so very undesirable? In 1996 the Vatican withdrew its support for UNICEF because the organisation 
was administering family planning programs in developing countries. Even as we might deplore the action taken, 
we must at least acknowledge it as a "moral position". The Roman Catholic Church rejects fundamentally the use 
of contraceptives. It must surely be wrong then to expect it to endorse such programs. 
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This "common sense" approach promotes justice as the freedom to 
plan, to take control of one's destiny i n some small way. Justice 
equals stability, which equals freedom. I f the goal of a policy such as 
EMU is stability and f rom this stability, the opportunity to grow, then 
is th is not a policy of the just government? In the context of the EU as 
a policy of war-avoidance (prosperous intertwined democracies being 
less historically prone to going to war w i t h one another), there is much 
to be said for the arguments for these policies i n Hume's terms. 
As already stated, there is a need for balance i n society as i n the 
individual . I t is a very Platonic argument that encourages the specific 
t ra ining of leaders (the philosopher-king argument) to ensure the rule 
of the wisest and most clear-headed members of society. The rule of 
the wise is equated to the rule of the good ruler. This can retain i ts 
plausibility even as we recognise the imperfectability of wisdom, the 
Absence of Solomon, that is exemplified by the di f f icul ty i n identifying 
the "national interest". 
Stability is not enough. "Justice" is more than stability, and this 
should be recognised not just at a personal level but at a state policy-
making level. Can we f ind objective criteria for this? 
There is a sense i n which we cannot escape our post-Enlightenment 
scepticism. I f we are seriously to start f rom the premise that one can 
be sure of nothing except one's own mind, then everything is 
necessarily a matter of opinion. This throws into doubt not only the 
whole of polit ical theory but also all other academic pursuits. Can we, 
i n t ru th , be any more certain that what we see is "right" as what we feel 
is "right"? The mind-body dilemma faced by philosophers is an 
expression of these uneasy foimdations to intellectual and scientific 
study. Is all "science" a sham? 
The belief of logical positivism^ss that there are simply competing 
beliefs and competing interests, w i t h no more legitimacy attached to 
one than the other, is morally bankrupt. We can recognise that certain 
things are wrong. Man's moral development, recognising that acts of 
rape, pillage and wanton slaughter are not just issues of power but of 
barbaric evil , is a fact as much as our physical transition f rom homo 
erectus to homo sapiens. 
"Able to" and "ought to" are not interchangeable. To deny this is to 
deny that there is anything unique about mankind. That man has the 
capacity for great cruelty is not i n doubt. But neither is the fact that 
man has the capacity for great kindness and sacrifice, and love. This is 
as clear as his imperfectabili ty and his bio-diversity. I t is these very 
things that make us realise that, however unjust we f ind a particular 
255 As expounded by R. Plant in Plant, 1991. 
97 
government, we are aware - by examples of i ts absence - of the 
potentially civil ising and morally enhancing circumstances of the 
l iv ing conditions where men and women have some say, however 
qualified, i n their own destiny.256 Destiny is a much abused word, 
frequently used by individuals frightened to embrace their potential 
["Que sera, sercC and other superficially comfort ing but soul-destroying 
cliches), who must remain weak because they fear the chil l wind of 
autonomy. But i f the state can create a destiny for i ts people of peace 
and hope, then i t must do so. Too much of human history is littered 
w i t h the corpses and suffering of good and innocent men and women 
for this not to be true. That, surely, is where the law of human nature 
(common sense, really) and established conventions on the significance 
of "justice" can and must coincide. 
Therein lies the roots of the essential iniquity of the Communist reliance upon dialectic materialism (see 
Gellner, 1994). 
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Justice in government 
What can citizens expect from a Just government? What can Just 
governments expect from Just citizens? What possibility is therefor 
limited altruism in a culture of individualism? 
The rights debate is the same as the freedom debate, the justice 
debate, and effectively the core of the entire Western-Liberal tradit ion 
of poli t ical thought. The telos of the state is not defined by its form, 
jus t as the measure of a discus thrower is i n how effectively he is able 
to throw a discus, not i n the way i n which he does i t [NB within the 
prescribed rules of the game). 
The not ion of reciprocity that Hume so eloquently espouses is a 
consequence of a belief i n a rational basis to justice that is common to 
more recent polit ical thinkers. For example, i n Rawls' A Theoru of 
Justice the key idea is that there is a single rational choice under 
conditions of uncertainty. The principles of justice are reasonable to 
everyone i f they are able to "forget" for an instance their own identity 
(the "Original Position"). Even i f i n practice this seems a l i t t le absurd, 
the point that there are reasons of altruism, or grace and self-interest 
that we should empathise w i t h different points of view. Contracts tend 
to imply a compromise between the parties involved.257 
What are the chances of true public service by private individuals? 
Clearly when we t ry to answer the question of whether the system 
works, part of that answer is contained i n how i t does so. Government 
is perhaps best perceived first and foremost as damage l imita t ion. 
Once again we f ind ourselves drawn to a "post-heroic" scenario. In a 
broadly stable state (as opposed to the conditions addressed by 
Machiavelli, and those "addressed" by i n Albanian citizens in mid-1997) 
practical citizenship demands a balance of both community action and 
a tolerance of diversity, derived f rom a similar ideological balance 
between altruism and pragmatism. These at least should be the terms 
of debate for polit ical direction. 
Points which Rawls himself has later acknowledged (Rawls, 1985, pp. 223-51). 
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Compassionate government is on the one hand a necessary evil (for the 
strong who may someday be weak) and on the other a force for good 
(for the weak who seek to reduce their vulnerability).258 what is of 
overwhelming importance is that humans and human society can 
achieve consciousness (i.e. the concept of "nation" - and therefore a 
national or public interest - is not as wholly fatuous as i t might seem). 
There are l imi t s to the force of the collective, "herd" instinct . The 
"people" are a collection of individual choice-makers. In the absence of 
Brave New World cloning, i t is always possible to sub-divide people. 
Civilisation is about f inding the level of sub-division that allows 
judgements to be made that give f u l l credit both to the power of the 
team and the unique significance of the individual. This is not the law 
of nature as either Hobbes or Rousseau perceived i t , but i t is much 
more along the lines of contemporary thinkers such as Ridley.259 
Grand designs i n the name of "the people" have been responsible for 
some of the greatest atrocities i n human history - above all i n the 
twentieth century. But planning our betterment is essential to our 
existence as moral beings, for the very reason that we are not simply 
animals, apparently sophisticated but essentially similar descendants 
of the prehistoric "life" found in the deepest depths of our oceans (and 
also on Mars...). We can be self-aware; we can help how we feel. As 
Plato suggested, only the person who examines h im or her self, why 
they feel as they do, only then can that person be honest w i th 
themselves and wi th other people, and have the potential to be a truly 
good person, i n an enlightened (as opposed to purely functional) 
sense.260 We must therefore demand of our right-thinking just society 
a break w i t h the law of nature, that of survival of the f i t test . A decent, 
jus t , civilised society is based around not only rights but also duties. 
Duty to one's parents, duty as adults to the young, the sick, the old, 
the weak, duty to those who help, and duty to those who hinder and 
even harm (i.e. rehabilitation rather than retribution is a hallmark of a 
caring society). 
Without wanting to extend this into a discussion of the merits and otherwise of affirmative action it should be 
possible to start thinking about justice in terms of the analogy between the "soul" of the individual, and what these 
"souls" have in common that can be said to constitute the "soul" of a state, and whether or not the human soul is a 
product of neurone activity or a mythical ether is hardly the point when it comes down to practical citizenship. 
See Ridley, 1996. 
This is of course the theme of much of the Republic (but see, for example, Ch. XII on "Happiness and 
Unhappiness", in Plato, 1961). 
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Hume did not consider i t necessary to have a great plan, a vision, and 
an "end", to jus t i fy the means. We are not gods, but i n recognising the 
flawed but improvable beings that we are, is i t not the means that 
j u s t i f y the end, i n the sense that they are one and the same? I t is 
somehow fatuous to ask whether something of this type was a good 
th ing " i n the end". The question presupposes an end for which there is 
no clear evidence. This sort of analysis is one that lacks awareness of 
the cycles that are part of nature and therefore, since man is part of 
nature, of human history also. 
Hume's historical-empirical analysis addressed this common mistake 
directly: experience showed that men could expect to have duties 
imposed on them by the state i n order to guarantee the reciprocal 
system of rights that promoted peaceful co-existence and security. 
He did not deny there could be ambiguities, simply that i t was to be 
understood that solutions were rarely to be clinical, so changes 
should err on the side of caution since dramatic change created 
circumstances of instabi l i ty that i t is the point and duty of the 
government to avoid. The citizen can expect rights, and he can 
expect duties, w i t h a broadly civil aim. The state can expect and 
enforce obedience, so long as i t can carry the opinion of the 
significant part of the citizenry that it 's aims and methods are 
pursuant to the goal of the civil society. 
Are human rights and natural rights the same things? 
As already mentioned, Wittgenstein adjudged the meaning of a word to 
be i ts use, and as normally understood justice is a party to the debate 
over rights.261 
The ideal of the just government, i n terms of a government wi th a 
sense of public duty as opposed to self-aggrandisement (e.g. tyranny, 
oligarchy, democracy i n the Greek sense), is to make all the people 
happy all of the t ime. In recognising this to be an impossible ideal, we 
confront two crucial questions. Firstly, how to make as many as happy 
as possible, and secondly, given that this leaves others out i n the cold, 
how much should we temper our pursuit of this goal by concern for 
those who may not benefit f rom it? Would Tiananmen Square have led 
to c iv i l war? Were the controversial actions of the Chinese leaders at 
that t ime i n fact those of good men, good citizens, good leaders? In 
Platonic terms, and i n Humean ones, a good case can be made for this 
claim. I f so then better that a few hundred "antisocial" dissidents 
should die than mil l ions of ordinary citizens. Compassion i n all things: 
but we must have priorit ies. 
It may even be possible to establish a constructive debate out of a conceptual distinction between rights (as 
civil entities) and interests (as a natural feature of all living things). In terms of sensible policies on such divisive 
issues as abortion this can help in making the most balanced judgements possible. 
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For Hume there are no such things as natural rights; there is only 
nature. Nature creates, in mankind and elsewhere in the interactive 
world, cycles and rhythms which pattern out existence. There is a 
natural impulse to create systems, bu t there is an impulse to destroy 
systems also. The concept of "rights" is a part of both of these 
impulses, and as such can be a force for creation or destruction 
depending on their specific application, which is an entirely human 
def ini t ion. So human rights are vi ta l to Hume i n the scheme of the 
bui ld ing of the civil society, but once again, they are only of nature in 
that they come f rom man - and nothing more. 
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Conuention vs. natural phenomenon 
The idea that pragmatism is i n a sense the most important element in 
healthy idealism forms the basis of a k ind of uti l i tarianism. This is a 
theory of ut i l i tar ianism based aroimd healthy scepticism, tolerance and 
compassion. I f social cohesion cannot be maintained even after a 
relative level of stability has been enforced (e.g. in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
since 1996), then the humanitarian path may indeed be to 
acknowledge this, and arrange for as amicable a break-down as 
possible. 
Thrasymachus' "justice" is a rationalisation of the survival of the 
strong at the disadvantage of the weak.262 The empirical observation 
of the not ion of survival of the f i t tes t has been wi th us at least since 
Darwin.263 The Nazis celebrated power as the law of nature as 
demonstrated by the evolution of the animal kingdom.264 i t is not hard 
to translate this into terms of human society, and provide evidence of 
lawmakers making laws to attempt to protect or further their own 
interests.265 The key question is whether one can distinguish this 
empirical observation f rom a moral one. Is the stronger man the one 
who crushes the weak, or the one who helps and protects them?266 
Why this concern for the underdog? Nature is a savage garden, after 
all . But we are not trapped i n i t . We are not obliged to accept that 
might is right. There are two reasons why the strong should recognise 
their position as one of right, duty and privilege to protect the weaker. 
Firstly because i t breaks w i t h the barbarism of evolution. In a sense, 
the man who shows compassion has evolved. In Machiavellian terms, 
i t may very well be the case that i t is better to be feared than loved i f 
respect is at stake even Machiavelli is clear that i t would be even better 
i f the ruler was a nice guy, both loved and respected (a la Mandela). 
When a young person gives up a seat for an older person, when a man 
opens the door for a woman267^ these are acts of social convention. 
Mostly they are followed (if they are) because they are "the done thing". 
See Plato, 1993, Ch. I. 
See especially Ridley, 1996, for a fascinating analysis of the extension of this into a discussion of the "selfish 
gene" - that all concern for others (or in Hume's terms, "Morality") that we consider "natural" is in fact motivated 
by, if not directly self- then certainly genetic preservation. 
As such it was easy for the Nazis to use the arguments of Heiddeger and Nietzsche to support their prejudices 
(See Hitler, 1974). 
The Reform Acts in Great Britain; for example, the popular momentum towards which had grown during 
Hume's time and started to come to fruition shortly after his death. Similarly the repeal of the Com Laws that 
were so controversial before, during and after Hume's time, that was a result of the machinations of merchants 
who had joined together in 1839 to form the Anti-Corn Law League and appealed successfully in the 1840s to 
workers and farmers to unify against the landlords who supported their continuance (see Davies, 1996). 
See Buchanan, 1975 for a further discussion of public choice theories. 
Or whatever, e.g. in central Europe the custom is reversed: the man should precede the woman through a door, 
in case there is a brawl going on the other side, and leave the room last, in case a glass, bottle, chair etc is thrown 
in their direction as they leave (!) - the point being that such conventions are social mores not fundamental rights 
or obligations. 
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But their origin is i n the grace of put t ing oneself at the service of 
another, not because they are stronger than you and can bestow 
favours upon you, but precisely the reverse; because i t is i n your power 
to help them, and you choose to do so. The essential idea behind 
"conventions", the basis to all civilisations, is that there is a right way 
to do things (i.e. this is a natural human instinct; not everything is 
governed by the laws of chaos).268 
Secondly there is a more pragmatic reason: the strong do not remain 
the strongest forever and they might be grateful for the perpetuation of 
a culture of compassion when they i n tu rn become vulnerable. 
We are defined by our conflicts. I t is not when we acquiesce, when we 
please others, when we are "nice" that we encounter ourselves. When 
we take a stand, we do so because we wi l l not accept a particular 
destiny. I t is these moments that reveal our strength and integrity; 
our spirit , or lack of i t . 269 
This may be an argument between individuals, even friends, or i t may 
be between polarised representatives of something greater. So i t is 
w i t h the nation-state. In t ime of conflict and circumstances of 
challenge groups of people bond tighter than ever before, or they fall 
apart. These then are equally the defining moments of the corporate 
body. 
See Lecomber, 1992, for more analysis of how in fact laws of "antichaos", or order, can exist in the most 
unlikely of circumstances. 
An Ingushetian warrior tradition represents this idea. When confronted by insurmountable odds, the Ingush 
does not surrender, nor does he take his own life. Instead he carefully and deliberately takes off his cloak, and 
with the dignity of a priest administering last rites, spreads it across the ground. This damned man will literally 
take his last stand on this grounded cloak that is symbolic of his defiance, of his unbroken will. He will die 
defending this otherwise ordinary patch of ground. As freedom is in the mind not the body, he chooses to die like 
a man rather than be slaughtered in the animal-panic of the hunt or the pathetic desperation of the beggar. He 
retains his freedom, his dignity, his manhood - and, it is supposed, his identity. 
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Freedom 
With the l imi ted collectivism and communications (especially amongst 
the masses) of Hume's t ime, few major sources of power existed beyond 
the state religion and the state itself. Now of course w i t h multifarious 
inst i tut ions and social movements to challenge the "traditional" power 
bases we can make much more sense of Paine's "non-political" civi l 
society. These would include churches, universities, trade unions, 
green, feminist and other single-issue organisations. What de 
Tocqueville described as "the habit of association" was in Hume's mind 
the clear motivat ing factor between all himian society from the very 
beginning. In today's climate of atomising and enervating market 
forces Hume would have recognised a challenge to the other 
components of c iv i l society that threatens the balance he values so 
highly just as surely as either an overactive, over-intrusive state or the 
momentum of a revolutionary demagogue. I suggest that f rom what we 
know of Hume that this would have been his chosen path had his 
society been ours. 
This is surely a healthy wariness of the arrogance of applying 
scientific method to that which clearly defies it except i n the most 
specific of cases and i n the most general of ways. The inconsistency 
of nature is a beaut iful , dangerous thing. Beautiful , because diversity 
is part of the journey into the unknown that life is for all of us. 
Dangerous, because of man's desire to understand and master it 
through clumsy simplif icat ion. Such simple thought is at the heart of 
racism, nationalism, sexism, and sui generis almost every other "-
ism". Hume acknowledged that to avoid insanity and get anything 
done, as ordinary people we must pretend that we know things that 
we cannot. However it would be the greatest crime against ourselves 
and against our fellows if we were to t ry to bui ld a theory of 
everything on our crass assumptions. 
Any totalising plan is necessarily wrong. This was not strictly the 
lesson of the Enlightenment, but it is certainly the theme of Hume's 
work. Goodness in government as i n life demands humil i ty , 
translated in practice as principled pragmatism. This can be 
contrasted not only w i t h examples f rom Hume's knowledge of human 
history, bu t f rom history subsequent to his death. No century 
demonstrates better than our own, wi th its technological and 
population explosions, be it i n Germany under the Nazis, Stalinism in 
Russia, Cambodia under Pol Pot, or Iraq under Saddam, that political 
evil is the destruction of civilized stabil i ty, the devastation of the 
individual , even as those individuals may themselves aid and abet 
that ei;ii.270 of course Hume was a patrician, but because he loved 
people not because he had contempt for them. As Popper noted, i t 
' For a stimulating discussion of empirical evidence to this effect see Goldhagen, 1996. 
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may be presumptuous at times to ta lk about what x really needs (as 
opposed to what x says he wants), but whilst we are wary of 
authori tar ianism, i t is clearly false to say that I or anyone else is 
invariably r ight in judging one's best interest.27i Usually such 
judgments cannot be made wi thout hindsight anyway. We make 
mistakes. A crucial part of personal freedom is in learning f rom 
them. 
Greater awareness of the fragi l i ty of many of our assumptions about 
poli t ical and other "truths" is a good thing. This should not be 
treated as a call to revolution. Clearly such a th ing was far f rom 
Hume's mind . It is better to see that what has gone can usually be 
refined, and what has come should be treated wi th positive 
scepticism. This attitude, fundamental to Hume's work, applies 
poli t ically as well as metaphysically.272 There is no right or wrong 
fo rm of government. 
Democracy possesses no moral superiority over monarchy or oligarchy. 
A greater awareness of what we mean when we talk of contract allows 
us to th ink not of a bleak and static historical event, but of an onward 
contractual relationship. Society and the state, i f they are to survive as 
such, should be as convenient and advantageous to as many of their 
constituents as possible. In this way both the Contract of Society and 
the Contract of Government are based around consent. "Consent" may 
be as hazy at the edges as the very not ion of "society" itself (and 
equally, i t cannot be reduced to purely logical analysis, despite its 
importance to the way we live our lives). But i ts effects are very real, 
as are the effects of i ts breakdown. 
Hence there are tangibly right or wrong ways to govern. I n the context 
of a "free" state i n Hume's terms c iv i l society is sustainable when 
those who rule are aware that man is by nature simultaneously egoist 
and socialist, and real consent, or i n Hume's terms the formulation of 
"opinion", is an individual and ongoing activity.2^3 
Popper, 1966, Chapter VII. 
As well it should; there are always gaps and leaps of faith in any theory beyond Descartes First Meditation 
(in Descartes, 1955). 
Hence the obligation for the citizen qua citizen to realise an active interest in the polis; cf. Aristotle on the 
good man and the good citizen (The Politics, Bk. Ill , Chapter IV). 
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Final thoughts 
To accept that legitimacy is i n the eye of the beholder is dangerous. It 
requires good and strong leadership to maintain a sufficiently broad 
perspective. The power of common sense is blighted by the f ra i l ty of 
human nature. Too of ten we forget the "higher" rationality of 
mutual i ty , and descend to our base, "frivolous" temptations. This is 
why i n a state's best moments i t appeals simultaneously to pragmatic 
self-interest and a sense of commimity . Legitimate government is 
damage l imi ta t ion . "Good" or "just" government seeks to stem and 
guide rather than cure the selfish inclinations of man: 
"If we are too eager for perfection, we shall only perpetuate confusion" 
The goal of the good public servant or citizen is the harmonious 
funct ioning of society to the greatest possible extent, and whichever 
fo rm of government best creates such an environment is the one worth 
defending. Freedom and Justice are moral Ideals are best approached 
f rom a perspective of management rather than fu l l instalment. A. W. 
Sparkes compares the static property of having a high IQ and the act of 
actually l iv ing intell igently, distinguishing the latter as: 
"a continual activity in the face of opposing tendencies' 275 
Similarly, the conceptual mechanism of a Contract of Government 
creates the possibility of inst i tut ional arrangements like a national 
health service that are not perceived to impinge excessively upon 
private concerns (even i f wastefulness i n such a service is condemned). 
These types of arrangements attract the public loyalty that fosters a 
sense of nationhood. In this way there is a less schizophrenic 
demarcation for the man-citizen between his individual and social 
interest. Any functional theory of government as a contractually-
driven mechanism must work towards this symbiosis between public 
and private aims. A society that follows Hayek down the path to 
f imdamental rights to non-intervention is one that is on a path to jo in 
Nietzsche and the Nazis. 
""Mackie, 1980,p. I l l 
Sparkes, 1994, p. 152 i. 3. 
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Nagel proposes a state that is present and powerful, but minimal in i ts 
intrusion into the lives of i ts constituents, allowing a balance between 
the "agent-neutral" values that others i n society, and the "agent-
relative" values that do not.276 One might add that variations in these 
values and their impact upon others is a dynamic that is natural to the 
way a society changes, and the important th ing is that the balance is 
maintained for the greater good (i.e. peace and security are 
maintained). At this point we would be basically restating a philosophy 
of life and government that Hume eloquently constructed some 260 
years previously. This contemporary relevance may explain why, after 
being for some t ime regcirded as a cynic w i t h l i t t le to offer i n positive 
terms (he even observed that he would "not live to see justice done to 
my work"),277 he is now widely considered one of the greatest 
philosophers produced by this or any other country. 
I t is a moot point whether Hume believed i n the val idi ty of consent and 
contract i n explaining government. Personally Hume was a great 
challenger of the arguments that relied on these notions at the time of 
his wr i t ing . However i n retrospect we may well consider that his 
arguments do not destroy the need for these ideas as put them on a 
rather soimder, empirically based footing. Hume as an historian was a 
great revisionist, and the same might be said for much of his political 
and philosophical th inking . The ideas of the past and present were 
refined, and we have been left thoughts and most importantly ways of 
th ink ing that can enlighten our present too and are likely to remain 
relevant to our future . Uncertainty about authority leads to insecurity 
i n the minds and actions of individuals, and a breakdown of civil 
society. Regular, acceptable inst i tut ions that reinforce the sometimes 
shaky natural inst inct towards the benefits of society and good social 
behaviour are essential for most men. Wars are fought over the 
establishment of such inst i tut ions and once they are achieved, Hume's 
point is that they should not be given up l ight ly. The loss, as opposed 
to the refinement, of the conventions of these inst i tut ions is a 
dangerous game, since we lose a part of the fabric that binds our 
societies. When this happens we are i n danger of losing that civil 
freedom that allows us to reflect and grow as people, to be replaced by 
the paradoxical freedom of chaos, the freedom to lose everything. 
Hume's theory of just ice is a theory of property. This may appear 
l imi t ing , bu t i t is not. Firstly, because Hume's defini t ion of property 
is not l imited to material possessions, but also to the minds and 
bodies of individual citizens. It must also be viewed in the context of 
his general moral dichotomy. Property is ar t i f ic ia l . Justice is 
a r t i f ic ia l . Acts of thef t , when they break both types of morality (e.g. 
benevolence and respect for property) are unjus t and wrong. Hume 
Nagel, 1991, p. 86. 
^" In Noxon, 1976. 
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felt, rightly, that living along these lines must be the right way to live, 
and that all else was selfishness and lies. 
Hume frequently alluded to the Aristotelean distinction between being 
a man and being a good man. Civil society is the means for the citizen 
to live well, and unlike Aristotle, the good man and citizen are 
necessarily the same thing in Hume, because society is an expression 
of humanity in itself. Civilisation is a process as much as a 
destination. For Hume it is focussed around expressions of humanity 
in the arts and the sciences, certainty derived from rule of law, and 
trade. Self-interest drives all men. As such, the enlightened citizen 
must realise that speculative factional bias must be avoided and that 
the public interest is their real, private interest as well.278 
How has Hume been received over the years? During his life it was 
only Hume's Histories, and to a lesser extent the Political Discourses, 
that established him as a significant writer in public debate. Indeed, at 
a time when historical interpretation was still the main battleground 
for the debates of the present, his accumulated Historu of England 
became the seminal volume for decades after his death. However, the 
publicity it achieved entered him into the fray in which all participants 
were assumed to belong to one of two polarities, namely Whig and 
Tory. Hume's underlying philosophy in this work was obscured by its 
contemporary interpretation, perhaps inevitably, as the work of a 
polemicist. As a consequence of his leanings toward enlightened 
monarchy279 and stability in general, and the fact that the first part of 
his History to be published was that of the ascendancy of the House of 
Stuart led to his being labelled unfairly as a Tory apologist.28o whils t 
remaining a significant force in epistemology, particularly alongside 
Berkeley and Locke, in terms of poiiticol philosophy Hume's star fell 
for a long period after his History was superseded in the public 
f irmament by T. B. Macaulay's own Historu. In the period until the 
Second World War little attention was paid to the significance of Hume 
as a political thinker. 
Ernest Barker drew attention to Hume as a thinker of stature in the 
political arena in 1947,28i but the perspective did not significantly 
alter until momentum began to build behind something of a Hume 
revision that exploded in the 1970s. The cause of this change was the 
examination by Duncan Forbes and J . G. A. Pocock of the impact of 
Hume's thinking on the Founding Fathers of the Constitution of the 
Hume, 1994, pp. 33-9. 
Such as that of France, although of course it would have been interesting to have observed how Hume 
would have dealt with the fact that such enlightenment failed to prevent the French Revolution not long after 
his death, (see, for example, Hume, 1994, pp. 1-3, 186-201, 58-77). 
Hume was proud of relating that the Tories had been upset by his handling of the period from the death of 
Charles I to the 1688 Revolution (See Chapter 1 of this Thesis, pp. 11-12). 
See Barker, 1947. However this was largely restricted to providing a foil to the Social Contractarians. 
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United States. This exploration led them to lead the re-examination of 
the works of this hitherto relatively low-profile "North Briton" .282 By 
looking at Hume's works i n the context of Florentine Renaissance 
poli t ics - above all, the existence of mili t ias, armed, reactionary 
citizens, and influential but transient wealth - one can apply 
fascinating analysis on civic ethics. I n a similar way one might today 
assess the political and economic climate of late twentieth centiary 
Russia. In this context Hume was, curiously, reinvented as a 
proponent of republicanism. 
Interest i n the Scottish Enlightenment's impact upon the Founding 
Fathers283 has led naturally to an enhanced standing for Hume, and the 
1970s and 80s interest i n the writ ings of his doctor and friend, Adam 
Smith , have i n particular opened up new interpretations of the 
Humean vision of justice. I t was not un t i l this t ime, strangely, that 
Hume came to be seen as offering a framework for discussion as 
something other than yet another natural law theorist. Our 
understanding of Smith's poli t ical thought on jurisprudence is greatly 
augmented by Hume's methodology of causation and knowledge i n 
general, and justice i n particular. Natural law was at the t ime of his 
wr i t ing fundamental to the systematic framework for students of 
jurisprudence i n eighteenth century Edinburgh. By rejecting natural 
law as an explanation of ethics, Hume was setting himself up as a 
pioneer of psychology, empirical history, and jurisprudence. 
His belief in progress through balancing moral impulse wi th rational 
reciprocation is applicable for the state as for the individual , i n the 
manner of Plato's alignment of the t r ipart i te state and the tr ipart i te 
mind in his Kepubhc.284 As Hi l l observes: 
"just as the threat of social disorder provides the antagonistic parties of subjectivist 
contract theory with a reason to seek agreement, so the inner conflict occasioned by 
the c l a s h of subjective and impersonal concerns provides each person with a 
powerful incentive to find a reasonable accommodation between these competing 
claims''285 
We obviously should look to advance the quality of those assumptions 
through which we live our lives and affect those of others. For that 
we must f i r s t know that inevitably to some degree they are false. 
Then we must look for inspirat ion f rom writers such as Hume to 
See in particular Forbes, 1975, and Pocock, 1975. Ironically Forbes in particular pursued the idea of Hume 
as a Whig (albeit a more scientific, neo-Whig)! 
Madison especially - see Freedland, 1998. 
Especially Chapters 11 and 12 (Plato, 1993). 
Hill, 1995, p. 114. 
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encourage us i n our belief that progress, towards enlightenment but 
never arriving, is possible.286 
David Hume was a man w i t h lofty intellectual ambitions. He also 
possessed great humi l i ty , displayed in his personal relationships, by 
his caution i n the boldness of his claims and his tolerance of others. 
He displayed great love not of the vague concept of humani ty but of 
the people w i t h who he engaged. Gibbon, his fr iend and rival, 
commented to Holroyd: 
"You tell me a long list of dukes , lords, and chieftains of renown to whom you are 
introduced; were I with you. I should prefer one David to them all . When you are at 
E d i n b u r g h I hope you will not fail to visit the sty of that fattest of E p i c u r u s ' hogs 
and inform yourself whether there remains no hope of its recovering the use of its 
right paw. "287 
I t was upon these experiences and these characteristics that Hume 
sought to create a t ru ly sympathetic and human intellectual 
mechanism for peace through balance. 
There is no one-off contract, either of society or government. But that 
is far f rom the essential nature of contract. Dynamism, i n our 
commitments as i n everything else, is the stuff of l i fe . Hume's case is 
that not only is poli t ical obligation (more obviously) art i f icial , but so is 
what underlies i t ; namely, "justice" itself. Consent is therefore 
essential to our poli t ical relationships i n Hume's view. 
The need for consent is a feature that continues even in the most 
"forceful" of states. Much is made of the "reasonability" of the 
common people. This is w i t h good reason, as Barrington Moore Jr. 
observes in his excellent Social Origins of Dictatorship and 
Democracy: 
"Peasants do not revolt a s long as they accept the privileges of the aristocracy and 
their own obligations to them as legitimate. Why the peasants accept them remains 
as m u c h as a problem as ever ... Folk conceptions of just ice ... do have a rational and 
realistic basis; and arrangements that depart from this basis are likely to need 
deception and force the more they do deparf'^ss 
Viewing the evidence empirically, as Hume would, we can see good 
jus t i f ica t ion for these sentiments. For example the 16^^ Century 
Baurenkrieg (1524-1525) peasant revolt was easily crushed in Bavaria 
because of the lack of class cohesion. However the 20^^ Century 
provides examples of the effectiveness of more consolidated class 
cohesion, like the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. Consent i n such 
Interestingly this was the line taken by the existentialists when in their more positive moments they sought 
for a human rather than divine meaning for life, however hard it may be to imagine a high degree of personal 
compatibility between Hume and, for example, Sartre or Heidegger. 
^" From Gibbon's Miscellaneous Works, Vol. 11, quoted in Braham, 1987, p. 49. 
Moore Jr., 1966, pp. 470-471. 
I l l 
circumstances does tend to be almost entirely negative: a desire to 
remove the status quo, which says nothing of their acquiescence to the 
subsequent system of government: 
"Twentieth century peasant revolutions have had their mass support among the 
peasants, who have then been the principal victims of modernization put through by 
communist governments"289 
Ultimately the limits of Hume's pohtical thought are in his 
championing of property rights as the key to stability and humanist 
justice. As far as he goes, he is quite right. But we would in our 
modem times consider this a somewhat reactionary defence of "special 
interests". As Ben Rogers notes: 
"There is a Russian joke that socialism marks the phase of historical transition from 
capitalism to capitalism...Yet it would be sad if the ideal of a civil society became just 
another route back to the free market."290 
We must be careful not to judge Hume unfairly. This limitation to 
Hume's political prescription is a product of his time. In the heady 
days of the Enlightenment, the debate raged between theocratic 
feudalism dominated by robber barons and the brave new world of 
equality imder law, advancement of "the common man" through access 
to education, and the justice of the market. Communism was not a 
concept yet tmder discussion, and this was as far as socialism could be 
said to have arrived. So it makes little sense to be surprised that such 
a man and thinker, who prized balance so highly, should not be a direct 
proponent of a "third way" between socialism and capitalism. 
Of course, in the light of mere reason and human experience, 
immortality cannot be proved, and grace cannot be definitively 
known. Hume knows this, but equally he accepts the possibihty of 
epiphany, as is typical with his double-edged scepticism. One of the 
great attractions of Hume is that for all his healthy pragmatism and 
scepticism, one senses that at heart he recognises the passion of 
belief. He was a first rate academic, but more than that, he was a 
truly human philosopher, and both he and his work - inseparable, I 
contend - deserve to be considered as such. As Braham states the 
case: 
"He is perhaps the greatest of all British philosophers if for no other reason than 
that he is undoubtedly the least committed to system. His acute mind was ever 
looking ahead. He closed no issue. He finally solved no problem, but he has raised 
enough to keep many generations of thinkers very busy."29i 
Moore Jr., p. 428. 
^'"Rogers, 1994, p. 43. 
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